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INTROOOCTION

Polish foreign aff aira have been a failure throughout n..ach of modern
and contemporary history because Poland has not been in a position to con
As a result of the high degree of

duct an independent foreign policy.

dominance in all facets of Eastern European affairs by the u. s. s. R.
after World War II, Poles again have been lcept from attaining complete
independence.

Thia has led sane observers to conclude that Poland has

become completely insignificant within international diplomacy since
1945.
The failure of Polish diplomacy is aptly illustrated in the history
of Poland's diplomatic activities in the United Nations, the main con
cern of this paper.

Chapter I reviews the situation in Poland during and

immediately following World War II.

The war had left Poland devastated

and completely powerless-politically, socially, economically, and diplo
matically.

The Soviet Union clearly sought to establish a postwar Polish

regime that was sympathetic to the Soviets.
evolved in Poland from 1939

to

The complex situation which

1945 must be carefully scrutinized to fully

comprehend the conditions surrounding the eventual restructuring of the
Polish nation.

The new Polish �rovisional Government of National Unity

was established in mid 1945 as a result of the recorcsnendations of the
Big Three (U. s. A., u. s. s. R., and Great Britain) at the Yalta Con
ference.

The Weatem Powers were unable to control the complicated chain

iii

iv

of political events in Poland after the Yalta decisions.

Provisions of the

Yalta agreements stated that "free and unfettered elections" would be held
as soon as possible.

Amid denunci:ations and accusations from the West,

the Polish elections took place in 1947 and resulted in cOl'llplete victo�
for the pro-Soviet parties.
As the new pro-S:bviet Polish government tried to establish itself o�
the international scene after the var, numerous proble11s developed as
efforts were made to select capable, loyal diplomats to fill her embassies
abroad.

Usually the person selected

to

represent Poland abroad as chief

delegate or ambassador vas a little-trusted, but well-known individual.
This delegate was then assigned deputies who were often incompetent in
foreign affairs, but highly respected in the Communist Party.

The deputies

reported the activities of the embassy back to the Warsaw regime.

Develop

ments as the first Polish delegation to the United Nations came to New York
in 1946 support this diplomatic appointment procedure.

Oscar Lange, a well•

known former American citizen and University of Chicago economics professor,
was named chief Polish delegate.

Lange was undeniably pro-Soviet, as

many of his state�nts distinctly illustrate.

However, he did hold clearly

defined ideas of a Polish state functioning independently of both the
United States and the u. s. s. R.

The record in Chapter II presents the

course of Lange's activities in the United Nations during 1946 and 1947.
Early in 1946 Poland's delegation, under Lange's leadership, made a careful
attempt

to

maintain an independent foreign policy as a non-permanent mem

ber of the United Nation's Security Council.

These efforts, however, ended

with Lange's removal from the United Nations in the fall of 1947.
Juliuaz Katz-Suchy, and avid pro-Soviet �nist, vas naiaed to succeed

v

The replacement of Lange as chief Polish delegate to the United

Lange .

Nations ended any evidence of Polish independence in the Security Council.
In certain periods Poland has been able to acquire more independence
from the

u.

s. s. R. in domestic affairs than any of the other Eastern

European nations.

Polish foreign relations , however, have remained

ly dominated by the Soviet Union , except for brief periods of time

large-

around

l

Stalin's death in the early 1950's and the Polish revolution in 1956.

With

the increase of Polish domestic.independence muc� speculation has been
made concerning the possibilities of alterations in Polish foreign affairs.
In its concluding chapter this paper discusses some of the speculation.
In this speculation

one

finds Poland's hope for achieving a chance to trans-

form her diplomatic failure into a new opportunity for some achievement.
The major P<>rUon of the research for this paper was conducted at the
University of Illinois.

Since World War II there has been an abundance of

material on Poland published, much of it highly sentimental toward the
non-Cbmmunists.

Numerous books, monographs, and articles can be found , but

these must be handled with the utmost apprehension.

For this study the

records of the United Nations (Official Records .2f � Genera l Assembly,
1946-; Security Council-Official Records, 1946--; and Yearbook .2!!!:!!
United

Nations,

12!2--> were the major sources of evidence.

Chapters I and III are not meant to be all-inclusive accounts of prewar Poland and affairs after 1948, .prepared to answer every question which
might arise.
from

numerous

These chapters are merely accumulations of

necessary

information,

sources , that help provide a smooth entry into and exit from

the time period 1946-1947 in Polish foreign affairs.

The material in

Chapter IV, stressing the current fluidity in Polish internal and external affairs, uses conclusions from many articles, aside from my

own

opinions .

CHAPTER'!

POLAND IN WORLD WAR II
AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE POLISH QUESTION, 1939-1948
Poland emerged from World War II devastated.

Her population had

been fragmented, most of her industry destroyed, her agricultural fields
ravaged, and many of her cities, including her capital, Warsaw, almost
I

entirely destroyed.

The Polish populace was split intb numerous

political factions either supporting or opposing Soviet influence in
varying degrees.
Long before the hostilities had ceased in Europe, it became evident
that the peace settlement was not going to find an easy solution to
Poland's numerous problems.

General principles to be followed in the

re-establishment of a Polish government were tentatively agreed upon and
laid down by Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, United States President
Franklin o. Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at
the Yalta Conference in February, 1945.

In the first meetings it became

clear that the u. s. s. R. planned to establish a Communist regime
in Poland, disregarding any promises made at Yalta in February, 1945.
The Soviets intended to reconstruct all of Eastern Europe to accommodate their own security system.

"Allied cooperation became at

most a formality, with Soviet armed forces, Soviet diplomats, and
local Communists cooperating closely to ensure the establishment of
Communist controlled regimes."

1

1

Leland M. Good.rich and Anne P. Simmons, The United Nations and the
Maintenance£! International Peace � Security (Washington, D. c7 Th;
Brooklings Institution, 1955), P• 36.
1

2

The dismal conditions in Poland were the result of many complex
and long range developments.

The political situation in the country

from 1939 to 1945 had been extremely chaotic and tragic.

Without a

declaration of war German troops had advanced into Poland from the
.west, south, and north on September 1, 1939.
declared war on Germany two days later�
but were easily overpowered
German army.

France and Great Britain

The Polish forces resisted

by the technically and numerically superior

Within two weeks the Germans had occupied Brest and

Bialystok; they had surrounded Warsaw and were marching toward Lwow.
The Red Army attacked Poland from the east on September-17,1939, in
accord with the Nazi-Soviet agreement$ of August 23 and 28.

The Soviet

troops met little resistance as they·sought a portion of eastern Poland,
populated

by Ukrainians and Belorussians.2

The Polish government of President Ignacy Moscicki and the commander
of the army, Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly, had left Warsaw on September
6 and 7 and a few days later entered Rumania.

On September 27 the

Polish capital, under siege from ground and air attacks, capitulated
after a valiant resistance effort.

Most of the open Polish resistance

was terminated when the troops of General Franciszek Kleeberg surrended
near Kock, southeast of Warsaw on October 5, 1939.

3

2
For more information on Polish-Soviet and Polish-German relations
before the war see:
Bohdan Basil Budurowycz, Polish-Soviet Relations,
1932-1939 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1963); Diplomat in
Beri'in, 1933-1939, Papers and Memoirs of Jozef Lipski, Ambassador-to
Poland, ed. wacTaw Jedrzejewlcz (New York:
Columbia University Press,
1968); and Russo-Polish Relations, ed. Serge Konovalov (London:
The
Cresset Press, 1945).
3
Feliks Gross, "The Fate of Poland," Journal of Central European
Affairs, VIII (October, 1948), PP• 243-245.
�

.)

On September 28,

1939,

the Germans and the Soviets established

a new boundary defining the German and Soviet spheres of interest.
The agreement, signed in Moscow by Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet Foreign
Minister, and Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Minister of Foreign Affairs,
fixed a Soviet-German border along the San and Bug rivers, then westward
to Bialystok.

Gdynia , Bydgoszcz, Poznan, Katowice, Lodz and Plock

a part of the Ger11an Reich.

became

The remainder of the German occupied territory

was set up in four districts as a General-Government.

The four districts

were Warsaw, Lublin, Radom and Cracow, where the governor-general Hans
Frank resided.

4

Thousands of Jews were deported from Germany into the GeneralGovernment and became forced laborers or prisoners along with many
Poles from the newly-annexed regions.

Thousands of Germans were settled

by the Reich.in the former Polish western territory.

The Poles who re-

mained in the annexed areas were subjected to a vigorous Germanization
program.

The General-Government was, of course, completely administered

by Germans.

All educational institutions were either taken over by the

Germans or closed.

Polish literature and history was prohibited.

In-

human and savage treatment of the Poles began during the initial days
of

the

German occupation with mass

executions and ruthless persecution

in the numerous concentration camps.

5

4

Louis Gottschalk and Donald Lach , � Transformation � Modern
Europe (New York: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1954), pp. 856-857.
5

See: Tadeusz Cyprian, Nazi Rule in Poland, trans. Edward Rathert
(Warsaw: Polonia Publishing 'iiOU'Se , 196Tr; and William F. Gingerich,
The German Administration of the General Government of Poland, 1939-1941
(Washington, o. c., 1949) .- -

4

Portions of the Polish territory occupied by the Soviets were
integrated into the Soviet Ukraine and Belorussia.
area, including Vilnius, was annexed

to

The remaining

Lithuania which became a re-

public of the Union of Soviet-Socialist Republics on August 3, 1940.
The Soviets deported many Poles to Siberia and Central Asia.

Even

though the procedure was largely a random matter, the deportations
were carried out under the pretense that these persons were political
activists or radical members of the former Polish administration.
Later, in 1941 when the German troops began to inove into the u. s. s. R.,
Galicia was annexed to the General-Government.

Other former Polish

provinces became parts of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and
Reichskomm issariat Ost.

The Poles in these areas now saw Soviet

brutality replaced by Nazi barbarism.6
President Moscicki had left Poland for Rumania and was interned
there.

Wladyslaw Raczkiewicz, as Moscicki's successor, established the

Polish government-in-exile in Paris and, after the collapse of France,
moved to LOndon.

A Polish army of about

85,�00

men was organized out

of Polish wartime refugees and other persons of Polish descent already
abroad.

General Wladyslaw Sikorski was designated comm ander-in-chief

of the new Polish army.

As part of the Allied forces,

the Polish

troops made an impressive record for themselves, in battles throughout
World War II.

Sikorski also became Prime Minister of the Polish govern-

ment-in-exile which was more representative of all the Polish political

7

parties than the prewar Polish government.

6Gottchalk and Lach, .22• .£!!•• PP•

7

857-858.

James F. Morrison, � Polish People's Republic (Baltimore&
Johns Hopkins Press, 1968) , pp.

3-28.

The

5
A Polish underground resistance movement began to crystallize
within Poland promptly after the German invasion in 1939.8

The "Victory

of Poland Service0 was initiated on September 27, 1939; this was later
called the "Union for Armed Struggle" (January, 1940).

The Polish

government-in-exile designated a representative inside Poland in August,
Even though political parties were illegal in Poland under the

1940.

German occupation, subversive activities and sabotage were led by the
"Union for Armed Struggle."
Nazi aggression against the Soviet Union abruptly ended SovietGerman friendship established on August.23, 1939, by the MolotovRibbentrop Pact.

The Soviets began to praise the Western Powers in

order to obtain military assistance.

A Polish-Soviet agreement of

cooperation during the wa.r was reached on July 30, 1941, in London.

9

The agreement called for the creation of a Polish army in the Soviet
Union to be recruited from Polish prisoners of war and from the Poles
who had been deported to Russia during the preceding two years of
Soviet occupation of Poland.

The agreement also canceled all earlier

8

Polish activities during the war are discussed in:
Wladyslaw
Macmillan, 1949); Ann Su Cardwell,
Poland Here-rs the Record-An American View (Ann Arbor, Michigan:
The
Michigan-commi ttee of AmerTCans for PoTaiia', 1945); Jan Karski, Story
of a Secret State (Boston:
Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1944); and Stefan
'R'Oroonski,
Warsaw; � Story .2f the Polish Underground State,
1939-�, trans. F. B. Czarnomski (New York:
Funk and Wagnalls, 1968).
Anders, An Army in Exile (New York:

Fighting

9

For further information on Polish-Soviet relations see:
w. w.
Kulski, "The Lost Opportunity for Russian-Polish Friendship, "Foreign
Affairs,� (July, 1947), pp. 6 77-685; and Documents on Polish-Soviet
Relations, 1939-1945, General Sikorski Historical Institute (LOndon:
Heinemann, �>:--

6

agreements concerning Polish boundary changes between the Germans and·
the Soviets.

10

Poland concluded these agreements in spite of the atrocities

which the Soviets had implemented against the Polish people during the previous two years.

The Polish government-in-exile not only forgot earlier

hardships rut also trusted that the agreements would lead to a new period
of Soviet-Polish cooperation.

11

A Polish army was organized with General Wladyslaw Anders as comm ander
after a Polish-Soviet military agreement was signed on August 14, 1941,
in Moscow.

Prime Minister Sikorski and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin jointly

signed a Polish-Soviet declara�on of friendship on December 5, 1941,
.
12
assigning the Polish military forces to the eastern front.
"At this time Stalin believed that he could sway General Sikorski's
government to follow a pro-Soviet policy.

The very first parleys, however,

showed the Polish government's unwillingness to be subservient to Soviet
policy and, even more, to recognize the Soviet annexation of nearly half
13
of Poland's territory in 1939."

According to Rakowski, even as early

as December, 1941, the Polish pro-Soviet leaders met at Saratov to discuss
formation of the Union of Polish Patriots, a pro-Soviet Polish organization.
This meeting was called to concur with Sikorski's negotiations in Moscow,

10
See Annex II , Document No. 1, p. 129.
11
Manfred Kridl, "Poland and R\.issia in the Past and in the Future,"

Journal .2f Central European Affairs,
12

V

(July, 1945), pp. 148-149.

See Annex I I , Document No. 2, p. 130-131.

13

Tadeusz Rakowski, Foreign Policy 2!, � Communist Regime in PolandTechniques � Functions, .!2.12,-� (New York: Mid-Eu.t"opean Studies Center
of the National Committee for a Free Europe, 1953), P• 26.

7

showing Sikorski that the Russians really did not need his cooperation.
If Sikorski refused to accept the Soviet suggestions, they would organize
a Polish puppet government.

In fact the Union of Polish Patriots was not

made official until March 1 , 1943.

14

From the very outset the Polish and Soviet governments did not work
in harmony.

Early in 1942 it was obvious that relations were growing

more strained.

In March and April, 1942, some of the Polish military

divisions were assigned to the Middle East.
troops had left the Soviet Union.

By

August all of the Polish

Relations between the Polish govern-

ment-in-exile and the Soviet authorities continued to erode during the
remainder of 1942 and early 1943.

The announcement in April, 1943, of

the discovery of mass graves of over 14,000 Polish officers in the Katyn
Forests near Smolensk caused further deterioration in Polish-Soviet
relations.

The Germans charged that the Soviets had conunitted the

massacres in April, 1940, while the Soviets accused the Germans of the
crime.

The Polish government of General Sikorski requested that the

International Red Cross make an investigation of the murders.

Even

though the Red Cross refused to examine the area, which was eventually
investigated by Swiss officials, the Soviet government severed diplomatic
relations with the Polish government in London on April 25, 1943, saying
that the Polish government's attitude toward the Katyn massacres was
15
hostile to the Soviet Union.

14

Ibid., P• 2 7.

15
For further details see:

J.

K. Zawodny, Death

�Story _2! � Katyn Massacre (Notre Dame:
Press, 1962).

!!l .!h!

Forest:

University of Notre Dame

8

The Union of Polish Patriots in the u. s. s. R. now increased their
vigorous progaganda campaign against the Polish government-in-exile in
London.

The Union was preparing to accept the role of the Soviet

recognized Polish government.

The Union attempted to establish in

fluence abroad by publishing a pro-Soviet periodical, Poland, in London.
In the United States the Kosciuszko League was founded and strongly
advocated Polish cooperation with the Soviets through the Union of
Polish Patriots.

One of the leaders of the Kosciuszko League was Oscar

Lange , who was later selected as the postwar Polish ambassador to the
United Nations.

Prominent members of the Union of Polish Patriots were:

Wanda Wasilewsk a., the daughter of a distinguished Polish Socialist and
former Polish government official1 Andrzej Witos, a step-brother of the
former Polish prime minister and Peasant Party leader Wincenty Witos;
Boleslaw Drobner; Stanislaw Skzesjewski; Stanislaw Radkiewicz; Jakub
Berman; Stefan Jedrychowski; Jozef Brubecki; J. Haneman; and E.
Sommerstein.

Rakowski states that the only ones of these even known

to the Polish people were Andrzej Witos and Wanda Wasilewska.

These

two had been specifically included in the Union because of their con

nection with formerly important Polish political families.

The Soviets

felt that these names would sufficiently deceive the Polish people.

16

The spring and summer of 1943 brought about significant alterations
in the plans for a postwar Polish state.

General Sikorski was killed

in an airplane crash near Gibraltar on July 4 , 1943.

16

Rakowski ,

.22• ill• , P.•

27.

This brought about

9

a reorganization of the Polish government in London.

Stanislaw Mikolajczyk,

the leader of the Peasant Party, became the new prime minister.

The new

commander of the Polish army, General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, proceeded
to reform the army which had recently been transferred to Iraq from the
Soviet Union.
The Soviets had organized from the Union of Polish Patriots, a new
representative body for the Polish state, the Polish Liberation Committee,
along with an additional Polish army more on the Soviet model.

The split

between the Soviets and the Polish government in London had made this
necessary if the Soviets wished to have any influence in Poland after the
war.

17
The question of future Polish boundaries had been ignored

up until this time.

by the West

However, the Polish-Soviet rupture brought the border

issue officially to the surface at the Teheran Conference (November 28December 1, 1943).

Franklin o. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph

Stalin discus�ed postwar Polish borders, but no definite decision emerged
from the conference.

Nevertheless, Churchill suggested before the British

House of Commo ns on February 2,

1944, that the so-called "Curzon Line" be

the Polish-Soviet boundary and that Poland be compensated with German
18
territories in the north and west.

17
Gross,
18

22•

cit.,

pp. 249-250.

For further information on the Polish frontier see:

Drzewieniecki, �German-Polish Frontier (Chicago:
Association of America,

1959);

w. M.

Polish Western

Norman J. G. Pounds, Poland B etween

rng

East and West (Princeton, N. J.:
Van Nostrand, 1964};and The Genesis
World
of the Oder Neisse � !!l � Diplomatic Negotiations Our

� g,

eds. Rhode, Gotthold, and Wolfgang Wagner (Stuttgart, Germany:
Brentano-Verlag, 1957).
·

10

Jan s. Jankowski, the Polish government-in-exile's representative
in Poland was chosen deputy premier of the Polish government in London
on April 26, 1944.

Jankowski along with three other London-appointed

ministers constituted the Home Council Ministers. As an advisory body
the Council of National Unity was formed consisting of representatives
of all Polish parties,

except those with leftist views.

The Union for

Armed Struggle and the armed forces of the Polish govepmlent-in-exile
had been reorganized into a single force, the Home Army, under the
conunand of General Stephan Rowecki, as early as February, 1942.
During early 1943 the Soviet Conununists assigned Boleslaw Bierut to
German occupied Poland to begin the reorganization of the Polish
Communist Party,

which had been dissolved for Trotzkyism in 1937.

The Polish Communists formed the Polish Workers•
Partia Robotnicza;

PPR)

in January, 1942.

Gomulka.
May,

Party (Polska

Marceli Nowotko held the post

of secretary-general of the party until his death.
by Pawel Finder until Noyember,

19

He was then succeeded

1943, when Finder was replaced by Wladyslaw

The PPR organized its military forces,

'

the Peoples• Guard,

1942, to rid the homeland of the German invaders.

in

The Home Army

of the Council of National Unity and the Peoples• Guard of the PPR carried
out intensive guerrilla warfare against the Germans from mid 1942.

The

PPR agreed to the Soviet initiative to establish a new government for
Poland.

This effort was realized on January 1,

1944, with Boleslaw

Bierut, a Soviet citizen as the chairman of the National Home Council.
This body was composed of some left wing members of the Socialist Party,

19

Rakowski, .2£• ill•t

P• 28.

11

and some democratic groups; but the new body was extensively dominated
by the Communists. 20

Rakowski states that the National Home Council

(KRN) was "based on non-existent and imaginary groups such as the
'Initiative Committee' and the 'Group of Leftist Syndicalists', neither
known nor supported by the Polish people.n21

The Peoples' Guard was

reorganized under the command of General Michal Zymierski and was renamed
the Peoples' Army.
On July 21, 1944, Soviet and the pro-Soviet Polish military forces
in the u. s. s. R. entered into Polish territories upon the retreat of
the Germans.

By its decree on July 21, 1944, the National Home Council

called into being the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN).
When the Germans were forced to evacuate Lublin, this city in eastern
Poland became the operating base for the PKWN.

On July 22, 1944, the

PKWN declared itself the sole governing body o� Poland and issued statements declaring that the Polish constitution of 1922 was reinstated.
Decrees called for complete Polish-Soviet cooperation in the struggle
against Germany.

The PKWN declared that border problems would be

settled according to ethno-graphic principles.

The new government

announced government control of heavy industry, called for agricultural
reform, and advocated the restoration of democratic rights.

The Peoples'

Army and the Polish army, which had been organized in the Soviet Union,
were united into a single military force. 2 2

20

Rakowski,

21

�., P•

22
Morrison,

21?.• .£!!.,

pp. 27-29.

29.

21?.• �. , p. 42.

12

Wanda Wasilewska, Edward Osobka-Morawski,

The PKWN was composed of:

Andrzej Witos, General Michal Rola Zymierski, General Zygmunt Berling,
Wincenty Rzymowski, Stanislaw Radiewicz, Dr. Boleslaw Drobner, Jozef
Brubecki, Stefan Jedrychowski, Stanislaw Skrzeszewski, J . Haneman, E.
Sommerstein, s. Kptek-Agruszewski, and J . Czechowski.

All of the

members had arrived in Lublin from Moscow and at least ten of the

:

committee's members had also belonged to the Union Qf Polish Patriots •

23

.

Twice in 1944, (October and November)Prirne Minister Mikolajczyk
of the Polish government-in-exile journeyed to Moscow to negotiate
with Stalin concerning the problem of the two Polish governments.
However,. agreement could not be reached concerning postwar Polish
boundaries and the establishment of a coalition Polish government
between the Soviets and the Poles from London.

After these attempts

Mikolajczyk resigned from his position as Prime Minister.

He was sue-

ceeded by Tomasz Arciszewski, a Socialist Party leader who had been
chairman of the Polish underground, Council of National Unity in Poland
until July, 1944.

Arciszewski demanded territories east of the "CUrzon

Line" and was a staunch advocate of absolutely no negotiations with
the Canmunists.

Relations between the Polish government-in-e�ile
Union only worsened henceforth .

and

the Soviet

A major point of irritation to the

Polish government was the Soviet failure to aid the Home Army in a
heroic attempt to recapture Warsaw from the Germans.

The Home Army

inaugurated an effort to take the Polish capital before the Soviet
troops could occupy Warsaw.

However, the attempt failed because of

the lack of Moscow's military support.

23
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The situation was disastrous

13

for the residents of Warsaw.

The insurgents and most of the civilian

population were either murdered or taken prisoner by the Germans who
managed to retain control of the city.

The Polish capital was left
24

devas·ta.ted, artillery torn and fire gutted .

With the National Home Cbuncil serving as the provisional parliament,
the PKWN proclaimed itself the Provisional Government of Poland on
December

31, 1944.

Only five members of the old Committee of National

Liberation entered the new provisional government:

Osobka-Morawski,

a left-wing Socialist; Rola-Zymierski , Radiewicz, Skrzeszewski , and
Rzymowski .

25

The PPR with Gomulka a s its leader was the dominant force in the
new government.

It was obvious that the new government was interested

in exhibiting a government that was representative of several political
factions.

Gomulka, Radkiewicz, Skrzeszewski� Mine, and Zawadzki were

Communists; Osobk:a-Morawski , Dabrowski, Matuszewski, and Piotrowski
were Socialists; Janusz, Maslanka, Berthold, and Kaplinski were members
of the Peasant Party; Rzymowski and Rabanowski represented the Democratic
Party .

Rakowski says, however, that the reputed representatives of the

Peasant and Socialist Parties had absolutely nothing to do with

24

Jerzy Hauptmann, "The Warsaw Uprising of 1944 in the American
Press," � Polish Review, IV (Autumn, 1959), PP• 46-57.
25

For a complete list of the composition of the new Polish Provisional
Government seez Rakowski , .2E• ill• t P• 31.
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the authentic Polish parties.
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By early. 1945 the provisional government was in nominal control
of all Poland , as a result of the successful Soviet winter offensive.
General Leopold Okulick1, commander-in-chief of the Home Army, and
I

several of his colleagues were arrested and imprisoned by the Soviets.
This was standard procedure for anyone who demonstrated any sympathies
or support for the Polish government-in-exi le.

As

a

result

most

of the

London followers went underground.
In February , 1945, at Yalta, Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevel t were
again confronted with the Polish problem.

The following decisions con-

cerning Poland resulted from the Yalta meetings:

"A

new situation has been created in Poland as a result

of her complete liberation by the Red Army.

This calls for the

establishment of a Polish provisional government which can be

more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation
of western Poland. The provisional government which is now
functioning in Poland should, therefor e , be reorganized on a
broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic
leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad.

This new

government shou ld then be called the Polish Provisional
Government of National Unity."

..Mr. Molotov , Mr. Harriman , and Sir A. Clark Kerr are

authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance
in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government
and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland
and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the
present government along the above lines.

This Polish

Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to
the hol ding of free and unfettered elections as soon as
possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret bal lot.

In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have
the right to take part and to put forward candidates ...

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity

has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the
Government of the USSR, which now maintains diplomatic relations
with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the

Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the

United States of America will establish diplomatic relations
with the new Polish Government of National Unity and will
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exchange ambassadors, by whose reports the respective govern
ments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland."
"The three heads of government consider that the eastern
frontier of Poland shall follow the Curzon line with digressions
from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor
of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial
accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that
the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of
National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of
these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western 27
frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference."
From the very outset the Polish goverrunent in London refused to recognize
the validity of the commission's decisions, since the London government
had not been a participant at Yalta.
No invnediate decision was reached by the three-power commission.
Ultimately a statement was issued on June 13, 1945, reconvnending that
representatives of several political parties be invited to Moscow on
June 15, 1945, to participate in a conference concerning the organization
of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Those requested
to attend were::
Boleslaw Bierut, Edward Osobka-Morawski, Wladyslaw Kowalski,
and Wladyslaw Gomulka as representatives of the Soviet-backed
Polish Provisional Government; Wincenty Witos, Zygmunt Zulawski,
Stanislaw Kutrzeba, Adam Krzyzanowski, and Henryk Kolodziejski
as representatives of the democratic circles in Poland; and
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Jan Stanczyk, and �uljan Zakowski
2
as representatives of the Polish exiles.
All those invited to Moscow attended except Wincenty Witos and Juljan
Zakowski.
On June 28, 1945, the composition of the new Polish Government of
National Unity was announced with Edward Osobka-Morawski as Premier and
Wladyslaw Gornulka and Stanislaw Mikolajczyk to serve as Vice-Premiers.
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With the National Home Council (KRN) acting as the provisional parliament
from Lublin, Stanislaw Grabski, Stanislaw Mikolajcyzk, Wladyslaw Kiernik,
Antoni Kolodziej, Adam Krzyzanowski, Stanislaw Kutrzeba, Jan Stanczyk, and
Zygmunt Zulawski were added to the KRN's membership.

Stanislaw Grabski

and Wincenty Witos were asked to become vice-presidents of the KRN.
However, Witos refused to cooperate with the
capacity.

new

I

gove�ent in any

Boleslaw Bierut continued as president of the KRN.

the new Polish government was organized.

Thus

Great Britain and the United

States immediately withdrew recognition of the Polish government-inexile in London and on July

s, 1945,

recognized the Polish Government

of National Unity as the Big Three had agreed upon at Yalta.
Of the twenty-one members in the newly organized government,
fourteen were Communists and sixteen of the twenty-one were former
members of the Soviet-supported Lublin Committee, and only five were
former members of the London government.
not Soviet sympathizers were:

30

The five members who were

Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Dr. Wladyslaw

Kiernik, Jan Stanczyk, Czeslaw Wycech, and Dr. Franciszek Litwin.
Stalin had accepted Mikolajczyk in the new Polish government because
he

"underst� only too well that the presence of a former Polish

prime minister, though now only a private citizen, who contrary to
the solemn protests of his government had publicly approved the Yalta
decisions, would create the illusion that, after all, there was a
merger of two Polish governments with appearances of legality."
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The influence of these cabinet members meant even less since the
composition of the parliament, the former KRN, was even more illbalanced in favor of the Communists.

Opposition to the Soviets within

the ranks of the parliament was too weak to influence an¥ legislation.
Despite the seemingly obvious defeat, the Polish goverrugf:!nt-in-exile
•'\.
tried to continue its existence and activities against �e Soviet
government and the puppet government in Poland.
Poland's fate was further shaped at the Potsdam Coqference,
July 17 to August 2, 1945.

Poland's eastern frontier had been delineated

along the "Curzon Line•• at Yalta.

The new Polish-Soviet border was

finally established in a treaty signed in Moscow by Polish and Soviet
representatives on August 16, 1945.

The problem remaining for the Allied

Powers at Potsdam was Poland's western and northern frontiers.
�

Mikolajczyk,

Bierut, and Rzym()'f(ski were chosen to attend the Potsdam Conference to express
'

the Polish governme nt's views on the problems confronting the Allies.
The following decisions concerning Poland were made a� the Potsdam Conference:

0The Conference considered questions relating to the
Polish Provisional Government and the western boundary
of Poland."
00n the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity
they defined their attitude in the following statement:
A. We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached
among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which made
possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions
reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional
Government of National Unity recognized by the three Powers.
The establishment of the British and United States
governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish
Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of
their recognition from the former Polish Government in
London, which no longer exists. The British and United
States governments have taken measures to protect the
interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the
recognized Government of the Polish State, in the property
belonging to the Polish State located their territories

18

and under their control, whatever the form of this property
may be.

They have further taken measures to prevent

alienation to third parties of such property.

All proper

facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional
Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies
for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State
which may have been wrongfully alienated."
"The three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish
Provisional Government in facilitating the return to
Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who
wish to go, including members of the Polish armed forces
and the merchant marine.

They expect that those Poles who

return home shall be accorded personal and property
rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens."
"The three Powers note that the Polish provisional
Government,

in accordance with the decisions of the

Crimea Conference, has agreed to the holding of free and
unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of
universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all
democratic and anti-Nozi parties shall have the right to
take part and to put forward candidates,

and that

representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full

freedom to report to the world the developments in Poland be
fore and during the elections.

B.

The following agreement was reached on the Western

Frontier of Poland:
In conformity with the agreement on Poland, reached
at the Crimea Conference,

the three heads of Government

have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government
of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in
the north and west which Poland should receive.

The President

of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish
Provisional Government of National Unity have been received
at the Conference and have fully presented their views.

The

three heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the
final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should
await the peace settlement."
The three heads of Government agree that, pending the
final determination of Poland's western frontier,

the

former German teritories east of a line running from the
Baltic Sea immediately west of Sinnemuende, and thence along
the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse
River and along the Western Neisse River to the Czechoslovak
frontier,

including that portion of East Prussia not placed

under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at
this Conference and including the area of the former free
city of Danzig shall be under the administration of the
Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered
as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany."

19

Orderly Transfer of German Population.

XII.

"The three Governments, having considered the question
in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Ger

many of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining
in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, will have to be

undertaken.

They agree that any transfers that take place

shou ld be effected in an orderly and humane manner."

"Since the influx of a large number of Germans' into

Germany would increase the �rden already resting on the
occupying authorities, they consider that the Control

Council in Gepnany should, in the first instance , examine
the problem, with special regard to the question of the

equitable distribution of these Germans among the several
zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing

their respective representatives on the Control Council to

report to their Governments as soon as possible, the

extent to which such persons have already entered Ger
many from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to

submit an estimate of the time and rate· at which further
transfers could be carried out having regard to the
present situation in Germany . "

0The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional

Goverrunent, and the Control Counci l in Hungary are at

the same time being informed of the above and are being

requested meanwhile to suspend further explusions pending
an examination by the G �vernments concerned of the

report from their representatives on the Control Council."

32

Harry s. Truman, Clemet Attlee, and Joseph Stalin had not met at Potsdam to
deal unconditionally with all the complex problems which had developed
as a result of the war.

The procedure laid down was indeed one which would

postpone a general peace settlement and therefore allow time for special
agreements on specific issues.

The Polish Provisional Government of

National Unity accepted the new Polish boundaries even though these
borders were subject. t� further alteration in any subsequent peace
settlement.
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Reassured by the Big Three ' s statements insinuating the success of Polish
governmental reorganization at the Potsdam Conference in the fall of 1945, the.
leaders of the Polish Government of National Unity moved to consolidate her
position as clearly pro-Soviet throughout the late months of 1945 and early
1946.

Within the new government a so-called Democratic bloc was organized

consisting of the PPR, the PPS ( the Polish Socialist Party ) , and the
Democratic Party. This bloc favored close cooperation �ith the Soviet
Union and the establishment of socialism in Poland.

34
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On June 30, 1946, a referendum was held to make judgment on three

questions:

Should the Senate be abolished?

Should the future constitution

consolidate an economic system based on �and reform and nationalization
of the basic branches of the Polish economy , but allow private business
to retain all legal rig�ts?
Neisse rivers?

Should the western Polish border by the Oder

The Democratic bloc urged the Polish people to vote affirm'

atively on all three questions.

The PSL (Polish Peasant Party) suggested

the rejection of the first question.

There were some illegal organizations

still operating underground in Poland that urged a negative vote on all
three questions.

When the official vote tally was made public the govern-

ment officially declared that 80.8 per cent of the eligible voters had gone
to the polls.

The results were 66.2 per cent, 77. 3 per cent, and 94.2 per

cent affirmative votes on the three questions respectively.
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After the

referendum a strong minority in the PSL, led by Czeslaw Wyech and Jozef
Niecko, contended that Mikolajczyk should compromise with the reputed
Democratic bloc.

However, Mikolajczyk refused to soften his opposition
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to the Soviet influence.

The confrontation continued to grow more

36

acute.

On January 19 ,

1947, elections to the Polish Sejm were held.

PSL was served an almost fatal blow.

The

The PPR and three c�osely allied

· parties faced little oppostion except from the PSL.

Officially 89.9

per cent of the legal voters cast ballots with 80.1 per cent being cast
for the pro-Soviet parties.

Boleslaw Bierut was elected president of

the Polish Republic by the Sejm on February s , 194 7 .

Jozef Cyrankiewicz

of the PPS was elected premier and Wladyslaw Gomulka became deputy
premier.

The remainder of the cabinet posts were fil led by former

. . ters of the
minis

37

Democrati.c bloc. · ·
.

Constitution" on February 19,

The .Sejm instituted the "Small

1947, placing executive power with a

Council of State compri sed of the president, the marshal C speaker ) . of
the Sejm, the deputy marshal and any other members selected by the Sejm.
From the very outset of the new Polish Government of National Unity,
a left wing faction of the Socialist Party,

led by Jozef Cyrankiewicz

and Oscar Lange, was able to gradually assert enough power to prevent
any of the membership of the Socialist Party from supporting Mikolajczyk ' s
attempts at democratic reo.rganization.31:}

Opposition to Mikolajczyk' s

36
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leadership within the PSL continued to increase.

Of course such dissension

3
within the PSL was encouraged by the Democratic bloc. 9

Finally on October

21, 1947, Mikolajczyk fled from Poland, fearful of being arrested on charges
of cooperating with Polish underground organizations.

With the aid of the

United States embassy Mikolajczyk escaped, making his new home in England
and then in the United States, where he died in 1969.

After Mikolajczyk ' s

departure the members of the PSL f�voring closer cooperation with the PPR
took control of the party, which proceeded to �cupy a position of little
significance in future Polish politics.
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CHAPTER

II

POLAND AND THE UNITED NATIONS:
AN ERA OF SF.MI-INDEPENDENCE, 1946-1947
Out of ·the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and the
chaotic conditions which it created domestically, emerged a pattern for
the new Polish foreign policy.

Not unexpectedly, there were many changes

and constant reorganization within the Polish Foreign Ministry .

New agencies

were created and the number of employees grew; many old agencies were
liquidated.

After the Yalta decisions the inunediate recognition of the

new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity posed serious problems
for the new government because of the urgent need to establish embassies
abroad and to appoint representatives to these posts.
Initially there was no confirmed organizational statute for the Polish
Foreign Ministry.

There was a period of gradual adaptation to the organ-

izational pattern of the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union.

Newly

created agencies and already established ones were reorganized on the basis
of the relationship of the individual heading the agency with the Communis�
Party.

If the head of a particular agency was a Communist, the agency

would play an important role in the Foreign Ministry, if the head of an
agency was non-Communist, the agency was bound to become powerless.

These

conditions resulted in extreme fluidity in the execution of foreign affairs.
Related to the massive multiplication of employees and agencies was the
increasing emphasis within the Foreign Ministry on propaganda and· political
functions .

Before World War II there had been a Political Department

within the Foreign Ministry which dealt with political , economic , and
public information issues and was headed by a Vice-Minister whose expertise
23

and experience in the field of international affairs served as a sufficient
basis for the formulation of policy.

This practice had been possible be-

cause of the quality of the individuals employed by the Political Department.
An attempt after 1945 to substitute the quality of the experts in the
Political Department with numerable less capable individuals proved to
impractical.

be

These conditions led to a complete reorganization of the

.Foreign Ministry.

Two new departments, the Economic Department and the

Press and Information Department, the latter being the major instrument
of propaganda, were created within the Political Department.

Also within

the Foreign Ministry numerous separate bureaus were created to handle the
innumerable postwar problems such as peace treaties , repatriation of Polish
citizens , and the resettlement of the fragmented Jewish populations. l
Of course , an important factor in the formulation of foreign policy
of any country is the execution of its economic and trade relations.
Significant economic agreements foster the establishment of friendly
political relations based on mutual commercial interests.

Since Polish

boundaries had been altered and Poland had acquired some industrialized
western provinces , economics would now play a more significant role in .
her foreign affairs.

Also it was hoped that the Communists' economic

policies on massive industrialization of a formerly basically agricultural
Polish nation would add to Poland ' s international economic importance.
Areas of Silesia which were annexed to Poland were rich in coal and
metal ore deposits .

1

The postwar world witnessed a severe shortage of

Tadeusz Rakowski, Foreign Policy 2i, the Communist Regime in Poland�
Techniques and Functions , �-� (New York: Mid-European Studies Center
of the National Committee for a Free Europe , 1953) , pp. 50-51.
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coal so Poland seemed to occupy a very privileged position on the international
economic horizon.

Howeverp Soviet pressure forced the Poles to conclude agree-

ments with the Soviet Union which ruined Poland ' s chances to take advantage
of the favorable world trade situation.

From 1945 to

1947

Poland negotiated

trade agreements with the u. s . s. R . , Rumania, Denmark , Norway , Hungary,
Yugoslavia, Switzerland , Bulgaria, East Germany , Finlaqd, France, Austria,
Iceland, Holland, Great Britain, and Czechoslovakia.
after the war Polish trade became largely dominated
other Communist-controlled states.

2

However, invnediately

by the U . s . s. R . and

The three major states in Poland ' s

postwar trade relations were the u. s . s . R . , Czechoslovakia, and East
Germany .

It is believed that highly unfavorable trade agreements were

forced upon Poland by the u . s . s . R.

The most flagrant example of such

agreements was one made concerning Polish coal on August

1 6 , 1945.

This

arrangement required Poland to send large quantities of coal to the

u. s. s . R. at a price of about eight to nine per cent below the world
market prices.

These economic conditions indicate that the Communists

probably also had firm control of Polish foreign relations.

3

Because participation in the foreign service of a nation demands
extensive training in geopolitics, law, history,

language, economic s ,

and the social conditions of the country involved , the postwar Commun ist
regime in Poland faced a serious shortage of diplomats and foreign policy
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experts within the ranks of the Cormnunist Party.

Since the area of foreign

relations is extremely critical to a nation, diplomats associated with the
earlier anti-Soviet Polish regimes could not be retained in the new proSoviet Polish government.

These circumstances resulted in two types of

representation in the Polish embassies abroad.

One involved acceptance

by the regime of a non-Communist representative whose political and diplomatic
activities were closely observed by trusted Convnunist overseers whose only
qualification was blind obedience to the Conununist Party.

4

In other cases

where qualified pro-Soviet diplomats could not be found, non-professionals,
selected more for their loyalty to the Communist Party than for their
ability in foreign affairs, were appointed to high positions in the foreign
embassies.

These s<:>-called diplomats were often extremely incompetent.

"Under such conditions there was a strong tendency for each Conununist
regime to become heavily dependent on the foreign policy direction of the
Soviet Union and accept uncritically positions developed by Soviet experts."

5

The structure of the new Polish diplomatic missions followed a certain
pattern.

The chief of the Polish foreign mission was usually a prominent

Polish politician, scholar, or writer, not necessarily a member of the
Communist Party.
on

Because the eye of international politics would focus

the head of the missions,

an outright Communist in such a position

initially would afford bad publicity for the Communists.
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minister, who acted as supervisor of the embassy staff, however, was
usually the confidence man for the Corrununist Party.

There was a regional

party representative who usually traveled among several embassies to check
on operations .

He was also a trusted Corrununist.

The regional party represent-

ative exercised disciplinary authority over the embassy staff.

He was ex-

tremely alert to any indications of disloyalty to the Communist-dominated
Polish regime .

Staff members showing anti-Corrununist sentiments were taunted

until they were forced completely out of the embassy.

The regional party

representative "had his informers among the janitors and probably among
some clerks too and enjoyed the feeling of knowing everything about everybody ."6

Each mission had its staff of experts, qualified professionals

in the field of international affairs who knew the country and were
frequently without political affiliations.

These experts were usually

not trusted completely, and therefore not fully informed by the Commun ist
leadership.

There were also so-called research personnel whose work

actually bordered on espionage for the Communist Party.
embassy employed a clerical staff.

Of course each

Some were brought from Poland; others

were of Polish descent who had become naturalized citizens of the country
where the embassy was located, and some were stateless Polish refugees . 7
Significant changes in the organization of the entire Polish Foreign
Ministry were effectuated in February and March of 1948.

In this reorgan-

6
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ization a new position, Secretary General of the Ministry of. Foreign Affairs,
w 1 ;

created to which Stefan Wieblowski , former Ambassador to Czechoslovaki a ,

was assigned.

The new minister was granted decisive authority i n both foreign

and domestic affairs.

The former Political Department was divided into two

independent bodies , each to formu late policy involving separate groups of
countries.

Each division was alloted significant influence in the Foreign

Mi�istry .
Zygmunt Modzelewsk i ,

�he Polish Foreign Minister since the establishment

of the postwar Polish government, had been in failing health due to a heart
condition since the summer of 1946.

Modzelewski was gradually retired from

his position within the Foreign Ministry and stripped of all governmental
and party powers.

8

Jozef Olszewski ,

the highly efficient head of the

recently remodeled Political Department was also removed and divested of
all political influence. 9

Rakowski says that reports of Olszewski ' s individ

ualism could no longer be tolerated by the Communists.
as a member of the Polish Workers'

Party (PPR)

At any rate Wierblowski ,

Politbureau , assured the

Communists of a completely subservient and Soviet-directed foreign policy.

lo

It is also significant to note that Poland ' s three major spokesmen in the
United Nations during 1946 and 1947, Wincenty Rzyrnowski in the General
Assembly,

and Zygmunt Modzelewski and Oscar Lange in the Security Counci l ,

were completely removed from any positions of · influence i n the Polish government .

8
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9
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by 1948.

These changes within the Polish Foreign Ministry and the 1947

elections, which had been coerced upon the Polish people by the Communis t
forces , resulted in a totally submissive and Soviet-dominated Polish
government.
The years 1946 and 1947 were a period of great i�stability and inconsistency within the Polish Foreign Ministry when absolute Soviet
domination of Polish international affairs had not �en completely consolidated.

Because of this fluidity and uncertainty there were some

possibilities for gestures of Polish independence in international
relations.

This can be observed in the activities of the United Nations.

In order to examine postwar Poland' s international affairs within the·
framework of the United Nations, it is necessary to briefly review the
structure of that organization.
Great Britain, and the
establishment

•

•

•

At Yalta the Big Three , the United States,

u . s. s. R. ,

had called for the "earliest possible

of a general international organization to maintain

peace and security."

11

After months of careful planning, including the

Dumbarton Oaks talks in August, 1944, and the more decisive Yalta meetings,
a conference was scheduied to convene in San Francisco on April 25, 1945,
to establish the United Nations.
Representatives from

Francisco.

Poland, however ,

were not

in

attendance at

San

The Polish government, therefore , ·was unable to sign the United

Nations Charter at the organizational meeting and did not become a member
of the United Nations until the middle of October, 1945, because the United

11
Oscar T. Barck, Jr. and Nelson M. Blake, Since 1900: � History E! �
United States !!! � Times (New York: Macmillan, 1959-r:-pp. 658-659.
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States and Great Britain recognized the Polish government in London until
July, 1945 , while the Soviet Union recognized the Lublin Conunittee as the
legal government of Poland.

12

The Soviets demanded that Poland be solely

represented at the San Francisco Conference by the members of the Lublin
Conunittee. The United States and Great Britain objected to this Soviet
proposal.

As a result Stalin immediately declared that he would not

allow Soviet Foreign Minister Vyscheslav Molotov to attend the San
Francisco Conference.

The United States and Great Britain did not want

to antagonize the Soviet Union too severely and therefore did not invite
the Polish government-in-exile to the conference.
to allow Molotov to attend the conference.

Later Stalin decided

13

So even though Poland had been one of the original signatories of
the Declaration by the United Nations on January 1, 1942, in Washington,
O. c.

( a declaration by twenty-six nations that were fighting against the

Axis aggressors which called for an international peace-keeping body ) , no
Polish representatives were invited to participate in the Charter conferences
in San Francisco.

14

The Foreign Ministers of the Big Three were unable to

reach any conclusive agreement in discussions concerning Poland at San
Francisco.

12

Stalin had obviously directed Molotov to evade any meaningful

Document No. 3 and No. 4 ,

pp.

132-136.

13

Edward Rozek , Allied Wartime Diplomacy: � Pattern in Poland (New
John Wiley and Sons, Inc . , 1958 ) , P• 363.

York:
l

4yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47 (Lake Success, New York:
Department of Public Information , 1947) , P• 1.
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conversations about the Polish problem. 15

On April 27, 1945, the delegates

at the San Francisco Conference adopted the following resolution with regard
to Poland:

"The Governments of the United Nations express to the people

of Poland their symp?thy and their admiration.

They hope that the

constitution of a Polish Government recognized as such by the sponsoring
nations will make it possible for Polish deleyates to come and take part
as soon as possible in the work of the conference. " 16

It was in this

manner that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, organized
later that year after the report of the Yalta Conference ' s Three Power
Commission, was given a position in the United Nations.
To review Poland ' s role in the United Nations one must re-examine
the functioning of this international structure .

The United Nations

is made up of two major bodies--the General Assembly and the Security
Counci l .

The General Assembly is constituted of representatives of

each member state and discusses "any questions or matters within the
scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions
of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and

•

•

•

makes

recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security
Council or to both on such matters. 1117

However , the General Assembly

is restricted from discussing disputes already being considered in the

15

Rozek , �· cit . , p . 375.

16
.
.
Yearbook of the United Nab.ons, 1946-£ , �· cit. , p. 12.
17
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cit . , P • 662.
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Security Council.

The General Assembly has the power to initiate studies

for the codification and strengthening of international law and is to
reconunend corrective measures for any social , cultural , educational, or
economic problems .

In the General Assembly a two-thirds vote is required

for any action. 18
The more important and powerful of the two United Nations bodies is
the eleven-member Security Council.

The United States, Great Britain,

China, France, and Russia hold permanent seats in the Security Council
and are often referred to as the Big Five.

The remaining six positions

are chosen for two year terms by the General Assembly.

The votes of

seven members are needed for the approval of any action; however, on
significant resolutions such as the issuance of military or economic
sanction�, the Big Five have to be unanimous in their decision.

This

encompasses the much disputed veto power of the Security Council , in
which an issue can be discussed involving one of the Big Five, but that
member can prevent the initiation of any major action with its veto power.
The Security Council also has jurisdiction ov.er the Military Staff
Committee, which is composed of the chiefs of staff of the Big Five . 19
The Economic and Social Council is an agency of the United Nations
which is elected by the General Assembly and is to report on international
economic, social, cultural , educational, health, and related matters.

A

series of special agencies has been created and placed under the supervision

18
Ibid . , p . 663.
19

Ibid . , p. 662.
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of the Economic and Social Council these include:

lhe International

Bank,

the International Stabilization Fund , the International Labor Organization
( I LO ) , the Food and Agricu ltural Organization, and the United Nations
Educational , Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESC0) . 20
A Trusteeship Council was established by the United Nations Charter.
This Council was to. preside over lands taken from the Axis Powers during
World War II 9 territories already held under mandate , and areas of which
any nation might want to terminate supervision.

Fifteen judges who

convene at the Hague as the International Court of Justice , are elected
by the General Assembly.

The record keeping and assembling of needed

materials and information for the United Nations is carried out by a
permanent Secretariat.21
Since the first two sessions - .of the United Nations C l946 and 1947)
were the only meetings in which any Polish independence from Soviet
domination was attempted , this will be the period considered in this
study.

After the return of Oscar Lange to Poland and the naming of

Juliusz Katz-Suchy as the new permanent Polish delegate to the United
Nations on January 1 ,

194 8 , Poland merely became an agent of the Soviet

Union within the United Nations .22
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Poland was active in the Economic Commission for Europe and had
representatives on these specialized bodies in the United Nations during
1946 and 1947:

Security Council, International Labor Organization (ILO) ,

United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UN�SCO} ,
Food

and Agriculture Organization (FAO) , International Cjvil Aviation

Organization ( ICAO} , the World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO} ,
International Monetary Fund, Atomic Energy Commission (ACE} , Economic
and Social Council ( ECOSOC) , World Meteorological Organization (WMO) ,
Universal Postal Union (UPO) , International Trade Organization (ITO) ,
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) , Commission for Conventional
Armaments (CCA) , the Committee of_ Experts, Commission on Narcotic Drugs,
Economic and Employment Committee, Fiscal Committee, Headquarters Advisory
Committee, Social Commission, Transportation and Communications Commission.2 3
As the Polish member of the Sub-Commission on the Reconstruction of
Devastated Areas , Oscar Lange worked with delegates from the United States
and Great Britain.

These three nations presented

the establishment of the Econo

a

proposal calling for

ic Commission for Europe.

The Soviet

Union and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic objected to the fonnation
of such

a

commission.

The commission was established, however, and was to

begin work immediately on short tenn economic difficulties in war-torn

454.

23
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Europe .

24

Waclaw Konderski, a Pole, was designated chairman of the Economic and
Financial Committee of the United Nations.
Oscar Lange declared to the

��

Cbncerning Kondersk i ' s selection

Times that this action constituted

international recognition of the important position a free and independent
Poland was to occupy .

According to Lange it was obvious that "Poland is

to play a vital role in the economy of Europe . "

25

Poland i n the United Nations General Assembly--

There were few occasions of Polish independence in the United Nations
General Assembly .

The few instances which did occur were found during the

early years of the organization.

The first Plenary Meetings of the General

Assembly were held from January 10,
Hal l , Westminster, London.

1946, to February 14,

1946, in Central

As the General Assembly convened , Wincenty

Rzymowski arrived as the chief Polish delegate .
Nations Charter on behalf of the Pol ish nation.

He signed the United
26

Rzymowski , an original

member of the pro-Soviet Polish Commi ttee of National Liberation and later
Minister of Arts and Culture in the Lublin Commi ttee, had been Polish
Minister of Foreign Affairs since mid, 1945.

Even though Rzymowski

had assumed the reputation of a devout Convnunist, prior to World
War II he had published The Horizon , an anti-Soviet journal.

24
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25
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In his early writings he denounced the wide ly circulated concept of
Polish independence within the Soviet political structure .
outbreak of the war, however,
position;

After the

Rzymowski shifted more toward a pro-Soviet

perhaps this explains his eventual demotion."

After the 1947

Polish elections he became Minister without portfolio thus relieving

him of

any

future political influence .

In February,

1947,

Rzymowski was

replaced as head of the Polish United Nations delegation 'by Zygmunt
Modzelewski .

27

Rzymowski cast a vote contrary to the Soviets as early

as the Second Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, January 11.,
A vote was taken on a Cuban amendment to the rules of procedure.
the u . s . s . R . voted no.

voted yes;
ment to the

� �·

28

Times in March,

1946.
Poland

In a somewhat conci liatory state-

1946, Rzymowski declared:

"There

are many things which divide the United Nations but i'mmeasurably more
unite us.

The evil influence of capitalist interests should not be

allowed to 'b.lild up Germany again, and peace is possible if we destroy
fascism, secure the cooperation of the great powers, and plan on an international basis to equalize the standards of civilization all over the
world."

29

However,

in the succeeding meetings of the General Assembly ,

Rzymowski exhibited little independence with regard to Soviet suggestions
with1n ·the United Nations General Assembly .

27
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The issue of major importance for the General Assembly to act upon
in the early meetings was the election of the members to the Security
Council .

This issue· was brought u p a t the Fourth Plenary Meeting , January

12 , 1946.

Poland was nominated to serve as one of the non-permanent

members on the Security Council by Dmitri

z.

Manuilsky, the representative

from the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Poland rj:?ceived thirty-nine

of the fifty votes cast on the first ballot.

This was more than the thirty

four needed for a majority.

Poland had been assured of a seat on the

Security Council, but there still followed a vote to decide which nations
would get the three two-year seats and which would get the three oneyear seats. 30
In the .l:'ifth Plenary Meeting January 12, 1946, Rzymowski hoping for
a two-year term spoke to the General Assembly,

"I

venture to hope , in the

name of my country and with a view to furthering the welfare of the United
Nations , that you will confer a two-year term on Poland.

The Poles conunand

a historic knowledge which they will place at the service of peace, the
price of which they know better than anybody.11'31 Poland, however, did not
receive a majority of the votes needed on the first ballot.

Brazil and

Australia were selected by a majority, but the third seat was left un
dec id e

d

Neither Poland,

.

which received nineteen votes,

nor the Nether

lands, which received twenty-three votes, had won a majority.

On the

second vote both Poland and the Netherlands received twenty-five votes.

aou

.

A. O. R. ( 1st session) , pp. 79-82.

31 Ibid . , pp. 87-88.
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two

The President, Mr. P . H. Spaak, of Belgium, then drew lots for the
year term, as was provided in the rules.

Mr. Spaak drew Poland.'32 Poland

thus became a two-year member of the important Se�rity Council.

Poland ' s

activities within the Council for these two years show some independence
from the dictates of the

u. s . s .

R.

The details of the Security Council

meetings will be discussed later.
In the Tenth Pl�nary Meeting, January 16, 1946, Rzymowski made his
first major speech to the General Assembly on the tasks confronting the
United N ations. 33

Despite numerous idealistic speeches , very little was

accomplished in the General Assembly until the Twenty-third Plenary Meeting,
February 6 , 1946, when judges to the International Court of Justice were
selected.

A Polish candidate for the court, Dr. Bogdan Winiarski, failed

to be elected on the first ballot.

In the General Assembly he received

nineteen votes and in the Security Council he received five votes.

In

the Twenty-fourth Plenary Meeting February 6 , 1946, Winia.rski again failed
to receive a majority vote.

In the Twenty-fifth Plenary Meeting February

6, 1946, on the third vote Winiarski was still not elected.

Finally on

the fourth vote the Polish representative received twenty-six votes, the
required majority. 34

Now Poland not only had a two-year seat on the

influential Security Counci l but

also had managed to get one of her

. 32
" 'Ibid. , PP • 87-88.
· 33
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4
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representatives on the world' s highest tribunal.
Actually there is very little variance between the Soviet voting
record and that of the Polish delegation throughout the records of the
United Nations General Assembly .

Other than the one instance already

mentioned , there are only four occurrences involving Polish-Soviet dis
agreement.

However, it is important to note that the tol lowing occasions

of dissent occurred during the first two years of the United Nation ' s
operation and also that on one occasion Oscar Lange,

the key to Polish

ind�pendence within the United Nations,was voting for the Polish del
egation.
At the Sixty-second P lenary Meeting , December 13 ,

1946� in two

votes on trusteeship agreements for the French Cameroons and French
Togoland , Poland abstained and the u . s . s . R . voted no.
In the Sixty-fourth P lenary Meeting , December 14,

35

1946, in a vote

on a draft resolution on regional conferences of non-self governing
territories •

peoples, Poland voted yes;

the u . s . s . R . voted no.

In the Sixty-sixth Plenary Meeting , December 15 ,

36

1946, in a vote

concerning consultative arrangements with non-governmental organizations
with the Economic and Social Counc i l , Poland voted no;
abstained.

37

35
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And finally in the One-hundred Fifth Plenary Meeting , November l ,

1947,

in a vote on a Danish amendment that urged the Union of South Africa propose
a trust agreement on South West Africa as soon as possible, Poland voted
no;

the u . s . s .

R. voted yes.

38

Thomas Hovet has attributed many of these examples of divergences in
the Soviet and Polish votes as merely a case of mixed signals within the
two delegations.

This theory he has explained by the voting procedure in

the General Assembly .

On roll-call votes a member ' s name is drawn by

lot and the voting begins with that �ember and continues from there in
alphabetical order.

Therefore , the Soviet Union does not always vote

before all her satellite countries.

If,

for instance,

the Poles were

uncertain about how they were to vote they could possibly cast a vote
contrary to Soviet wishes.

There have been occasions in which the pro-

Soviet nation would abstain on a vote and then later try to gain permission
to change its vote after the Soviet Union had cast her vote.

39

It seems

in relation to later developments and activities in the United Nation ' s
Security Council,

that the Polish delegation was not completely dominated

during these early meetings .

Even if these deviations of the Polish

delegation from the Soviet policy do not solely represent any corroding
of the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe,

these irregular votes do

suggest that if Poland had had the opportunity she might not have become

38
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0
so absclutely dominated by the u . s . s. R.4

Of more significance than

these instances of slight deviations in the General Assembly ' s voting
record , are the records of the Security Council for 1946 and 1947.
Polish Activities in the Security Counc i l ,

1946-1947

Poland ' s chief delegate to the United Nations Security Council from
January to March,

1946, was Zygmunt Modzelewski.

He went to London as the

Polish representative to the Preparatory Committee on �he Formation of the
Security Council and participated in the Council ' s work uhtil the Security,
Counci l moved to New York in March ,

1946.

As early as 1944 Modzelewski

had b�come active in pro-Soviet organizations as Ambassador to Moscow ,
first from the Polish Committee of National .Liberation and later from
the Lublin Conunittee.
of Foreign Affairs.

In July,

1945, he had been appointed Vice-Minister

After Rzymowski ' s fall from Soviet favor Modzelewski

became Polish Foreign Minister.

However ,

by

early 1948 Modzelewski too

was divested of all political influence and replaced

by

a less individ-

ualistic Communist, Stefan Wieblowski .
From March,

1946 ,

to August,

1947, Oscar Lange served as chief

Polish delegate to the United Nations Security Council as it convened
at Hunter College, New York .

It was Lange who seemed to have the courage

and fortitude to implement the strongest pressures for Polish independence.
He had been a member of the pre-war Ministry of Labor in Poland, but had
come to the United �tates in 1937 and became a naturalized American citizen
in 1943.

Lange had a long and well-established reputation of being a pro-

Soviet Socialist,
In May,

both in Poland and in the United States.

1943, Lange had been scheduled to be one of the principal

speakers at a New York meeting under the auspices of the National Counc i l

4°

For further discussions o f Poland ' s voting record i n the United
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for American-Soviet Friendship.
at Columbia University .

At this time Lange was a visiting professor

He had been one of the founders of the Olicago

chapter of the National Council for American Soviet Friendship.

However,

he withdrew from the engagement because he feared that his statements
might be misinterpreted , bu t he did endorse the objectives of the meeting .
At this time Lange went on record as being opposed
in-exile in London .

to

the Polish government-

He revealed that he had planned to urge the formation

of a new Polish government-in-exile opposed to the legal administration.
General Sikorski was at this time head of the government .

Lange considered

Sikorski "an honest but ineffective leader, sabotaged by the reactionary
emigres upon whom he had to rely."

41

Lange suggested that the liberals

sever relations with Sikorski and form a new coalition government with
the Union of Polish Patriots.

As time proved this was exactly the type

of resolution that the Big Three accepted when they discussed plans at
Yalta to establish a coalition postwar Polish government .

The Polish

Provisional Government of National Unity was constructed from elements
of the Soviet-recognized Lublin government and some of the liberal
members of the London government .
In September, 1943, Lange recommended a five-point program for the
organization of postwar Poland in a letter to the New York Herald Tribune.
Introducing his program , he attacked "the follies of the anti-Soviet emigres"

41
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42
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43

who were currently in charge of the London government-in-exi le, referring
to Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, who was then head of the London Government.
Lange ' s five points were:

1.

Poland should maintain a close military understanding with the

Soviet Union , in a similar way as say, Canada and Mexico needs
the military support of the United States;

2.

The Unitep States, Great Britain,

and the Soviet Union must

establish a nuclear understunding , which is essential to the
preservation of Poland ' s freedom.

3.

Poland must implement agrarian reform to eliminate the elements

of feudalism and have a democratic form of government.

4.

Polish sovereignty over East Prussia i s necess<iry for the

peace of Europe.

•

•

.A

democratic Poland will have to expropriate

the Junkers, to ship them out of the country and to settle their
estates with peasants.

This will break once and for all the social

basis of Prussian militarism.

s . T o solve the Polish-Soviet border dispute, Lange, differing from
the Soviet view, advocated giving the u . s . s .

R.

any areas with

large White Ruthenian and Ukrainian populations, but expected cities
with Polish majorities , even though situated in Ukrainian terriroty,
to remain part of Poland.

The Soviets wanted these former Polish

cities to remain part of the u. s . s .

R. 43

44

The most essential part of Lange ' s plan was for Poland to become
part of the Soviet military security system .

This should al low the

Soviet Union to be more understanding in regard to territorial settle
ments since, in the final analysis ,
advantage of the Soviets.

the entire plan would be to the

Lange was evidently correct in his feelings

because newspapers reported the following year,
granted an interview with Stalin,
postwar Poland were similar.
In February,

1944,

after Lange had been

that their ideas on the structure of

44

it was reported from London that "Moscow is

said semi-officially to have intimated a desire for the inclusion in a
reshuffled Polish cabinet of three or four Poles whose good faith to
ward Russia is thought to be assured .
Lange of the University of Chicago.••

45

These include Professor Oscar
Then in Apri l ,

1944, Premier

Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union invited Lange and Father Stanislaus
Orlemanski, a Catholic priest who favored Polish-Soviet friendship ,
to visit Moscow.

The United States Department of State furnished the

passports nit strongly asserted that Lange and Father Orlemanski were
acting purely as private citizens.
Lange spent six weeks in the U. s . s . R. and was allowed a two

hour and twenty-minute discussion with Stalin.

Lange also visited the

Polish army, organized by the Union of Polish Patriots inside the Soviet
Union , who were stationed along the Soviet-Polish frontier.
with Polish leaders in the Soviet Union,

44
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and

visited schools that the Soviets reputedly had built for Polish

children.

On his way back to the United States, Lanqe stopped in London

to impress upon the Polish government-in-exile
sincerity.

his

belief

in Stalin ' s

Lange believed that "Stalin was interested in a strong and

independent Poland, that Stalin had not the slighte�t intention of
dictating the political� economic or social fonns of the Polish state,
but wanted only the resignation of certain anti-Soviet people in the
Polish government-in-exile, the inclusion of Poles from the Moscow Union
of Polish Patriots in the new Polish cabinet, and territorial adjustments.11 46

In

August, 194 5 , just one month after the recognition of

the Polish Provisional Government of National Liberation by the Western
Powers, rumors started to circulate that Lange would be appointed postwar
Poland' s first qmbassador to Washington.
York Herald Tribune by John

c.

chosen."4·7

Medcalfe that "the State Department would
be

probably accept him but would

It was reported in the �

far from enthusiastic if Lange were

Medcalfe further stated that the State Department feared a

man "who is a citizen of

one

country today, another tomorrow, and relurns

to his native land the third.1148

In the fall of 1945 Warsaw offered Lange

the ambassadorship to Washington, which he �ccepted .
left

for Poland

46
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to

regain

his

Lange immediately

citizenship and receive further instructions.

46

Lange said that he had taken the position to "better relations between
the land of his birth and the land of his adoption.11

49

Lange returned

to the United States as the new Polish Ambassador in December, 1945 .
During 1946 and 1947 there were numerous instances when Lange was the
only supporter of the Soviet Union ' s p�sitions and so Lange has been
labeled by many observers

a

mere Soviet puppet.

Many of these

attacks

against this reputedly Soviet-dominated Polish delegate were in the
newspapers and especially in publications of Polish groups still seeking
to have the official pro-Soviet Polish regime abolished.

so

To these

accusation� Lange simply replied, "anything that creates understanding
between the big powers and keeps us friendly with our closest neighbor,
Russia, and with the Western powers, too, we favor.

Our very life and

existence depend on it ( peace between the Western Powers and the Soviet
Union) .

Any conflict will be fought on our soil.

conflict involves us . 11 51

Even a diplomatic

In regard to Lange ' s attempts at conciliation

between the West and the Soviets th� Christian Science Monitor observed:
"His actions so far have shown th�t he is under stringent instructions
from Warsaw not to find himself in opposition to the Soviet Union in
Council deliberations .

At the same time , however , as a former United

States citizen, Dr. Lange is personally drawn to the latter country and

so

See publications such as: The Polish Review, � United Nations
Review, and New Europe published by former supporters of the Polish
government-in-exile in London.
51

Current Biography, .£E• cit . , p . 32 5 .

47

to the viewpoint it expresses.11 5 2

However, as the following record

shows Lange did not always support Soviet aims, especially on issues that
were not so widely publicized as the major crises, in which Lange usually
supported the Soviets. 53
Against this background one should consider Poland ' s activities in
the United Nations Security Council from the spring of 1946 to the fall
of 1947.

Zygmunt Modzelewski , Polish Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs,

was the first delegate sent to the Security Council which convened in
London for its preparatory meetings in January and February, 1946.
�ring these early months , Modzelewski was allowed ample time to
clearly express his feelings and establish his position with regard
to

what Poland ' s role in international politics should be.

In �arch,

1946, as the Security Council reestablished itself in New York, Oscar
Lange became the permanent Polish representative on the Security Council.
On January 17, 1946, Modzelewski made his first appearance before
the Security Council saying:.

"Poland can look back on a long history

devoted to the defence of justice and peace.
depends on the preservation of peace.

The very life of Poland

The truth of this was shown to

us in a sad and painful manner during the recent German occupation.
This is but an additional reason for our endorsing whole-heartedly the
statements in favor of peace made by the representatives of the great nations ." 54

52

Ibid.

53
For a good summary of Lange' s attitudes concerning post-war
foreign policy see: Annex II, Document No. 10, pp. 158-162.
.

polish
.

540fficial Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, 1946
Meetings 1-49, No. l First Meeting 17 January , 1946 to Twenty-third Meeting 16
February , 1946 {Church House, Westminister, London: United Nations) , PP• 5-11.
(Hereinafter referred to as s. c. o. R . , No. l-49.
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and the numerous similar ones that Modzelewski presented ,

This statement,

perhaps encouraged the Western Powers in their illusory hopes that Poland
would distinctly attempt to establish her own foreign policy decisions as
a non-permanent,

and therefore , potentially very significant, member in

the United Nations Security Council and in world affairs.

But Modzelewski ' s

positions in the actual voting procedure of the Counci l soon proved that
Poland would obviously not exhibit any independent opinions under his leadership.
The first issue of major importance to be considered by the Security
Counci l was the application for admission to the United Nations by.Albania.
Throughout January and February,

1946,

Modzelewski arduously supported

Soviet statements favoring A lbani a ' s application for membership, and repeatedly stressed the importance of the Albanian admission into the l l 1 1 i ted
Nations.

On February

13 , 1946,

in a long,

emotional speech Modzelewski

assumed the role of "great defender" of new states and quite dramatically
appealed to the Security Council to accept Albania as a United Nations
member.SS

Because of vigorous opposition to Albanian admission from the

Western Powers, however, Albania was not admitted into the United Nations
in

1946

or

194 7 .

On January

SSibid . ,

30,

pp.

1946,

the Iranian issueS6 was brought before the Counci l

268-270.
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··rhis concerned the withdrawal of Soviet troops which had remained

stationed in Iran after the end of World War

II.

Iran had filed a co·rrplaint

with the Security Council stating that Soviet officials were interfering in

Iran i:m domestic affairs, and they now sought United Nations action to correct
the situation.

49

for debate.

In the extremely heated ensuing ;discuss:i;ons :.the- Soviets ; ,

quite expectedly,

be

took the position that no action should, or could,

taken toward the u . S . s . R .

Under the leadership of Ernest Bevin,

a

United Nations delegate from the United Kingdom, and Wellingtion Koo, .
the Nationalist Chinese delegate,
type of resolution ordering

the forces that sought to adopt some

that the Soviet troops with?raw from Iran,

continuously referred to the United Nations Charter as the source of
their demands for corrective action against the Soviet

qpion.

in support of Soviet statements and against American, French,

Speaking
British,

and Chinese proposal s , Modzelewski suggested that Iran aqd the Soviet
Union be al lowed to solve their own problems.

He stated that the involve-

ment of a third party could not result in a satisfactory solution.
In response to British and Chinese statements, Modzelewski declared,
"If we start referring to the various Articles of the Charter,

as one

speaker did a little while ago, we can find justification for anyth.ing .
The Charter contains a wealth of provi sions designed to meet many cases;
it is easy to invoke such and such an article to prove that one· is right.115 7
The Council members'

obvious disagreement over the type of action to be

implemented in the franian affair resulted in a resolution recognizing
the Soviet and Iranian agreement to negotiate,

and accepting the Counci l ' s

request for frequent reports on the progress of the negotiations.

The

Iranian issue was not completely settled during Modzelewski• s.. tenure;

howev.�r,

he had certainly demonstrated his support of Soviet aims on the issue.

:57

�. ,

pp.

59-69 .

so

Later Modzelewski' s successor, Oscar Lange, would not

be

so unfailingly

cooperative .
Modzelewski was not quite so vigorous in his support of the Soviets
in relation to the Greek issue.

SS

On February 4 ,

1946,

referring to the

problems in Greece, Modzelewski did not exhibit the same inflammatory and
denunciatory tone he had so markedly shown in earlier deb te s in

a

Security Counci l ;

in fact,

the

he conducted himself in an almost concil iatory

manner toward the United Kingdom.

In concluding a speech reviewing his

opinions concerning the Greek situation, he stated " that the British
troops should be withdrawn from Gi:eece in due course.

This opinion i s ,

moreover , i n agreement with the statement made several times by the
representative of Great Britain.0 59

be

The Greek issue was thus left to

dealt with independently by the British and Greek goverrunents;

however ,

situation erupted with even more hostility an,d complexity in Auglist,
By this time Polish leadership in the United Nations had changed ,

the

1946.

and

Poland ' s opinions occasionally varied from those of the Soviets on some
minor issues.

Before the Greek issue is further considered ,

let us look

at Modzelewski ' s activities concerning other issues while the Security
Council was in London.

58
The Greek issue involved complaints by the Soviet Union that Great
Britain was violating the Charter by allowing her troops to remain in
Greece in 1946.

The Greek situation later developed into a civil war

involving Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav guerri llas.
were not completely solved until 1954.
59

�· ·

pp. 116-117.

The problems
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In early January ,

1946 ,

problems began to emerge i n Indonesia, which

were brought before the Security Council by the Ukrainian and Egyptain
6
delegates. 0

As could by now be expected Modzelewski, on February 1 1 ,

1946, pledged strong support to the Soviet demands for the removal
of British troops from Indonesia and called for an immediate end to the
deplorable condi�ons for which the Dutch imperialists were responsible.
The following day Modzelewski continued his emotional denunciations of
the Dutch and British governments with a very innovative comparison
of Indonesia
. • s ensl avement to po l and' s l ong and unJUS
.
t captivi
• tY •
A lessening of the tension i n Indonesia came i n March,

61

1946, a s

negotiations between the Nationalists and the Dutch were initiated.
The only other issue of major importance discussed in the Security
Cbuncil while Modzelewski was chief Polish delegate was the trouble which
62
developed in Syria and Lebanon
Allied troops.

On February 1 5 ,

regarding the withdrawal of postwar
1946, Modzelewski energetically supported

Syria and Leban.on in their demands for the immediate withdrawal of French
and British troops from their countries.

When no action was taken by

the Security Council on a draft resolution denouncing the French and

60
The Indonesian difficulties involved accusations that British

and Dutch troops in Indonesia were fighting against the Indonesian
Nationalists.

Negotiations were carried out from 1947 to late 1949

with a final settlement establishing an independent Indonesia.
61
s . c . O. R. ,

No. 1-49, PP•

245- 246.
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This situation concerned French and British troops that had not

been withdrawn from Syria and Lebanon after World War I I .

The Soviets

and the West clashed over the issue in the Security Council but,

because

of their failure to agree upon ar.y measures to be taken , no action was
taken.

French and British troops, however, were satisfactorily withdrawn

by the end of 1946.

52

and British governments for their refusal to withdraw quickly Modzelewski
declared:

0to be in the minority does not necessarily mean that one i s

63
wrong ."

The u . s. s.

the resolution.
a resolution

R. and Poland had been the only members supporting

The following day, the United States•

suggesting

parties involved .

delegation introduced

that the issue be privately negotiated by the

Modzelewsk i ,

continuing to display enthusiastic support

for an immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Syria and Lebanon ,
violently attacked the United States•
with so many proposals.

delegation for confusing the issue

The Soviet delegation was also vigorously defending

the rights of Syria and Lebanon against the "devious Western imperialists.0
Wi thout any meaningful Security Counci l action,

64

the Syrian-Lebanese issue

was thus left to be settled independently.
As noted earlier at the end of February,

1946, Modzelewsk i ,

preparing

himself for promotion as Polish Foreign Minister to replace Wincenty
Rzymowski , returned to Warsaw,

surely feeling that he had distinctly

established a permanent pattern of complete Soviet domination for the
Polish government' s actions within the United Nations.

However,

the

selection by the Polish government of Oscar Lange as the new chief Polish
delegate in the United Nations , now permanently based in New York , resulted
in a very significant alteration of Polish foreign policy within the Security
Counc i l .

On some of the same issues in which Modzelewski had so faithfully

supported the Soviet Union , Lange quite early showed the world that he had

63

64

Ibid . ,

PP• 313-314.

Ibid . , pp. 3 51-3 52.
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his

own

ideas about the conduct of Polish diplomacy.

Lange managed to

remain chief Polish delegate in the United Nations officially until
January, 1948, actually until August, 1947, when although not completely
censured by the Warsaw government, he was relieved of his duties in the
Security Council and Juliusz Katz-Suchy was named acting Polish delegate to
the Security Council, amid i:umors that Lange' s health wpuld no longer allow
the strenuous demands which the work of the Council required. 65
Although Modzelewski expressed unfailing support for the u . S . s . R . ,
during January and February , 1946 , in her objections to efforts by the
Western Powers and Iran to expedite the evacuation of Soviet troops from
Iran, Lange shortly after his appointment to the Security Council,
clearly exhibited that he had no intentions of unquestionalby supporting
the u . s . s . R . in her harangues with relation to the Iranian issue.
On March 26, 1946, in deliberations concerning the adoption of the Council ' s
agenda , which included consideration of the Iranian issue, clearly to the
dismay of the Soviet delegation who had introduced a resolution which was
to amend the agenda by deleting the time al lotment for discussion of the
Iranian issue, Lange stated:

"I have to disagree with the position of

both the representative of the United Kingdom and the representative of
the u . s . s . R. that we have to do anything here with an amendment .

I

think we have an agenda presented by the Security-General which we have
either to accept or reject.

If we reject it; then we can vote on the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republic' s proposal.

;6

�udzinski ,

2£. ill · , p. 40.

I therefore move that we vote

4
.5

on the agenda as proposed by the Secretary-General,
it or rejecting i t . 006
The following day,

either accepting

This Soviet-opposed agenda was accepted by the Counc i l .
still upset over the Counci l ' s approval o f an agenda

which included time to study the Iranian issue ,

the Soviets introduced a

resolution to postpone indefinitely debate concerning the Iranian complaints
about the Soviet disturbances in Iranian internal affairs.

The Australian

delegate then proposed a counter-resolution calling for postponement of
the discussions concerning the problems in Iran for a very limited time.
Unexpectedly, Lange chose to support the Australian proposal and opposed
the earlier Soviet resolution.

61

While Lange asserted that the Polish

delegation sympathized with the Soviet view, he maintained that Po land
would not withdraw from the Security Council meetings as the u . s . s .
had threatened.

When asked if Poland was planninQ to align herself

with the Soviets on the Iranian issue,
going to withdraw . "
hurriedly added ,

R.

Lange replied,

"No,

Poland is not

Legal advi sers trying to minimize Lange ' s statements,

"Poland has no reason to withdraw . "

��

The Iranian problem was intermittently discussed throughout the
remainder of March.

Early in Apri l ,

1946 , the Soviet delegation submitted

a letter to the president of the Security Council which labeled the recent

Council action of April 4 i l legal and incorrect�

6"6's . C . O.

R . ,. m? • ill • ,

pp. 24-26.

&7.rbid . , pp. 43-44.

5·9

The New York Times,

28 March 1946 , p .

2.

The Council had scheduled

55

discussion of the Iranian complaints for
American proposal by James F.
the April 1 5 ,

M
ay 6 ,

1946,

as a result of an

Byrnes, which Lange had supported .

Du r- '

1

1946, meeting Lange took this position concerning the

Soviet allegations:

"I should like the record to show that the Polish

delegation does not share the view that the action of 4 April was incorrect
and illegal."
"We believe i t was perfectly legal because the resolution was taken
after a study of the writ ten s tatements subrni tted to us by both Governments,.
the Government of Iran and the Government of the u . s . s . R.

I think that

this disposes of the argumen t . "
"We voted for the resolution because we believed it t o
and i t serves a useful purpose.11 69

At this meeting Lange,

be

correct

in a seeming ly

conciliatory mood, spoke in favor of a Soviet proposal calling for the
removal of the Iranian complaint from the agend a ,
that her earlier statements be retracted .
allow the passage of the resolution;
to be considered on May 6 ,

since Iran now wished

But the Council refused to

therefore ,

the I ranian issue remained

1946 . 70

During the next several Counc i l meetings Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet
delegate,

continued to condemn and attack the Council ' s action which had

schedu led consideration of the Iranian problem for May 6 .

On April

23,

1946, i n deliberations concerning the Soviet charges against the United
States resolution to continue discussion of the

69s . c . o .
'70

R.,.2.E.•

ibid . , p • . 138.

cit . , p .

137.

1
ranian issue,

Lange

56

"There is no question of

again spoke in opposition to the Soviet position:

rescinding the resolution which was adopted on 4 April .

That resolution we

consider is both perfectly valid legally, and also useful politically.
would remind the Council again that we voted for the resolution.

I

On the

question of its legality, we do not share the opinion of our colleague,
the representative of the

u . s . s . R."

Lange later asserted his confidence

that the Soviet pledge to withdraw her troops from Iran would be fulfilled.
Reinforcing this belief, he pointed out t:-iat Iran had accepted the Soviet
evacuation commitment; so apparently there would

be

no need for the Council

to discuss the issue. 7 1
Late in May, 1946, the Iranian issue faded from the international
scene as Iran reported to the Security Council that the Soviet troops had
been completely withdrawn from Iranian territory .

I t is significant to

note the obvious shift in Polish policy as Lange succeeded Modzelewski
as chief Polish deleg�te to the United Nati · 'ns in March, 1946.

The latter

unquestionably supported all Soviet positions, while Lange refused to echo
the Soviet statements.
Another issue on which Modzelewski exhibited support of the Soviets
was the debate� in relation to the problems involving the civil war con
ditions

in Greece.

In February, 1946, Modzelewski had expressed a con

ciliatory attitude toward Great Britain in her pledge to immediately
withdraw her troops from Greece.

Perhaps this seemingly conciliatory

attitude on Modzelewski ' s part toward Great Britain fostered Lange ' s

71
Ibid. , pp.

208-210.
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subsequent actions concerning the Greek problems, which frequently did
not coincide exactly with the policies of the Soviet delegation.

The

Ukrainian delegate brought the Greek issue before the Council for a second
time in August,

1946.

On September

speech concerning the subject.

1 7 , 1946,

Lange delivered a lengthy

Lange emphasized his record of open-

mindedness in earlier considerations of the Greek issue and cited his
delegation ' s earlier support of action allowing Great B�itain the
opportunity to remove her troops from Greece at her own discretion.
Lange, while still wishing to allow Great Britain time to withdraw her
troops ,

also expressed his support of a Soviet proposal which demanded

that Greece terminate her state of war with Albania and that the Greek
government stop persecution of her own minority groups.
ment ,

in counter-arguments,

The Greek govern-

claimed that Albania , Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria

were sending guerri llas into Greek territory and interfering in her
domestic affairs .�2
The numerous , varied accusations and al legations over the problems in
Greece finally resulted in the passage of a resolution by the Security
Council arranging for the selection of a commission to investigate the
turmoi l in Greece.

During the December

1 9 , 1946,

meeting the Mexican

delegate proposed an amendment to the earlier resolution establishing a
Greek Investigative Commission, which suggested that the commission be
composed of eleven members,
on the Security Council .

a member from each of the nations represented

Lange voted against the Mexican amendment , while

Gromyko abstained. "1·3

n
r
.
S.

C.

·7 3rbid . ,

O. R . , No.
p.

681.

50-88 ,

pp.

344-353.
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At this same meeting in further discussion of the Greek issue, Lange
introduced an amendment to the Greek Investigative Commission resolution
which would permit free passage of the members of the Commission within
Greece,

Albania,

Bulgaria,

and Yugoslavia.

This Polish amendment was

not satisfactory to the Soviets, because they did not want representatives
of the West observing activities in the Soviet satellite nations;

so

Gromyko introduced an amendment allowing the commissio� members passage
on ly in the border areas of her satellite nations therefore curbing
free movement throughout the area.

The Soviet amendment was later with-

drawn as opposition from al l members,

even the Polish delegation,

arose

•

. 74
The Polish amendment was finally adopted by the Counc i l . · ·
As the Commission to investigate the .Greek problems returned in
1947 , the United States delegation introduced a resolution sug-

Apri l ,

gesting massive aid for Greece.

Lange opposed any such action declaring

"that the United State s , opposing continuation of the UNRRA (United Nations
Relief and Rehabi litation Administration) , c.i.ted' lack of funds for relief,
yet now was providlng funds unilaterally,
an irresponsible,

corrupt,

to support

inefficient, and unpopular �egime which was

itself creating instabi lity;

the Charter.•�5

and in his opinion,

such aid constituted a direct violation of

Throughout June and July ,

1947, Lange positioned himself

more in support of the Soviets and in opposition to the West in all questions

4rbid. '

'7

pp.

684-686.
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International Organi zation ,

I (September,

1947) ,
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involving the Greek issue.
1947,
�,,mge

77

76

Finally in a series of votes on July 29 ,

on an American draft resolution concerning the Greek problems,

and the Soviets voted differently on several of the articles of

the proposal, put both were against the entire resolution in the final
analysis.

Lange managed through this series of votes , however, to show that

his opinion of the resolution was not completely identical with that of the
Soviet delegation, as can be seen by studying the section-by-section voting tally.

76
S . C. O. R . , No. 121-146,

PP•

768-785 .

77
The voting record of Poland and the

u. s . s .

Prea'nble--Poland, no
u . s . s . R . , abstain
Article II, Paragraph 1--Poland, yes
u . s . s . R . , .abstain
Article II, Paragraph 2--Poland, no
u . s . s. R . , abstain
Article II--Poland, yes
u. s. s . R . , abstain
Article III--Poland, yes
u . s . s . R . , abstain
Article IV--Poland, abstain
u. s . s . R . , abstain
Article V--Poland, abstain
u. s. s . R. , abstain
Article VI--Poland , no
u. s . s . R. , abstain
Article VI, Paragraph 6A--Poland, no
U. s. s. R. , abstain
Article VI, Paragraph 6B--Poland, abstain
U . s . s . R. , abstain
Article VII--Poland, yes
u. s . S . R . , abstain
Entir� Draft Resolution--Poland , no
u . s . s . R. , no.
78

S. C. O. R . , No. 147-173 , pp. 1693-1613.

R . was:
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On August 4 , 194 7 ; the Commission of Investigation on the Greek
Frontier Incidents made its final report .tq the Council.

Poland, with

Lange by this time already in semi-retirement and not participating
in the Security Council ' s activities, voted with the U . s . s .

R.

continuously, placing the blame for all the difficulties in the area
on Greece, while

i gorous ly try ing to exonerate the �lbanian government. 19�

v

On August 6 , 1947, however, for no apparent reason, Juliusz KatzSuchy voted in favor of a Columbian resolution which called for further
study by the Investigative Commission in the Greek area while the
U. s. s.

R.

abstained .

Perhaps this vote was merely a case of mixed

signals between the Soviet delegation and Katz-Suchy, the new acting
so .

Polish delegate to the Security Counc:Li . -··

�

.

The Greek issue was a good example of Polish activity in the United
Nations during 1946 and 1947 , showing most of the facets of Polish
political activity in the United N ations during this period.

During the

first two months of 1946, with Modzelewski as the chief Polish spokesman,
the Polish delegation exhibited ardent support of any Soviet policy; then
for awhile during mid-1946 and early-1947, because of the boldness of
Oscar Lange, Polish diplomacy in the United Nations underwent a period in
which attempts were made to establish a semi-independent role for Poland
in world politics by not completely mimicking the Sovlet statements toward
the issue; then by mid-1947, with his demotion eminent, Lange chose only

1.a9

s.

'I

C . O.

R.,

No. 174-196, pp. 1715-1741.

89.
Ibid . , p. 1806.
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to show opposition to the Soviets in a very limit0d and meaning less way;
and finally,

after Lange ' s removal from active participation in August,

1947, one again finds absolute and energetic support of all Soviet policy.
Such was the pattern for most of Poland ' s foreign policy attitudes on
the major issues brought before the United Nations during 1946 and 1947.
In considerations of the applications of new members to the United
Nations, Polish policy follows the same kind of pattern as has been outlined with regard to the Greek issue.

The Polish delegation, however,

regardless of leadership consistently adhered to the Soviet assertion that
Albania should be immediately accepted as a member in the United Nations,
but Albania failed to be admitted during 1946 and 1947 because of staunch
objections by the West.

Poland and the u . s . s .

all applications for membership on August 29,

R. voted identically on

1946, except that of Ireland.

With Lange voting for the Polish delegation, Poland voted in favor of
81
.
. h admission.
.
.
.
whi. le the u. s . S • R • blatantly opposed Iris
Ire l and . s admission,
However , by the time applications for admissions were again discussed on
August 18,

1947,

and Lange had been replaced by Katz-Suchy ,

the Polish

delegation refusing to display any support for Ireland only abstained in
the vote on the Irish application for membership,
fact that the u. s .

again substantiating the

s. R. had gained firmer control of Polish policy by late

82
1947.

81

soth the Soviet and Polish delegations supported, Mongolia, which

was not admitted; Afghanistan,

Iceland,

and Sweden , which were admitted;

and both were opposed to the admitta�ce of Transjordan and Portugal ,
of which were admi tted during the 1946 session.
pp. 132-140.
82
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194 7 ,

In January,

the Security Council was involved in debate concerning
Lange ' s extreme desire to accomp-

general disurmanrnent and weapon reduction .

lish some kind of armament agreement between the East and West was shown in
some of the votes and debates concerning this issue.

In many cases Lange

seemed to be attempting to function as a mediator between the World Powers.
On January 15,

194 7 ,

three proposals . had been placed before the Security

Council members concerning this issue.
nations;

France, Australia,

quite surprising ly,

One proposal from each of these

and the u . s . s . R . had been introduced and,
He

Lange did not choose to support the Soviet plan.

suggested that "the one presented by the representative of France might

be the easiest for all of us to agree upon.

I think i t contains everything

which appears in the draft resolution pre��nted by the u . s . s . R . ,
hope ,

therefore ,

that he may be able to agree to i t .

and I

I t also contains

essentially what is the chief concern o� the representative of the United
States, namely,

that we do not forget about considering

Atomic Energy Commission . "

the report of the

Lange ' s speech continued in an extremely

conciliatory tone . 83·
Lange ' s spirit of compromise was again expressed on February 1 3 ,

1947,

as he voted in favor of a final Security Council resolution concerning
general regulation and reduction of armaments which included an article
requiring all nations to contribute information concerning their military
capabilities to the United Nations.
resolution ,

d3 .:>.

.

The u . s . s . R. refused to support the

obviously not wanting the Western Powers to know anything about

c • 0•

R . , No. 89 to 1 2 0 , p . 90

•
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their military establishment.

84

The question of armed forces seemed to

be of paramount importance to Lange as was shown by vestiges of independence
Lange, his authority already in sharp decline, still

as late as mid 1947.

had the courage to exhibit outright opposition to the u. s. S . R. on June
24,

1947, as the Security Council discussed a series of Belgian amendments

to the United Nations Charter concerning the organization of the United
Nations • armed forces.

On the first amendment to Article 6, under Article

43 of the Charter both Poland and the u. s . s . R. voted yes, but on the
second Belgian amendment,

thi s one to Article 10 of the Charter , Poland

voted yes and the u . s . s . R . abstained , and finally on the third Belgian
amendment, this one to Article 13 of the Charter, Poland voted yes, and the
85

u . s. s. R. voted no.

This was Lang e ' s last attempt to slow down the

growing arms race, as his authority and influence in Polish foreign affairs
was soon to end.
Early in January,

1947, another instance of Polish insubordination

toward the Soviet Union can be cited.
Channel off the coast of Albania .

86

Trouble had arisen in the Corfu
On January 20,

1947,

the British

delegation, still uncertain of the course their nation would pursue in
this matter, did not want the issue placed on the Security Council ' s
agenda, but the Soviet delegate initiated efforts to place the incident
on the agenda.

Lange voted with Great Britain in favor of an agenda which

84
Ibid . , P • 247.
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86
sritish ships had been damaged by mines in the Corfu Channel
allegedly laid by the Albanian government.

The United Nations Security

Council was never able to agree upon where the responsibility for the trouble lay.

64

.

did not include the Corfu Channel incidents;

the Soviet. : Union abstained.

After the British had submitted letters to the Security

C

,,

97 ·

ouncil accusing

Albania of placing the unmarked mines in the Corfu Channel which had caused
damage to British property and a loss of some British personne l , Lange again
deviated from the Soviet delegation ' s policy on January

2�, 1947.

Gromyko

wanted the Council to require by a vote that the president of the Counci l
inquire of the Albqnian government as to when Albania wou ld make a reply
to the Council concerning the British charge s .
by stating:

Lange refuted Gromyko

"I already said earlier that I quite concur with your proposal

to inquire from the Albanian Government the possible date of the arrival of
However,

its representatives .

I wonder whether the matter is of sufficient

importance for us to take a formal vote on this subject.

I think it is

really in the normal prerogatives of the President to take whatever action
he seems necessary,

since this is simply a matter within,

administrative field of the President.

so to speak ,

the

I suggest that we leave this to

the President without taking a vote on i t . "

The Counci l president adhered

to Lange ' s suggestions and the vote was not taken as the Soviet delegation
had desired .

88·

..
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On February

10, 1947,

in further discussion of the Corfu Channel

incidents several amendments to a major resolution calling for an investigation of the Corfu Channel affair were introduced.
Soviet amendment Poland abstained and the u . s.
vote on a Polish amendment was just the reverse.

�.·87s . c.
.

ea

·Ibid . ,

o. R . ,

p.

No.

135 .

89-120,

p.

128

•

In a vote on a

s. R. voted yes, while the
On an American amendment,
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however, both Poland and the u . s. s .

R. abstained .

A Security Council

sub-committee was then selected to study the incidents,
Katz-Suchy participated as the Polish representative.

89

and Juliusz
Katz-Suchy and

the Soviet representative on the sub-committee submitted a minority report
concerning the incidents which refused to place any blame on the Albanian
government, while the majority report pl aced all responsibility on Albania.
Because of the Soviet Union• s veto power no action could be taken against
Albania;

so the case was eventually referred to the International Court

of Justice, which later assigned all responsibility to Albania.
After World War II another problem which had to be settled by the
United Nations concerned the administration of the mandated islands of
defeated Japan.

Oscar Lang e , acting for Poland, seemed destined to mold an

independent Polish policy concerning this issue,

perhaps because of the

initial Soviet attitude of disinterest in the Pacific area.

Deliberations

relating to a draft trusteeship agreement for the former Japanese mandated
islands began in early March,
the United States,

1947, with Poland,

and the U .

in accord with American security aims,

s. s. R. allowing

to take the in

itiative in outlining a settlement to the problems involved in· the future
administration of these islands.

However , by April 2,

1947, when final

votes were being taken the u . s . s . R. had evidently decided to object
to any postwar American ambitions to control the Pacific area.

In a

vote on a resolution which merely called for the termination of the
Japanese mandate on the islands, Poland voted yes , while the u.
chose to abstain.

89

Ibid . ,

s. s . R.

The American representc. i� 1 ve with the support of the

P• 188.
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Polish delegation then introduced an amendment to the original resolution
which called for the establishment of American control of the former
Japanese mandated islands , but the

u.

s.

S.

R.

vetoed the amendment .

the Soviet delegation introduced an amendment, without the supr>ort of the
Polish delegation, which would have denied American dominance of the
islands, and not surprisingly this amendment was vetoed by the United
States.

Finally the Polish delegation introduced an amendment which

established an American a:iministered United Nations trusteeship over the
former Japanese mandated islands.

Since this plan was acceptable to both

the United States and the u . s . s . R . it was adopted by the Security
90
Council, thus solving temporarily the problems in the Pacific area .
·
As stated earlier, in February, _1946, Modzelewski had consistently
supported all the Soviet denunciations and accusations of the British and
Dutch in their activities in Indonesia.

The Ukrainian delegate had charged

before the Security Council that British and Dutch troops were jointly
attempting to repress the Indonesian Nationalists' efforts .to establish a
free Indonesia, but by March, 1947, the controversy had cooled down as the
Dutch and Indonesian Nationalists met to negotiate a settlement.
1947 , however, the trouble in Indonesia again erupted full scale.
principal castigator of

the

British

By August,
As .the

and Dutch the Soviet delegation had

introduced a resolution which called for the immediate withdrawal of the
British and Dutch troops in order to permit complete Indonesian independence.
'

Whereas Modelezewski had earlier ardently and indiscriminately supported .
any Soviet proposal concerning Indonesia, Lange displayed perhaps lightly

; 90� . c. o. R . , No. 121 to 146, pp. 658-679.
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to the world, but undoubtedly stinging ly to the Soviets,
sti l l , even as late as August 1 ,

that he cou ld

1947, correct the Soviet delegation ,

as he delivered the following speech with relation to the Soviet resolution
"As regards the addition suggested "t:rj the u . s . s . R . ' s

concerning Indonesia:.

representative , I had myse lf prepared an amendment which demands the same
thing,

though in other words .

Reading the addition to the draft resolution

proposed by the 4 . s . s . R . ' s representative , however, I· find that there
is one point which is not covered,

but which I had in;ended to present.

The u . s . s . R. ' s addition states that • troops should immediately be
withdrawn to ( their)

previous positions , •

and so on.

As a minor point

I should rather prefer to use the term • armed forces•
that naval forces, aircraft and so forth are used.
inclusion of the words

since we are informed

I should suggest the

• armed forces and administrations ' ."

In a later

vote on the Indonesian resolution amended by the United States, Poland
and the U . s . s . R . voted together, except on the first paragraph of the·
preamble in which Poland voted affirmatively while the U. s . s . R.
Eventually an independent Indonesia was created in December,

abstained .
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1949, as the

Dutch withdrew from the area.
Lange was able consistently to exhibit his difference of opinion with the
Soviet Union ' s policy with

little fear of chastisement by frequently opposi ng

the u . s . s . R. on procedural matters.

Perhaps Lange felt that he could

continue to trouble the Soviets and show his dislike at always being labeled
a Soviet puppet by deviating from the u . s . s . R . • s directives on these �ess

91
S . C.

O.

R . , No. 147-173, pp. 1686-1700.
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publicized matters. Lange could contradict the Soviets on procedural votes
with nominal international publicity, but had he taken such distinctly
opposing positions on the more significant international political issues,
he probably would not have survived as chief Polish delegate to the United
Nations as long as he did.

By continuously disagreeing with the Soviet

delegation on procedural matters, Lange surely

disquieted the Soviets and

forced them to maintain interminable fears about the degree of authority
they actually possessed over Lange, and Poland ' s foreign policy at this
time .

On September 2 3 ,

1946,

in a debate on the adoption of the agenda

Lange opposed the Soviet delegation ' s efforts to leave consideration of
the border disputes in Greece off the Security Council ' s agenda.
obviously to the Soviet ' s dissatisfaction, declared:

Lange,

"In the view of the

Polish delegation, the question of the adoption of an item on the agenda
is not a matter of passing judgment on the merits of the case, but is
simply an expression of the view that the item is of sufficient importance
to be considered by the Council.

I would contend that the very fact that

a government which is a member of the United Nations brings an item to
our attention indicates that it is of sufficient importance to be con
sidered.

The government may be right or wrong , that is another matter. 1192

In such statements as these Lange was able to - display his annoyance with
the Soviet' s continual attempts to control the Council ' s activities.

The

Soviets never seemed to gain complete control of Lange ' s actions concerning
procedural matters.

92

s . C.

o. R . ,

93

No. 50-88 , p . 429.

93
Lange stated that, npoland is not, and will never consent to be,

a satellite of any power, near or distant ...
Annex II , Document 10, PP• 158-162.

For further information see:
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Numerous occasions can be cited i llustrating Lange ' s opposition
to the Soviets.

On December 16 , 1946, in a vote on an Australian resolution

to extend the term of the Counci l president, H .

v.

u. s. s. R.

of December, Lange voted yes and the

Johnson, until the end

voted no • ..94)

Rudzinski

states that during this period when Gromyko "indulged in vicious and
constant

verbal

attacks

repeated on

every

occasion, anq even

without

occasion, directed against the Australian delegation" Lange remained
a close friend of Herbert V . Evatt a major Australian representative to
the United Nations. 95 '

On January 20, 1947, Lange also favored the

Australian delegation in a vote on a proposal to al low the current
Council president, N . J . o. Makin of Australia, to determine and
convene the next Council meeting , in which Lange voted yes and the
u. s . s . R.

abstained, because of the Soviet ' s dissatisfaction over the

Council ' s conduct concerning the Corfu Channel incidents. 96..
On January 20, 1947, Lange again voted in favor of the adoption of
an agenda, in line with policy of the United Kingdom, and against the
desires of the Soviet delegate, who abstained in the vote because of
Britain ' s refusal to allow investigation of the trouble which had just
arisen in the Corfu Channel .

On

June 20, 1947, in a procedural vote for

the adoption of an agenda, Poland again opposed

the u . s . s .

voted affirmatively and the Soviet delegate voted no.

.. ·9�
•
Ibid. , p . 587.
' �?h.u
. , �. _S2J:.. , p . 199
_) d zinsk l.
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S . C . O . R . , No. 89-120 , p . 128.

R.;

Lange

Also at this

70

meeting Lange supported a proposal to consider privately the appointment
of a governor for Trieste, which the Council had established as a free
port in January, 1947;

the U .

s. s . R.

abstained on a final proposal

which arranged to leave the Trieste issue off the agenda.

97

In the

July 10, 1947, Council meeting Gromyko wanted to leave a letter of application to the United Nations from Austria off the agenda because no
formal peace treaty had as yet been signed between all the All ied Powers
and Austria.

In the final vote on the adoption of the agenda, however,

which included consideration of the Austrian letter of application for
membership,
July 29,

Poland voted yes, and the u.

s . s. R.

abstained.

98

On

1947, one of Lange ' s last actions in the Security Council be-

fore he was replaced by Juliusz Katz-Suchy , was to vote no on a proposal
for adjournment while the

u. s. s . R.

voted yes.

99

This was the last account of any divergence between the balloting
of the Polish delegation and the Soviet delegation in the Security
Council.

During the latter part of 1947, Juliusz Katz-Suchy became the

acting chief Polish representative on the Security Council.

Katz-Suchy

was later named permanent representative to the United Nations from
Poland as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary .

Katz-Suchy

had been a Communi s t since he was about fifteen and his appointment to

97
5 . c. o.

R. ,

No.

c . o.

R. '

No. 146-173,

98 c

.:.> .

121-146, p . 1052-1053.

99 T b " .
- 10 . , pp. 1603-16 1 3 .

p•

1260.
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this high position within the Polish Foreign Ministry was the first instance
of an outright Communist being designated as head of a foreign ambassadorial
delegation from Poland.

lOO

Katz-Suchy had been an alternate representative of Poland to the
United Nations Security Counc i l since March; 1947.

He was a member of a

Security Council sub-committee which investigated Great Britain ' s charges
that Albania had laid mines in the Corfu Channel which had resulted in the
destruction of two British vessels in 1947.

101

Katz-Suchy urged the

Security Counci l members to support his position that there was not
sufficient evidence to confirm the British accusations against Albania.
As acting head Polish delegate to the Security Council after August,
Katz-Suchy exhibited unfailing support for the Soviet Union:

1947,

By supporting

u . s . s . R. and Egyptian demands that British troops be withdrawn from Egypt
and the Sudan ;

in votes against United States and Australian resolutions to

cope with the problems in Greece; and by continually holding to the position
that he would support admission of Finland and Italy into the United Nations,
only if Rumania, Bulgaria , and Hungary were admitted.

102

Katz-Suchy was also

named alternate Polish representative to the Economic and Social Committee
and began a long series of attacks on United States President Harry s .
The New York Times declared that "his denunciations of the West

Truman.

have more than matched Andrei Vyshinshy' s" ( a Soviet delegate to the United

100

Ruth Karpf, "The Big Brain From Poland," United Nations World,

III (May,

1949) , P• 60-62.

See Annex I I , Document i-:o. 1 3 , pp. 166-177.
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102
0?ersonali tier; of the General Asse::-.bly," United

Bu11�tin, rv· (May l ,

l

1948 ) ,

P• 3 7 1 .

:,tat� \':eekly
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Nations ) .
abrocid ."

Katz-Suchy had become "Poland' s best known representative

103

Katz-Suchy energetically continued his vehement verbal outbursts
agains t the West as Chief Polish United Nations delegate until Augus t ,
1951.

He was then replaced by Henryk Birecki.

I t was rumo=ed that

Katz-Suchy had been recalled because he was too Western-minded for the
Sovie ts, since he had lived in England for several yeqrs during the
war and had marri�d an Eng lish woman , Elizabeth Nenkes.

104

However,

Katz-Suchy denied all such rumors as "stupidities" and said that he
had requested transferral back to Poland where he would pursue some
academic interests.

The

�

York Times stated that the suggestions

that Katz-Suchy had been recalled to Poland because he was too westernminded "should s14rprise anyone who has listened to his speeches during
the last few years.

For sheer vitriol they are unsurpassed by any

Communist oratory so far heard in the West."

105

Despite his enthusiastic

defense of the most radical forms of Communism, Katz-Suchy was labeled
as a "London Pole"

by

the Soviets.

106

In

spite of these contradictory

interpretations of Katz-Suchy ' s behavior, after August,

1947 the Polish

contribution to international affairs through the United Nations became
nothing more than a series of unrealistic verbal attacks and denunciations
of the West, especially directed toward the United States.

103
�ew
104
N�w

�

Times , 26 August 1951, IV-2.

�

T�mes, 24 August 1951, p . 1 .

l05
Ibid.
-

l06� ·
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See Annex II , Document No. 14,

pp. 172-182 .
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In 1 9 53 Alexander w. Rudzinski wrote a detailed account of his years
in the United Nations n s a Polish adviser and member of the United Nations•
Committee of Experts.

Rudzinski came to the United Nations in March ,

1946,

as a legal adviser to Oscar lange upon Lange ' s appointment as chief Polish
delegate to the United Nations Security Council .

Rudzinski had discussed

in detail his experiences within the United Nations until 1950 , when he
was relieved of his duties by the Polish government.

As an influential

member of the Polish delegation to the United Nations, Rudzinsk i ' s
observations are invaluable, but,
personal statements.

the information must be accepted as

In comparison with the complete official account,

Rudzinski ' s conclusions appear basically accurate.
Rudzinski states that Zygmunt Modzelewski was actually the power in
the Polish Foreign Ministry initially and that du.ring these early years
the Soviets were apparently willing to allow Modzelewski a certain margin
of freedo� in the inst.ruction of the Polish diplomats.

Modzelewski was

a Moscow-t.rained Communist, whom the Soviets completely t.rusted in the
beginning .

To the subsequent consternation of the Soviets, however,

Modzelewski was convinced that even though i t was desirable for Poland to
closely adhere to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union,

maintain friendly relations with the Western Powers.

she could still

Oscar Lange had

had lengthy conferences with Modzelewski and realized that according to
Modzelewsk i , Big Three cooperation was to be a major goal of Polish
diplomacy .

lOSR

108

" ,
udzinski
.

££• �. , PP•
.

-

100 101

•
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Lange did not receive specific instructions from Warsaw concerning
the position he was to adopt in the votes dudng the months from March
to June,

1946.

During this period Lange merely voted according to his

own judgment, then reported his actions to Modzelewski and Jozef Olszewski,
head of the Political Department in the Polish Forei�n M�nistry, and subOn certain occasions Lange

mittcct explanations of his final decisions.

would also send reports to the Foreign Ministry on fut�re issues to be
discussed in the United Nations so as to allow Warsaw enough time to
dispatch specific instructions to him if the Polish government desired.
However , Warsaw usually reacted slowly on these advance requests,
therefore granting Lange more frequent opportunities to use his own
judgment successfully.

In late summer,

1946,

Lange went to Warsaw

and was severely criticized by Olszewski for the. instances in which
Lange had not voted in accordance with the Soviet delegation.

After

this confrontation Lange was more reluctant to exhibit as much outright
.

opposition to the Soviet point of view as before.
In April,

1946,

Jl09

Lange received directives from Warsaw instructing

him to submit letters to the Secretary-General of the United N ations
requesting that all members of the United Nations sever diplomatic
relations with

the

fascist

government of Gene�alissimo

Francisco

Franco

in Spain. �lf> Rudzinski says that he is certain that Lange did not think

.
·u.09
. -:rbid. , pp.

101-10 3 .
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See Annex II , Documents No.

11

and No.

12,

pp.

163-169.
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that this request from Warsaw was actually a Soviet order,
to be to the rest of the world.

as � c appeared

The West felt that this move by Lange

was simply another indication of Poland ' s subservience to Soviet dictate s .
Lange swayed from Soviet policy on the Spanish issue,

however, when he

cKpressed his willingness to accept the sub-committee ' s report on the
Spanish situation which

suggested that discussion of the Polish resolution
Lange

calling for emendatory action toward Franco ' s regime be terminated.

actually tried unsuccessful ly to persuade Gromyko to accept the sub-com
l
mittee' s negative report.l 'l.!
\

During the first half of the United Nations sessions in 1946,
control of atomic weapons was discussed on several occasions.

the

Lange

had sent advance corrununiques to Warsaw informing the Polish government
that the Polish delegation in New York had agre·.�o to accept the American
plan for international control of atomic energy,
Polish reservations ..

However,

subject to several

the day before Lange was scheduled to

deliver a speech to the United Nations outlining the Polish delegation ' s
position concurrent with these principles, orders arrived from Warsaw
directing Lange to adopt a negative attitude toward the American plan.
In this case Lange was forced to alter his own earlier decision and replace it the following day with an inflammatory and derogatory speech
against the attempts by the United States to reach meaningful agreement
for international control of atomic energy . li2

P1

�udzinski ,

114

Ibid . ,

p.

.££·
104.

cit . ,

pp.

103-104.
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Rudzinski states that again during February,

1947, Poland and the

u . s . s . R. disagreed over �he general reduction of arm;,·· nts and control
of atomic energy •

.

At this time Lange decided to introduce a resolution

before the Commission for Conventional Armaments .

The Polish proposal

would have reduced the armed forces of all member states in the United
Nations to small contingent forces to be placed at the disposal of the
United Nations under Article Forty-Three of the Charter and would limit
internal mili tary capabilities of the members to small forces for police
obligations and forces necessary for the occupation of Japan, Germany ,
and Austria until peace treaties were signed.
to Gromyko for Soviet approva l .

Lange took the proposal

Gromyko firmly rejected the plan;

therefore , Lange abandoned the entire idea.
explanation for his negative position:

Gromyko offered the following

"such a reduction of armed forces

to internal police only as suggested would deprive the Soviet Union of
its present preponderance on land and would not affect significantly
.. 113

Western preponderance on the sea.

Rudzinski says that the Polish

delegation tried to arrive at some kind of compromise resolution for the
control of atomic energy, but Gromyko made it quite irrevocably clear that
the Soviets were not desirous of any atomic agreement which even slightly
referred to

mutual

.
ion
inspect

.
.
ta11ations.
•
of atomic
energy ins

114

Rudzinski was Poland ' s permanent representative on the Commi ttee of
Experts; he was also a member on the Committee on Rules and Procedure of

113
Ibid., P• 172.

78

the Atomic Er.�rgy Commission, a special committee to negotiate with the
United States concerr.ing the establishment of the United Nations seat
in the United States ,

the Committee on Procedure in the Commission for

Conventional Armaments ,
Law,
1947.

the Commission on the Codification of International

and the Committee on the Admission of New States during 1946 and
He states . that at no time during the first two years of the United

Nations activities did he receive any orders from superiors in Moscow
concerning which . positions he was to accept.
During August ,

1946,

in discussions involving the applications of

new members to the United Nations, the Polish and Soviet delegations
differed on the application of Ireland.

Gromyko was ardently opposed

to Irish membership in the United Nations.
circumstances surrounding

Rudzinski discusses the

this unusual development.

Officially the

Soviet U�ion opposed the Irish application because of the lack of dip
lomatic relations between Ireland and the u . s . s . R . ;

in fact ,

the re

fusal of Sovi�t support was due to the antagonistic attitude of Ireland
toward the Communistic Soviet regime.

Oscar Lange, however , despite

the obviously imminent Soviet veto, favored Irish entrance into the
United Natio�s "in view of the strong and traditional sympathies of
Polish public opinion (based on common Catholic religion and similiar
history)

for the Irish people and for its fight for liberation from the

British rule.0

11 5

On August 29, 1946, Lange voted affirmatively on

Ireland ' s application for admission, but Ireland was not admitted to

1 15
Ibid . , pp. 166-167.
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the United Nations because of the Soviet opposition.

In August,

1947 ,

with Juliusz Katz-Suchy voting for the Polish delegation, Ireland ' s
admittance was again considered .

A t this time, only a year after Lange' s

affirmative vote, Katz-Suchy felt that abstention was his government's
wisest choice.
In July,

1947, while Rudzinski was acting chairman of the Cor..mittee

on the Admission of New States, it was suggested by the Soviet delegation
that he attempt to arrange a deal that would allow for the admittance of
all the applicants for membership, both those sponsored by the West�
Ireland, Portugal, and Transjordan ,�and those sponsored by the Soviets�
Albania , . Hungary, Bulgaria , Mongolia, Romania, and Hungary.

However, no

arrangement was ever agreed upon because of the West ' s strong objections
to any arrangement which included Albanian admittance into the United
Nations .

The Albanian government was at this time before the International

Court of Justice defending herself against the British charges over the
Corfu Channel incidents.
In July,

116

1947, Rudzinski , substituting for Juliusz Katz-Suchy in the

Committee for the Admission of New States, was instructed by Lange to vote
identical with the 1946 Polish votes on the admission of Albania , Mongolia,
Trans jordan, Ireland, and Portugal, and to support the recent applications

of Italy, Hungary, and Austria.

However, in early August, 1947, Katz-Suchy

returned to the committee, and following directives from Warsaw voted against
the admission of Portugal and Austria, and abstained on Transjordan and
Ireland .

In 1946 Poland had supported the application for admission of

Ireland.

This suggested that by mid 1947, Lange ' s authority within the

116
Ibid . ,

PP•

118-119.
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Polish delegation had already diminished greatly . � 1 7
On June 5 ,

1947, United States Secretary of State George Marshall

had proposed massive economic aid for general European recovery from
World War I I .

Lange had instructed Rudzinski to accept the plan.

June 1 7 ,

in the Economic and Employment Commission Rudzinski

1947,

On

expressed readiness on behalf of the Polish government to cooperate in
the ;-�: .-.rican arrangements for postwar recovery.
..

In personal conversations

Lange expressed his intentions to energetically support the Marshall
Plan.

"Lange enthusiastically favored its acceptance by Poland realizing

fully and expressing it in private conversations that financial assistance
which the Warsaw regime might receive from the United States would certainly

be accompanied by political demands for change in Polish internal policy
and obviously would bring also a political even if partial shift in the
1
international field in the Western direction .11 1 8

However, Lange withdrew

Polish acceptance of the Marshal l P lan "refusing to fall for the American
1
bait ,11 1· 9 after Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov so. violently rejected the
plan in Ju l y ,

1947.

This is one of the most notable manifestations of the

Soviet influence on postwar Polish diplomacy .120

117

11�
119
Europe ,

Ibid . ,

Ibid . , p .

109- 1 1 1 .
192.

Otakar Odlozilik, "Integration of Western European Nations , " Central
IV (Winter, 1950 ) , p. 29.

1 20
·

pp.

Leon Goure ,

"The Eastern Europcnn l3loc and the Uni tcd Nations Charter , "
(Spring , 1949 ) , p . 4 2 .
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Rudzinski says that there

was

no question that Sovi�t representative

.
Granyko informed Lange of .the Soviet position and requested Lange• s support.
.

.

.

"At the very beginning .during the first months a spirit of cordiality pre
Even . afterward with increasing exceptions outward appearances of

vailed .

good will and friendship were maintained.

Nevertheless the author had the

�

fee ing that relations between Gromyko and Lange were never close and n�ver
really friendly.

They worsened , naturally, after July, 1946, when Lange

learned in Warsaw about complaints submitted against him."

121

Ruozincki advised Lange during the Security Counci l ' • debates of the
Greek problem in 1947.

The Soviet Union

took

the position that the sub

committee selected to inveatigate the dispute could

not

force Yugoslavia

to allow the CocmnissiQn of Investigation canplete freedan of entry
Yugoslav territory.
inquiry into

the

in

Lange, after having Rudzinski conduct a legal:

matter, sta� that the parties to the dispute were

obligated to submit to canplete· and

unrestricted

course, this position was not sa·tisfactory to

investigation.

the

Soviets.

Of

The result

was Soviet withdrawal of her own amendment calling for limited access
in Yugoslavia and Albania and

the

acceptance· of a Polish amendment which

allowed free passage of the Commission members in all the nations involved
in the dispute.

122

In the autumn of 1946 Poland accepted the General Convention on
Privileges and Inaun!Ues of the United Nations.

121
. Rudzinski ,
122

Ibid . ,

P•

.22 • ill • , P•
116.

115.

The Soviet Union was

82

opposed to this. convention which granted diplomatic privileges and immunities .
not only to United Nations representatives, · �t also to the United Nations ·
Secretariat and experts who were involved in official missions.

The Soviet

delegation was not anxious to have any uninvited observers in ·their nation.
Even. though Lange had accepted the Convention and expressed ·international
friendship toward the United Nations missions for the Warsaw regime , by
late 1947 "a freezing Eastern wind started blowing
.

•

•

•

from Moscow after
.

the Marshall Plan was violently rejected by Moscow in July, 1947 and the
r:;;,711.nfcn:m created in September, 1947 and the traditional Polish hospi tality

for foreigners changed abruptly' into official Russian suspicion and
hostility."

123

·

·

Rudzinski says that the conferences of the Polish delegation held in
the fall of 1946 were · very · routine .

Wincenty Rzymowski, Polish Foreign

Minister, came to New Yo� to. plan and coordinate the forthct>ming work of
the delegation.

During the 1946 conferences there were no major political

or diplomatic decisions concluded; however, by the fall of 1947 Poland ' s
diplomatic situation had been modified.

Zygmunt Modzelewski had arrived .

in New York to head the United Nations• General Assembly delegation.

·

"Modzelewski . explained that the political situation had changed after · the
Mar�hall Plan was rejected by Molotov in Paris in July, 1947, and accordingly
the role of Polish diplomacy is now altered.

No further attempts to arrive

at �ompromise solutions of problems dividing the West from the East should
,

be made by Polish representatives, and

123

Ibid . , P• 170.

no

further efforts ·of coneiliation·.
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It was clearly implied that Russia considers such moves as undesirable. 01.24
After Modzelewski ' s retu.

t:o Warsaw in late 1947, Lange assumed the duties

of chairman of tne General Assembly conferenc�s for a time .

But already

aware of his approaching return to Warsaw, Lcµige had become ineffective
and indecisive within the delegation.
Another instance of differing views which Rudzinski discusses is
the votes in Marc�,
Pacifie.
.

J

1947, concerning Japanese mandate islands in th�

At first the Soviets seemed to willingly accept the. fact that

t-.h"! lJ:ii. f ?rl
<
States would incorporate these islands into the Americrin
security system, perhaps expecting American reciprocity toward the
Soviet initiatives in · Eastern Europe.

Therefore, in the early stag.es

of the deliberations Lange moved quite freely; however , in a final vote
on a Polish resolution concerning the Japanese mandate islands on Apri l
2,

1947, the Soviet dele
tion was explicity opposed to the Polish efforts
�!'

at leadership.
situation

This resulted in a joint Polish-Soviet approach to the

l25

•.

In the fall of 1947, Rudzinski had replaced Manfred Lachs on the
Sixth (Legal) Conunittee which was. drafting the. statute of the International
Law Commission.

A proposal was under discussion whi�h called ·for consultation

between the International Law Commission and the Pan American Union on the
codification of international law.

Vladimir K . Koretsky, the Soviet

representative on the committee , informed Rudzinski that the Soviet delegation
would not support a Latin American proposal which the Soviets believed was

'4_rbid. ,

1'2

1:26

lli!!!' ,

P• 132.

P•

135 .
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an outright attempt to grant special privileges to� the Latin American
nations in direct violation of the theorized equality of international
legal systems .

�oweyer , Rudzinski replied to Koretsky that the Polish

delegation did not Wish to alienate the countries of Latin American on
a matter of such insignificance , since Poland was up for re-election to

nomic and Social Cou.ncil at this time.

the Eco

Rudzinski then introduced

an amendment which made consultation with the Pan American U�ion optional.
The proposal was then adopted by the Sixth Committee without the support
1 1

•

• ···.::i.1' l· Union.

1Z6

According to Rudzinski Soviet requests during 1946 and 1947 were
infrequent and not strictly imposed upon the Polish. delegation and therefore
were easily evaded, Withou t excessive apprehension of being reprimanded by
the Soviets . · As late as July, 1947, Lange, who. had been admonished both
from Moscow and Warsaw for his lack of coordination with the Soviet
delegation, still managed to. maintain a degr�e of independence.

Lange

was president of the Security Council, which was discussing the Greek
problem at this time .

Lange still showed his independent nature in

several rulings on procedural matters. 121
Rudzinski headed the Legal Department of the Pol�sh Consulate · General
in New York .

During 1946 and 1947 the P�l�sh consulate was not dominated

by the Soviet Consulate.

A large margin· of independence was permitted for

the operation of the Polish Consulate.

l'26rbid . , PP• 129-130.

l:2.
pp.
. '7.�··

116-122.

There was no official contact

85

between the Soviet and Polish Consulates on legal procedures.

Legal

problems concerning former Polish territories in the East which were
now recognized as Sovie� provinces were routinely r�ferred to the
Soviet Consulate.

The Polish Consulate refused to become involved in

these issues to any degree. 128
During 1946 and 194 7 there existed a certain degree of free
exchange of conversation concerning international political affairs
within the Polish delegation.

In early postwar Polish diplomatic

.

quarters it was even possible to openly discuss controversial policies
with the Soviet diplomats. 129
Rudzinski emphasized throughout his work the significance of
Oscar Lange ' s participation in the initial acts of Polish independence
in foreign relations.

According to R�dzinski Lange was never trusted

·

completely by the Soviets because of his background of Western living.
Lange was used only to advance the Soviet scheme for complete Polish
domination, as long as his abilitiei;i were useful .

When Lange ' s use-

fulness came to an end in late 1947., he was retired from the government
In sununary Rudzinski defines Lange's and therefore Poland ' s

service.

position in the United Nations during 1946 and 1947:

�ar

was that Poland accepted in the pos

"His conception

world the protection of the

Soviet military might against defeated Germany and a Soviet guarantee
of her new Western frontiers.

That situation resulted according to

. Lange ' s views in the impossibility for Polish diplomats to take a
standpoint opposed to the Sovi�t Union in matters of vital (military

lZ8

-�. ,

p. 188.

86

or other primary)

importance to her.

any means (at •least so Lange thought)
ques t-.ions.

But this area did not cover by
the whole 'field of political

Outsi<:lc the core of problems so' vital to Russia,

diplomat could and should ,

a Polish

according to Lanqe ' s conception, move with

reasonable freedom of action always naturally preserving the obligatory
friendly but not subservient attitude towards Poland ' s mighty neighbor .11 13 0

130I bid. ,

pp.

164- 1 6 5 ;

nlso see Annex I I , Document No. 1 0 , pp.

158-162..

CHAPTER III

POLISH DIPLOMACY IN DECLINE,

1948-1956

As domestic conditions become more Communist-dominated after 1948,
Polish foreign policy became more Soviet-oriented .

Poland stepped into

line on all succeeding votes in the United Nations after Oscar Lange ' s
removal in 1948, and Poland ' s entire foreign policy became almost identical

with that of the U . S . s . R.

This period , known as the St;,linist er.Cl, was

e.x.ll."emely significant in the development of Poland as a Communist stote
subservient to the Soviet Union .

Relations between the u. s . s . R.

and

the Western allies became tense as the Cold War burs t upon the international
scene and the insuing development of the American policy of containment.
The Soviet Union,

plagued by uneasy postwar relations with the Western world·,

intensified her efforts to tighten control over all facets of Polish
interna l and external affairs.
Treaty Organization (NATO}
East-Wes t relations.

The formation of the North Atlantic

in 1949 by the West, further antagonized

China and Korea were also major issues during

this period, both ending with Communist victories to a great extent.
The Soviet Union refused to allow Poland and the rest of Eastern

_

Europe to participate in the Marshal l Plan, but did form the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance {COMECON )

in January ,

stitute for the Marshal l P l. an in the Communist world.
states presented a unique problem for Poland.

1949 as a subThe two German

West Germany made con

siderable economic and political recovery and along with the Westei;:n
Powers refused to recognize Poland' s Oder-Nei�se boundary as permanent.
Also during this period the Soviet Union developed her military strength

87

88

to immense capacities with nuclear weapons.
Poland

All these factors forced

l•er Communist leaders to become increasingly dependent upon

the Soviet Union.

As a resul t ,

the Soviets gained an extremely

high

degree of control over Polish foreign relations .
Poland ' s attitude toward the u. s.

s . R.

and the other Communist

nations has been one of "brotherly Communist friendship" since . 1948.
Poland recognized the German Democratic Republic in 1949 and a border
agreement was finalized in July,
•·p

1950.

Poland has maintained economic

''<'m"'11ls with lhe Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe , the mo!>t important

ones with Romania , Bulgari a , and Hungary.
large scale with Red China.

Trade is also conducted on a

Poland seems to serve as a carrier to Red

China for some of the other satellite states.

1

From 1948 to 1956 the

Polish Communists did not adhere enthusiastically to the Soviet efforts
to spread Communism throughout the underdeveloped areas of the world.
The Polish Communists never really vigorously opposed such plans, but
never whole-heartedly delegated many of their resources to these activities.
During the past several years, a large trade increase has been noticeable
between Poland and the so-called neutral states, such as the new nations
of Africa and Latin America.

A Brazi lian writer states that Polish and

other Eastern European diplomats "enjoy privileged
with their Soviet comrades."

2

-r;-p .

1968

�

Republic (Baltimore:

The

87.

2
Jose Oswaldo De Meira Penna,
Europe , " Studies

compared

Such special treatment seems to be based

1
James F . Morrison, The Polish Peoples•
Johns Hopkins Press,

treatment

"Brazilian Relations with Eastern

� Soviet Union, VIII

C l96B) , 82.
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on the fact that these Eastern European nations had been allied with the
West during the war but were later abandoned to the Communists.

Rudzinski

states that during 1946 and 1947 the chief Polish delegate in the United
Nations , Oscar Lange, refused to allow the Polish United Nations delegation
to display a hostile attitude toward the Latin American nations as the
Soviet representatives did

so

Shortly after World War

vehemently.

II ,

3

Poland became a participant in a series

of strategic agreements among Communist nations latter to be known cumulatively
I I t'? W.-1n1.iw

Ptlct.

4

These agreements of friendship, collaboration and

mutual assistance were made with the Soviet Union, April 21, 1945; with
Yugoslavia, March 18, 1946, later denounced unilaterally by Poland o�
September 29, 1949; with Czechoslovakia , March 10, 1947; with Bulgaria,
May 29, 1948; with Hungary, June 18, 1948; and with Romania, January
26, 1949.

These treaties call for "close co-operation, consultation on

important questions and international relations, collaboration against German
aggression, a ban on alliances or coalitions directed against a treaty
partner , strengthening of political and economic as well as cultural ties ,
implementation of the treaty in the spirit of the United Nations and a
duration of twenty years."

5

The security system of the Communist world,

which includes Poland, became multi-lateralized on May 14, 1955, with the
signing in Warsaw of a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and

3

Alexander Rudzinski , Inside Polish Postwar Diplomacy (New York:
Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe ,
1953 ) , P• 197.
4

For complete listings of Polish foreign treaties 1919 to 1960 see:
Stephen Horak , Poland ' s Internationul Affairs, .!2..!2,- 1960: A Calendar
(Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1964 ) .
5
Richard 1taar, Polann _!lli-�: � Sovietization 5!f. .! Captive
Peopl� (New Or1Pnnsi l .<>1d · 1 1 "n:\ State University Press, 1962 ) , p . 115.
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Mutual Assistance to be known formally as the Warsaw Pact.
Albania, Romania , the U. s . s . R. , Hungary, Bulgaria,
Czechos lovakia.

6

Members were

East Germany and

This agreement established a unified command of the

armed forces of these eight countries to safeguard peace and security in
the world.

7·

Polish attitudes toward the United States and the West have changed
tremendously since the July, 1944, declaration by the Polish Committee of
National Liberation proclaiming permanent friendship and alliance with

Gr��t. Rrlt�in and the United States.

The Polish Communists point to

'
several factors that have caused their anti-American policies since 1948.
The United States had strongly objected to the 1947 Polish elections, de-

claring that they were not free and unfettered as the Yalta agreements had
provided. ·

The United States also persistently stated that border demarcations

should await a permanent peace settlement with unified Germany as the Big
Three had decided at Potsdam.

After 1948 the United States also placed a

blockade on all exports to Poland that might contribute to Soviet military
power.

8

Polish relations with the United States and the West gradually

became almost non-existent by 1956.

Poland looked only to the East for

economic, military, and cultural assistance.

9

Polish diplomats supported

6
For a complete discussion of the legality of Poland ' s postwar

alliances under the United Nations Charter see:

Krzysztof Skubiszewski ,

"The Postwar Alliances of Poland and the United Nations Charter" , Journal

-2!

International �' LIII
7
Staar,
8

!!z!.9.• ,

.£E• �. ,

p.

(July, 1959 ) , 613-634.

115.

P• 116.

9
For complete documentation of Polish foreign treaties during t· his
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lloralc,

.££• ill• ,

pp.
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the Soviet policy by producing violent attacks upon any efforts to improve
international relations by the Western Powers .
The major world crises of the years after 1948 found Poland enthusiastically
supporting every Soviet policy.

Perhaps the most noteworthy eruption on the

international scene during this period was in Korea.

"The deterioration in

relations between the Western and Communist groups of states culminated in
the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950."
greater military expenditures from Poland.

10

The

u. s . s.

R. demanded

This hastened the adoption of a

!:i Y.-Y"ilr plan by thP. Cf!ntral Committee of the PZPR on July 15-16, 1950.
plan

one.

The new

was supposed to transform the Polish economy completely into a socialist
Consumer goods were to be ignored and industrialization was to be de-

veloped with emphasis on armaments.

"That Bierut and Minc--probably on

Soviet instructions--sought to ensure by every means in their power the
early fulfilment of this very far-reaching plan was certainly connected with
the tension between East and West caused by the Korean War."

11

From 1951 to

1955 eleven per cent of the total industrial investments were for defense

production.

This was more than the complete investments for light industries.

The Polish army was built-up at the demand of the Soviets.

By 1953 the

Polish army had reached 300,000 to 4009000 men under arms, not including the
security corps .

Even though many polish officers held high posts, Soviet

dfficers actually held the key positions.

12

During the Korean War the Soviet

Richard Hiscocks, Poland Bridge for � Abyss? An Interpretation .2£.
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Prior to the out-

Union took full advantage of Poland ' s vast coal deposits.

break of the Korean War coal had brought in 250 million dollars a year for
Poland.

However, because of Soviet insistence that Polish coal be exported

only to the U.

s . s. R.

and be used at home for armament production "it

probably earned a third of that amount."

13

In 1951 Poland was "under ot>.-

ligation to deliver to her neighbors 7,000,000 tons yearly at a price of
Sl.S per ton.

If sold to the West at world parity prices, a ton would

bring $10 to $15.!• 14
T n the

Uni ted

Nations Poland supported the Soviet Union in her state-

mcnts concerning Korea.

As early as 1948 the Soviet bloc nations, which

included Poland, maintained that the General Assembly did not have the right
to take any action with regard to Korea as that matter had been covered by
the Moscow Agreements and should be dealt with by the Allied governments
concerned.

The Soviet bloc held that a unified Korea should be established

by the Korean people themselves.

Poland refused to participate in a

temporary conunittee to study the Korean problem.

The Soviet bloc nations

jointly declared that "the Assembly ' s refusal at that session to permit
Korean representatives to take part in the discussions of the question at
a time when questions affecting the independence of their country were
being discussed contravened the provisions of the Charter and the right of
self-determination of peoples ."

15

13

Clifford R. Barnett, Poland-� People, ,ill Society, ,ill Culture
(New Haven: H�F Press, 1958) , p. 301.
14

"Cracks in the Soviet Bloc," United Nationc. World,
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On

June

25-�7,

1951, the United Nations Security Council voted to

send medical units, economic assistance, and military forces to South
Korea.

Poland stated that these resolutions were 0illegal since they had

been adopted without the vote of the
Republic of China."

16

u. s. s.

R. and with the vote of the

The Soviet delegate, along with the Polish delegate

had walked out of the United Nations in April, 1950,in protest of the
majority' s refusal to immediately expel the Nationalis� Chinese delegates
from the United Nations Security Council.
!.: 1:;l:cnt.ly declared

The Soviet bloc nations con-

that the Republic of China had no right to represent

the Chinese people in the United Nations.

The Soviet bloc "took the

position that the events in Korea were the result of a planned and

un-

provoked attack by the South Korean forces on the frontier areas of
North Korea, and that the United States had resorted to open, armed
intervention in Korea, before the convening of the Security Council."

17

However, in the final armistice negotiations to settle the Korean 9onflict, Poland participated as a neutral party.
another painful fiction.0

Halecki calls this "just

18

The same pattern for Polish diplomacy has been followed concerning
all major issues -since 1948 .

Poland has supported the

faill°ngly in questions concerning the Near East.

u. s. s.

R. un-

In 1948 in the General

Assembly , the Polish representative express�d this view toward efforts

16
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Press, 1953 ) , P• 4 .

18
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to end hostilities between the Arabs and the Israelis:
n'

"The majority

the General Assembly, at a special session, had yielded to pressure

from the United States and the United Kingdom."
voted consistently with the

u. s . s .

19

The Polish delegation

R. �elegation against efforts of the

West to solve the problems in the Near East.

The Polish delegate claimed

that Israel was really just being turned over to Great Britain.

The Polish

representative declared that "the war and misery in Palestine were due to
the attitude of the United Kingdom and the United States
.
m<l
ppnpl �s •

•

•

•

the Arab

the State of Israel should learn that they could not gain

real independence by reliance on certain Great Powers."

20

Polish reliance on Soviet foreign policy patterns of behavior was
also exercised during the problems in Indo-China.

Polish diplomats, like

those of the u. s. s. R., responded to any efforts of the West to solve
the difficulties in Indo-China as imperialistic attempts to dominate the
area.

Within the United Nations General Assembly debates and votes the

Polish delegation simply mimicked the Soviet viewpoint.

21

Again Halecki calls Poland ' s participation in attempts to settle
the problems of Indo-China a mere joke.

22

Condemnation and unfounded

allegations against the West were the main features of Polish diplomacy
concerning Indo-China.

.
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On June

20 ,

1956, a general strike in Poznan by the industrial

workers and climactic riot the following day spurred hopes in the West
that Poland might

be able to change her international position.

The

Central Committee of the Polish Conununist Party was called into session
in July , 1956.

committee.

A three-headed struggle for power developed within the

The Stalinist group sought complete censorship

of any liberalization movement.

chab and

I· "'·"•H"d O

slower pace.
unity

and

the termination

Another group of younger, more nationalistic

Polish Communists wanted liberalization to be continued.
tir

and

The third group led

Josef Cyrankiewicz supported change, but at a much

The only man who a l l three groups felt could restore party

authority was Wladyslaw .Gomulka.

Even though the old-line

Stalinists agreed to support Gomulka only because of his widespread
public support, all three factions voted to return Gomulka to the political
Oh ; August 4,

bureau.
Party.

1956, he was reinstated in the Polish Conununist

23

Having sgreed on the composition of the new political bureau, Ochab,
Gomulka, and Cyrankiewicz summoned a meeting of the Party' s Central Committee

on

October 19, 1956.

Unanticipated visitors arrived at the meeting

from the Soviet Union, N. s . Khrushchev, v . M. Molotov,

and

A.

I . Mikoyan.

Upon

the

arrival

of

L.

M. Kagonovich,

Marshal I . s . Konev , Conunander-

in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, it was reported that Soviet

2 3see:

Frank Gibney , � Frozen Revolution: Poland-� Study in
Communist Decay (New York: Farrar, Strnus, and Cudahy, 1959 ) ; K. s .
Karol, Visa !.££ Poland, trans. Marvyn Savi ll ( London: Macgibbon and
Kee, 1959 ) ; Flora Lewis, The Polish Volcano: � � History of Hope
(London: Secker and Warburg , 1959 ) ; s . L . Schneiderman, The Warsaw
Heresy (New York : Horizon Press, 1959) ; Konrad Syrop, Sp�g .!!! Octob<?r:
� Polish Revolution � � ( London: Weidenfeld and Nicolsen, 195 7 ) .
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troops were moving toward Warsaw.

Belweder Palace in Warsaw was the

scene of the meetings of the Polish Communist Party ' s Central Committee
and their Soviet guests on the night of October 19-20, 1956.

Evidently

the Polish Communists convinced the Soviet representatives that Gomulka ' s
reinstatement would not damage Polish-Soviet relations.
turned to Moscow on October 20, 1956.

The Soviets re

Perhaps the Soviets were aided in

making their decision to return by forecasts of further .demonstrations by
the Polish workers and students.

The next day the Central Committee

c J ecled a new nine-member political bureau with Gomulka as its chairman.
The new political bureau had no representative of the former Stalinist
group in its membership.
An era of reform seemed evident for Poland.

Oscar Lange was brought

back into the government and some domestic reforms were undertaken.

There

were hopes in the West that the 1956 change of power in Poland might also
bring some changes in Polish foreign affairs.

Observers felt that the

implications of Titoism might spread to Poland because of Gomulka ' s early
attachment to Tito' s cause but of course , were to be gravely disappointed
· in this respect.

CHAPTER IV

CONCUJSION
The modification of the p0litical power structure in

1956 in Poland

brought about many basic changes in internal Polish affairs but no real
changes in foreign policy.

Khrushchev made certain that Polish foreign

relations would not be altered before he returned to Moscow on October

20, 1956.

Gomulka pledged that Poland would remain in the Warsaw Pact

and accepted arrangements for Soviet troops to remain in Poland indefinitely.
Thus Gomulka had sacrificed any influence Poland might acquire on the
international scene in order to gain control of the Polish Communist Party.
Even though Poland forfeited any power she might assume in world
affairs for a greater degree of independence domestically, the very
assertion of any independence from the Soviet Union was an expression of
a shift in Polish foreign relations.

Naturally, questions were asked

throughout the world as to Poland ' s real position.

Since many clearly

remembered that Gomulka had been ousted from the Central Committee of the
· polish Camnunist Party for nationalistic tendencies, there was hope that
he might follow the

1948 path of Tito in Yugoslavia or that at least a .

kind of Titoism within the Soviet security system might possibly develop.
Poland ' s course after

1

1956, however, did not prove to be worthy of

such optimistic expectations.

Gomulka proved to be a unique partner for

the Soviets; he was initially reluctant to accept Soviet direction without
some reservation.

Many times the Sovi�t regime had to accept delays and

1
John Campbell , "Poland ' s International Position Since
Polish R�view, IV (Summer, 1959) , 47.
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1956, " �
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deletions of the usual pr�ises of the Soviet Union as the great Communist
leader.

During the Hungarian revolt Gomulka never expressed any justification

for the Soviet intervention in Hungary.

A Polish newspaper stated that the

source of the Hungarian rebellion "should not be sought in the simplified
version about alien agencies nor looking for counter-revolution at each
step •

•

•

It must be sought,

first of a l l , in the errors , distortions, and

even crimes of the past Stalinist period."
cedented occurence in postwar Poland.
Gomulka's regime might

try

2

This definitely was an unpre-

For a time i t even seemed that

to formulate its O'ft'n foreign policy.

took a position closer to that of Yugoslavia
Soviet intervention in Hungary.

3

by

Poland

condemning the first

In the United Nations General Assembly

the Polish delegation abstained in a vote to send observers to Hungary ,
obviously a switch from the old pattern of following unquestionably every
step of the u. s . s . R .

4

On

November 9 ,

1956,

the Polish delegate also

voted in favor of an Austrian resolution to send relief to Hungary .
Soviet delegation opposed the resolution . 5
the Soviet intervention.
internal issue.

Gomulka was quite indifferent toward

He claimed that the whole problem was a Hungarian

Even though he never showed outright support of the Soviet
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actions , Gomulka' s speeches were always fil led with condemnations of the
West for even considering intervention.
in convincing the Soviets

Such statements evidently succeeded

that there was no chance of a Polish attempt for

greater independence in foreign affairs.

By May, 1957, Gomulka "found it

necessary to term the Soviet help in suppressing the counter-revolution a
regrettable but inevitable necessity, al though we may differ from other

6

parties in our assessment of events in Hungary."

Gomulka remained throughout the years friendly toward Tito.
September,

In

1957, Gomulka and Tito made a joint declaration concerning their
Poland has refused to join

divergent, kxlt compatible roads to socialism.

in the violent denunciations of the Yugoslav regime as the Soviets have
done continuously since 1948.

At

a November ,

1957, meeting of Conununist Party chiefs in Moscow,

Gornulka was said to strongly oppose a declaration issued by the party
leaders .

Polish sources claimed that the final draft of the declaration

was considerably altered because of Gomulka' s resistance to proposals
stressing the leadership of the Soviet party in world Communism.

Through

the years , however, Gomulka seemed gradually to accept the fact that there
was really cause for opposing Soviet policies.
the

Hungarian Revolt, it

was

obviously

unrea l

After the Soviets put down

istic

for Gomulka to believe

he could ever attain the independence Tito had achieved. in Yugoslavia.

7

If Gomulka ever had any aspirations for Polish independence, and there

6

Campbell� .2£• cit . , 48.

7
Ibid. ; ' 48-49.
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are viable questions about that point, by 1958 they were completely abandoned.
By this time Gomulka was blaming inexplicably the Yugoslavs and Hungarians
for their own problems.

Gomulka was a devout Communist and therefore his

view of nationalism for Poland was a str�ng Communistic Poland and because
of her immediate neighbors this also meant strong Soviet influence in
Polish international relations.

As Bromke says , "in foreign policy, . the

Gomulka government did not exploit the opportunities to win more leeway
for Poland from the Soviet Union.

Both in East-West relations and in the

disputes among the Communist countries-including participation in the
suppression of Czechoslovakia--Warsaw trailed along after Moscow at every
turn. ..0

During Khrushchev' s second de-Stalinization campaign in 1961,

Gomulka could have perhaps forced the Soviets to allow his government. more
autonomy because of the tension between Red China and the Soviet Union.
However, Gomulka did not push for any change.
The l960 ' s were marked by serious challenges to Gomulka' s power.

9

In 1964 and 1968 complications arose between the Catholic Church and the
government.

Through the mid-sixties the intellectuals defied the govern-

ment•s restrictions on free expression.

As a result of the government ' s

banning of a play by Adam Mickiewicz, because of its anti-Russian character
there were three weeks of sit-ins and rioting in February, 1968.

10

Gomulka suppressed the protesters and managed to be re-elected First
Secretary at the Fifth Party Congress in November, 1968, "but his political

8
Adam Bromke, "Beyond the Gomulka Era" , Foreign Affairs, XLIX
(Apri l , 1970) , 485.
9
For activities within Poland during the sixties see: s . A . FischerGalati, Eastern Europe in � Sixties (New York: Praeger, 1963) ; and Jack
Kuron, Revolutionary Mandtit Students Spenk �' 1964-12§.§. (New York: Merit
Publishers , 1968.
10
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influence was waning .

He was discredited among the people ; dissatisfaction

with the deteriorating economic conditions was mounting among the workers."

11

·

Poland' s economic situation became intolerable to the workers in late

A goverrunent announcement of a food price increase resulted

December, 1970.

in rioting in several Polish coastal cities.

In typical Conununist fashion,

a reshuffling of party leadership was the answer.

Wladyslaw Gomulka was

replaced as Polish Communist Party First Secretary on Decei:ru>er 20, 1970,

by Edward Gierek .

12

The success of Gierek in settling the problems in Poland

will be the key to future Polish foreign relations.

The economic situation

with which Gierek must contend is extremely difficult.
Regardless of leadership, Polish diplom�cy probably can never be antisoviet, even thcugh •he may continue to attempt to become more independent .
_

Poland ' s position between Germa.'ly and the Soviet Union makes it impossible
for the Polish leaders to ignore the superior Soviet strength in Eastern
Simply by noting the Soviet-occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968

Europe .

and being aware of the large postwar Soviet militacy complex in East
Germany, Poland must accept the fact that she is surrounded by Soviet
Even before the Poles and the West Germans �oncluded a treaty

forces.

recognizing Poland' s western boundary , the U. S . S . R . and West Germany
had formally sanctioned the border in a Soviet-West German pact in August,

1970.

Thus Polish leaders cannot dismiss the immense importance of Soviet

influence in any respect.

11
12

Ibid . , 482.
Ibid . , 483.

13
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Poland , however , occupies a unique position in the family of Soviet
satellites.

The Soviet Union must control Poland to sustain Soviet access

to East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

If Poland becomes uncontrollable the

Soviet Union would surely find it impossible to control other areas of
Eastern Europe.

Poland ' s geographical position, therefore , not only

limits her activities in foreign affairs , but also provides Poland with a
certain amount of influence that none of the other Eastern European nations
possess.

Evidence of Poland ' s special position within the Soviet security

nystem was noted in the 1950 ' s when Polish leaders were allowed to de
collectivize agriculture and throughout the postwar era the Catholic
Church has been permitted to continue functioning ; such policies have
been prohibited in the other Eastern European nations which the Soviets
control.

If the Poles do not push too hard or too fast, they can possibly

continue �o hold this privileged position.
Since March , 1969, when at a meeting in Budapest the Communist leaders
began calling a broader political framework in Europe , Polish diplomats
have been energetically trying to create an atmosphere in Europe that
might lead to multi-lateral agreements among all the nations of Europe ,
instead of the customary bilateral Soviet treaty system.

Evidence of this

can be seen in the improvement of relations between. Poland and France., and
Poland and West Germany .

Polish diplomats have become major proponents

of an all-European conference seeking the support of all the Western
nations , including the United States.
Even though the Soviet Union now actively supports the reduction of
East-West tensions , Polish diplomats also must realize the advantages that
this policy offers her own nation.

By relieving the tensions between the
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East and West, Poland will gain new markets and technology which will
boos t her stagnant economy.

Also lll.l lti-lateral cooperation would lead

to troop reductions and a de-emphasis of formal bilateral treaties.

Such

a situation should help to solve some of Poland' s political and diplomatic
difficulties and allow her to play a more significant role in international
affairs.

"Poland' s return to Europe would also be of great importance in

resolving East-West conflicts in that part of the world.

Precisely because

she is a lynchpin of the present system in East-Central Europe,

such a

development would have far-reaching repercussions throughout the entire
continent.

Conversely, a major explosion in Poland could be extremely

damaging to the prospects for an East-West detente .

For there can be no

stable European system without Poland ' s active participation.

Whatever

the final outcome of the present political crisis in Poland , for better
or for worse, one thing seems to be certain--with the · end of the Gomulka
era, Poland will play an increasingly significant role in the international
sphere, as befits this dynamic and proud nation."

14

After Gomulka's rise to power the limits to Poland ' s freedom of action
in international affairs remained only too obvious.
wished to befriend the West his chances were slight.

Even if Gomulka had
Soviet troops re-

mained stationed in large numbers on both sides of Polan�, in East Germany
and in the ·Soviet Union, as well as some Soviet troops remaining on Polish
soi l .

The West would not help Poland in 1939, what chance was there that,

even if Poland could challenge the Soviet military strength ,
would support her efforts this time .

the West
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Poland has remained to a high degree dependent on the Soviet Union
economically.

The Soviet Union completely dominated the Polish economy

during the Stalinst period ,
tried hard to break

0ut

1948· to 1956.

Even though the Poles have

of economic isolation, especially since 1956,

western markets did not develop to a satisfactory level.

The only

alternative for Polish leaders was to remain economically bound to the
Soviet Union .
Even though Poland's own fate depends on the handling of the great
issues involved in the East-West confrontation; she can take only limited
part in these affairs.

An example of Poland ' s lack of influence in world

affairs came in the late 1950's and the early 1960 ' s with the introduction
of a plan for the curtailment of atomic weapons.

The plan was first

presented to the United Nations on February 14, 1958, by Adam Rapacki,
the Polish Foreign Minister who proposed that no atomic weapons be
manufactured or stockpiled in Czechoslovakia,
West Germany.

Poland, East Germany , or

The proposal also suggested that a ban be placed on all

equipment and 1nstallations in these countries designed to service atomic
weapons.

The use of atomic weapons against these four nations would

also be prohibited.

Rapacki presented a revised version of his plan

in two parts on November 4 ,

1958.

The first part · called for a general

agreement among the world powers that no nuclear weapons would be manu
factured or introduced in areas not already possessing nuclear capabilities.
The second part of the revised plan proposed that a ban on atomic weapons
would be linked with a reduction of conventional weapons in the four
country area.

Finally on March 28,

1962, Rapacki introduced a third
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version of his proposals to the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

This

new version included a section concerning international control and inspect.ion within the four countries.
able to the West.

However, the plan remained unaccept-

EVen though the Rapacki Plan might have led to wider

disarmament negotiations and the general reduction of �he dangers of
war, the Western Powers feared the strategic and political complications
of the plan.

The acceptance of the Rapacki Plan mighf have given Poland
•

a chance to maneuver on the international scene and perhaps have led to
Soviet troop withdrawals from Poland.
international position in this way:

A Polish official summed up Poland' s
"Poland cannot throw her weight around

in international affairs , but did try to wriggle her toes a little bit.
Now the fate of the Rapacki Plan shows the cannot do even that . "

15

Little was accomplished in relations with the United States because
of Gomulka' s denunciations of the United States as an aggressor in the
Arab world, violator of international agreements in Germany , meddler in
Chinese internal affairs, and promoter of imperialism throughout the
world.

If any advances are to ever be made in Polish-Western relations

the West must accept the fact that there is no chance that they will
ever replace the Soviet Union in Polish foreign affairs.

The Polish

leaders ID.1st work within the limitations placed on Poland by the Soviet

Union .

Polish leaders must continue to act as the Soviets cOIM\and be-

cause of Poland ' s econonlic, political, and military dependence upon

15
Campbell, �· ill• t 53.
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The Western Powers must realize that only gradual change is

Moscow.

possible in Poiand, as well as the rest of Eastern Europe.

If

aid is offered to these nations it will probably be accepted , but
perhaps taunted at the same time .

"Without losing site of the dread

possibility of war, the Western governme�ts must develop policies
geared to gradual change.

Change is going to take place anyway .

The

situation on both sides of the Iron Curtain is dynamic , not static.
What American policy should seek in the long run--through diplomacy ,
trade, and cultural ·relations are ways and means of influencing those
forces of change in directions which serve the needs and desires of
the people of Poland and of the rest of Eastern Europe, while at the same
Ume serving the fundamental interests of the United States and the
West •

.. 16

The present situation in Poland is quite susceptible to change .
The workers succeeded in changing the political leadership of Poland
in December, 1970.

They will not likely forget this limited success.

If the situation becomes completely unbearable again, perhaps more
distinct change might result.

These assertions of nationalistic

feelings on the domestic political scene may also result in a more
independent Polish position in foreign affairs.

Such developments

will surely lead to conflict between the u. s. s . R. and Poland.

The

Western nations must be alert at all times to fully capitalize on any
nationalistic developments within Poland.

16
Ibid . , SS.
-

107

As this paper suggests , i t is extremely difficult, to explain
Polish foreign policy since 1945.
allowed to conduct her

own

In fact Poland has seldom been

foreign relations.

Surely as John c . Campbel l

suggests "it is wiser to speak of the international position o f Poland
than of Polish foreign affairs.

History shows the grave limitations

of the scope of any foreign policy Poland can have.

From the time

of the partitions until the end of the first World War, Polish foreign
policy consisted of the silent will of the nation and the activities
of emigres trying to influence the chancelleries of the world in the
direction of restoration of a free Poland.

The period of independence

between and wars witnessed and i l lusory attempt to play a role beyond
Poland ' s capacities and the realities of its situation.

The hollow-

ness of the attempt to achieve status as a great, or just less than
great , power was exposed once Poland no longer enjoyed the situation
of security resulting from German and Russian weakness.

Colonel

Beck ' s attempt at • realism• led only to the fourth partition.

Whether

a different policy would have avoided that result, is another question.
The fact remains that Poland ' s fate was not in Polish hands . ..

17

At the termination of World War II Poland ' s activities in international
affairs were obviously a matter of paramount importance to the Soviet Union.

17
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Territorial gains in the West only helped to strengthen pro-Soviet Polish
government ' s determined endeavor to provide the Soviet Union with a completely
subservient Polish foreign policy. · The new Polish Provisional Government of
National Unity, even though it quite clearly exhibit�d its exclusively in
timate relationship with the u. s . s . R . , did experience a period when limited
insubordination was shown toward the Soviets.
the official United Nations records,
Security Council debate s ,

After closely scrutinizing

and especially after studying the

i t is quite obviou s , even though unusual,

that

the Polish delegation to the United Nations proved that its actions were
not merely echoes of Soviet opinions on. international affairs.

Within the

Security Council Oscar Lange was continuously confronted by explosive. crises
in international relations.

Even though Lange emerged as the only supporter

of Soviet actions in many instances,

such as the numerous proposals concerning

the Corfu Channel incidents, the Greek problems , and the indictments of
Franco ' s Spain,

it is relatively easy to locate several occasions when Lange

bitterly disagreed with the Soviet position,

such as the deliberations con

cerning Ireland ' s application for admission and numerous procedural issues.
Within the Security Council Lange cast seven votes completely opposite those
of the Soviet delegate between March ,

1946,

and July,

1947.

Four of these

six votes were votes concerning procedural matters; one was concerning
Irish admission to the United Nations;
and weapon reduction;

one concerned general disarmzment

and one established guidelines for the postwar

supervision of the former Japanese;-mandate islands in the Pacific .
March,

1946,

to August,

1947,

however ,

From

there were twenty more occasions

in which the Pol i sh and Soviet delegations did not vote identically;
involved . abstentions on the part of one of the nations.

these

Of these incidents
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only three were disagreements concerning procedural matters; eight concerned
the problems in Greece; two involved disagreements over the Soviet attitude
toward the Corfu Channel incidents; two concerned the general regulation
and reduction of armaments; two were disagreements over the future of the
Japanese mandate islands; and one vote each concerned the settlement of
the control of Trieste , the British and Dutch involvement in Indonesia,
and the application for admission to the United Nations by Ireland.
Besides these undeniable votes in the Security Council there were also
fervent debates regarding other major issues which never came to conclusive
votes in the Council such as:

the discussions regarding the Iranian com

plaints that Soviet troops still remained in their country in March and
Apri l , 1946 , in which Lange consistently held that the issue was simply
a procedural matter and could be rejected or accepted by the Security
Council, therefore refuting the Soviet attempts to postpone consideration
of the Iranian issue indefinitely through clever Soviet legal manuevering;
the deliberations concerning free passage into the nations involved in
the Greek controversy in December , 1946, in which Lange, speaking for
Poland refused to support the

u.

S.

s.

R . ' s attempts to limit international

passage of the investigative commission in Yugoslavia and Albania; the dis
cussions in connection wit� general disarmament and weapon reduction in
January, 1947 , in which Lange chose to support a French proposal as opposed
to one presented by the Soviet delegation; and finally debates with relation
to the planned investigation of the Corfu Channel incidents, in which Lange
refused to support the Soviet demands that no action be taken until the
Albanian government had had an opportunity to reply to the British allegations.
Some suggest that these early gestures of Polish independence in foreign policy
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were meaning less, and that they were even implemented by the Polish officials
with Soviet approval, considering it to her own interest to project the
appearance of a free Poland conducting an independent foreign policy.
However , these suppositions ITllS t be disregarded after carefully studying
the verbatim accounts of the activities of the United Nations.
Oscar Lange, as chief Polish representative on the United Nations
Security Council proved to be the source of most of the assertions of
Polish independence .

Lange frequently took positions in the Security

Council which conflicted with Soviet aspirations, and many times he even
rejected those patterns already established by Zygmunt Modzelewski, his
predecessor in the Security Council.

In discussions over the postwar

Iranian problems concerning the slow. Soviet troop withdrawal program from
Iran Modzelewski was always a staunch Soviet supporter; Lange accepted no
such position.

Similiar incidents occurred in discussions concerning the

Indonesian issue and the Greek issue, both of which had found Modzelewski
only repeating Soviet statements .

Lange, though by no means establishing a

complete break from Soviet dictates, clearly exhibited his independent nature
in votes and debates concerning many issues.

It was Lange who often rebuked

what Gromyko stated; it was Lange who made numerous attempts at East-West
reconci liation, and it was Lange who quite graciously expressed to the
newspapers his initial interest in the American Marshall Plan.

With

Lange ' s condemnation in late 1947, and his complete removal from the Polish
United Nations delegation in 1948, Polish insubordination toward the Soviets,
in terms of foreign affairs , was largely terminated, even though domestically .
Poland managed to attain more independence.

While initiative from the lower ech

elons in political matters was a welcome virtue and almost always approved during
the first period ( 1946-1947) , it became a vice and very serious hazard after 1948.
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What a Polish delegate was doing became dependent upon prior approval by
his Soviet opposite number .

A passive role of seconding Soviet motions

became a duty and a better part of wisdom •

•

•

i t became obvious to every

member of the Polish delegation that the advocating of a political viewpoint opposed or conflicting with the current Soviet line is out of question . "
Because of

the new Polish government ' s lack of experienced diplomats,
•

the postwar Polish foreign policy was generally compo�ed of amateurs at all
I

leve ls.

This situation added to Oscar Lange ' s importarce in the early

United Nations deliberations , as a result he. was al lowed a great amount of
personal decision-making responsibility for the Polish delegation.

Lange

was an international personage , as a result ?f his notorious rejection of
his newly-acquired American citizenship to become a public servant of his
formerly deserted homeland, and not su.rprisingly the non-professionals in
the Polish foreign office seemed to be quite anixous to capitalize on the
added prestige that such

a

development accorded tne new pro-Soviet regime .

Surely no one really believed that postwar Poland, regardless of the
\

attractiveness of the idea, could ever again adopt any foreign policy
attitudes which were diametrically opposed to those of the Soviet Union,
especially after the acceptance by the Western Powers of the distinctively
Communist-oriented Provisional Goverrunent of . National Unity,

a man of the intelligence and experience of Oscar Lange.

least of

all

Undoubtedly

Lange sympathized, and even planned, to closely cooperate at all levels
of policy-making with the Soviet Commun ists, but his actions within the

18

Mid-European ·
Alexander Rudzinski , Polish Postwar Diplomacy (New York;
Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe , 1953) , p. 200.

18
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Security Council quickly proved that he did not intend to become a Sovietpuppet, catering to every whim of the Soviet delegation.
The accounts cited in this paper clearly indicate that Gromyko and
Lange quite obviously got more than Party signals confused occasionally.
Their conversations and voting records only too clea�ly reveal that Lange
longed to establish Poland ' s own independent path in international affairs.
However , Lange ' s rem6val in 1948 demonstrated more absolutely than ever
that the Soviet Union was clearly determined to . realize complete dominance
in Poland, not just internally, but also externally.

The appointment of

Juliusz Katz-Suchy as Lange ' s successor only further supports the fact
that Lange was the key to Polish independence.

As Rudzinski states: "The

Soviet Union became so afraid of any semblance of independent or quasiindependent moves by her satellites that the role of satellite foreign
policy was reduced to obedient svpport given to Soviet proposals.

They

had to perform exactly the same task the Ukrainian and Bye lorussian delegates
were performing from the beginning of the functioning of the United Nations.
Any kind of initative was suppressed by Soviet delegates •

•

•

Soviet policy

insisted furthermore that Polish delegates take the floor only after a
Soviet delegate had already spoken.

Polish representatives were required

to clear their draft proposals with their Soviet coll eagues before such
proposals were officially submitted to the committees.

That held good

irrespective of the fact whether the contents of the proposal. were in
line with Soviet policy or not and in spite of how much they might be
19

,
.
techni ca1 or innocuous
.• ·
.

19

Being a devout Commun ist Katz-Suchy proved

..•Rudzinsk i , 22• ill· , PP• 136-137.
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to be just what the pro-Soviet Polish politicians were seeking, a mere
puppet ready to echo the objectives of Soviet foreign policy aims and
to contribute only ancillary remarks in the United Nation s in relation
to the Soviet attempts at intimidation of the West.
A definite date can probably never be established for the actual
beginning of the Cold War.

However, Poland surely must
i

be

involved in

any discussion of postwar international developments which led to the
Cold War.

As World War II started in Poland, the first major East-West

confrontation in postwar world affairs resulted from disagreement between
the Soviet Union and the Western Powers over Poland' s future position in
world politics.

Since few wartime coalitions survive any war and with

the added friction between

two

distinctly opposing political structures, a

rupture between the West and the Soviet Union was unavoidable.

Nevertheless,

. had the West not so completely and irrevocably abandoned Poland immediately
after World War II, the Western Powers might have been in a more advantageous
position in the Cold War.

Surely Polish history would have· been different
It

had the West exhibited greater determination in postwar negotiations.

must be anoteq. however, that the West ' s only other alternative was a certain
clash with the Soviet Union and probably another :catastrophic war.

"The

lessons of Poland were not quickly or universally absorbed; they are still
relevant today�

It was the first defeat for the West in the Cold War, but

it was not presented as such.

Ever since, whether during the Berlin air-

lift, Korea, CUba, or Vietnam, the same kind of voices first heard on the
Polish issue, castigating the victim or.. minimising the importance of. the ·
prospective loss, and advocating appeasement, have invariably been raised
in the West, using on each occasion the familiar sentiments of fear."

20Alexander Bregman, "The Polish Question," Survey, No.
1966) t 167.
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In

1960 William E . Griffith reported from Warsaw, "the situation here

is getting normal .

You know, it's not bad, i t ' s even quite good�but it's
21

totally without hope."·

Perhaps the Polish situation has not been significantly

altered during the last decade, but due to recent developments in Poland,
there seems to be a hopeful revival of political aspirations of some of the
more nationalistic segments within the Polish political stn.tcture .

Many

observers believe that the new Polish Communist Party chief , Edward Gierek
has been given freer hand in domestic affairs only in exchange for the
perennt�l Sovietdemand of complete subservience to the
foreign affairs.

u. s. s.

R . , in

As Edward Rohrback reported from Warsaw in July, 1971;

"Gierek ' s problem will be to break trru the choking centralization and
crusted-over bureaucracy in Poland that in the past has stifled almost all
reforms instituted .

This was what happened in 1956 to Gomulka when the

' bread and freedom' riots in Poznan brought him into power on a similar
wave of public optimism."
"That is how the sad cycle has gone in Poland.

When the reforms

failed to meterialize or were taken back, the people become disenchanted
with the new leadership.

Then, in order to bridle their discontent, re-

pression returns, often worse than before.

History had been cruel enough

22
for the Poles .11· Although Poles could certainly not publicly agree with
writer, Stefan Kisielewski 1968 statement that "the country was run by
23
ignoramuses , " · doubtlessly many would agree privately, as the recent outbursts

21

William E. Griffith, "Warsaw Notebook , " Survey, No. 35 (January-March ,

1960) ' 26.

22
Chicago Tribunet 25 July 1971, A-3.
23
Adam Bromlce, "Beyond the Gomullca Era," Foreign Affairs ,

1971) t 484.
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of workers in the Polish coastal cities readily substantiate.

The 1960 ' s

brought several encouraging developments i n international relations for
Poland:

a renewed Soviet de-Stalinization campaign in 1961;

the Chinese

Soviet disagreements; improved East-West relations; greater Rumanian
independence in foreign affairs;

the 1968 Czechoslovakian eruption;

the new favorable West German overtures which resulted in a PolishWest German treaty in late 1970 sanctioning Poland ' s western border;
finally,

the recent change in the political leadership in Poland.

and

These

phenomena, if link�d with cautious and realistic foreign policies by the
Western Powers toward East-Central .Europe, provide a measure of hope that
Poland may eventually emerge with increasing authority in international

affairs.

ANNEX I

BIOORAPHICAL SKETCHES
It would be a nearby impossible task to give biographical information
on all of the Polish delegates assigned to the various agencies of the
United Na�ions.

It is in the interest of understanding more thoroughly
I

the Polish delegation ' s actions within the United Nat�ons that the
fol lowing information is presented concerning some of the most active
and influential personalities.
be considered :

Therefore , the following delegates will

Wincenty Rzymowski , Zygmunt Modzelewski , Jerzy Michalowski,

Josef Winiewicz, Hilary Mine, Josef Olszewski, Ignacy �oltowski, Juliusz
Katz-Suchy , and Oscar Lange.

SECTION l�Wincenty Rzymowski

Wincenty RZymowski was born in Warsaw in 1883.

·

After studying at

the universities of Geneva, Lausanne, and Odessa, he received his law
degree.

In the early 1920 ' s he began a publication in Warsaw cal led

The Horizon in which he editorialized for a democratic , independent
Poland and against a popular concept of Polish independence within
the structure of the Soviet Union.

From 1923 to 1941 he was a corres-

pendent in Italy, but was forced to leave Italy because of his antiFascist articles.

Upon his return to Poland, Rzymowski continued to

write critically about Fascism and was also a member of "various .

,

radical groups dependent upon Communist favor , although non-Communist,

q.6

1 17

who were fol lowing the line of the PPR .11 1 These activities resulted in
an eight month sentence to a German prison in the early 1940 ' s .

Upon

his release from prison in 1944 by the Soviets, he seemed to align
himself more with the Leftists.

2

At the age of sixty-one, Rzymowski

volunteered for duty in the Polish army and became an original member
of the pro-Soviet Committee of National Liberation.

He was later appointed

Minister of Arts and Culture in the pro-Soviet Lublin Committee.

Rzymowski

became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Polish Provisional Government
of National Unity in June ,

1945, and was selected as Chief Polish Delegate

to the Paris Peace Conference in 1946.

He was also chief Polish represent-

ative to the United Nations Genera l Assembly in 1946 and continued as
Polish Foreign Minister until February 7 ,

1947, when,

foll0wing the 1947

elections he became Minister without Portfolio, an insignificant and
uninfluential position.

Nevertheless, he remained as nominal pre sident

of the remnants of the dying Democratic Party, which was composed largely
of the submissive members of the intellectual class.
Soviet .puppet Ryzmowski died in Warsaw , May 2,

1950,

3

Never an absolute
at sixty-seven ,

having lost a l l political influence.

lM . K. D ziewanowski , The Communist Party in Poland:
History (Cambridge, Massachusetts:

fill

Harvard University Press,

Outline 2f.
1959 ) ,

p.176.

b
radeusz Rakowski , Foreign Policy of the Communist Regime in. Poland-

Techniques and Functions, 1945-1949 (New York: Mid-European Studies Center
of the National Committee for a Free Europe , 1953) pp. 104-105.
3Personalities in the GPneral Assembly--Wincenty Rzymowski , " United
Nations Weekly Bulletin, I ( December 3 , 1946 ) , p. 22.
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SECTION 2�Zygnrunt Modzelewski
Born

to a family of Jewish origin in Czestochowa, Poland in 1900,

Zygnrunt Modzelewski joined the Polish Communist Party in 1920.

In 1925

he moved to Fra�ce, where he remained active in the Communist Party
trying his hand at jounalism and working for the Soviet Trade Commission.
Upon the outbreak of World War

II

Modzelewski entered the Soviet Union

were he became a captain in the Soviet-organized Poli�h Army based in
Moscow.

At this time he also became an editor for the Polish Press

Agency in Moscow.

In 1944 he was named Ambassador from the Polish

Committee of National Liberation to Moscow and later served in this
same capacity for the Polish Committee in Lublin.

In July, 1945 , the

position of Polish Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs became available,
upon the appointment of former Vice-Minister Jacub Berman to the Presidium
as Under-Secretary of State.

Modzelewski was selected as the new Vice-

Minister of Foreign Affairs to serve as a top aide to Foreign Minister
Wincenty Rzymowski .

Modzelewski proved to be extremely effective in his

new position and grew very influential within the Foreign Ministry.

He

was appointed the first chief Polish delegate to the United Nations
Security Council in 1946.

After the 1947 elections he became Rzymowski ' s

replacement as Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs .
1948

However, by early

he too had fallen into i ll-favor with the Communists and was re-

placed by Stefan. Wieblowski . 4

4Norld Biography (New York: Institute for Research in Biography, Inc . ,
p . 3288.

1948 ) ,

fI9

Rakowski presents this description of Modze lewski:
an able man, clever, smooth and liable.

"Modzelewski is

He is a fanatical Communist,

though he knows, when need be , how to mask himself to win over people of
different opinion.

As president of the Preparatory Commission for the

�

United Nations Security Council in London in 1945, Modz lewski became
very

popular

amon� his fe l low diplomats due

to

�

his dea ings.

Despite

appearances, Modze"iewski is a Communist trained in Russia; he thoroughly
understands the Soviet Union ' s policy toward conquered nation s , and he
feels no scruples in carrying it out. 115
SECTION 3--Jerzy Michalowski

Jerzy Michalowski came from a family of the Polish small gentry .
He was a graduate of the Warsaw Law School and became an active, but
not prominent, member of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) before World
War II.

He had served on the editorial staff of the Institute for

Social Research in Warsaw and had participated in the prewar Socialist
cooperative movements.

I)Jring the war he served as an officer of the

Polish Army in a German prison camp.

As the Preparatory Commission of

the United Nations Security Counci l convened in London in November ,
1945, Michalowski served as a counsellor to Modzelewski and the Polish
embassy. 6

5Rakowski,

££•

c i t . , p . 112.

6Alexander w. Rudzinski , Inside Polish Pos twar Diplomacy (New York:

Mid-European Studies Center of_ the National Committee for a Free Europe ,
1953) , P• 49.
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SECTION- 4--Josef Winiewicz

Josef Winiewicz was born in the western provinces of Poland and
like much of the populace of this area, held strong anti-German prejudices.
These convictions brought him
Polish Committee in Lublin.

.. into close contact with the Soviet-organized

Winiewicz was a Rightist journalist prior

to World War II , who supported the
and the Ozon Government Party.

Polish

regime of Marsh a l l

Rydz-Smigly

During the war Winiewicz acted as Director

of the Bureau of Preparatory Studies for the Peace Conference , an agency
of the Polish government-in-exile in London .

He was a strong advocate

of the Oder-Neisse boundary and published several articles concerning
this subject and other matters relating to Polish-German affairs.

His

anti-German feelings made Winiewicz very popular with the Soviets, who
also sought to establish the Oder-Neisse line as the Polish border.
General Wladyslaw Sikorsk i . who was head of the Polish government-inexile at this time , did not agree with Winiewic z ' s statements concerning
the Polish-German frontier issue.

Sikorski felt that Polish territory

should not be so greatly extended to the west,

still hoping that the

Soviet Union would not continue to maintain her own boundaries in the
eastern Polish provinces .

The recurring dispute finally forced a

complete split between Winiewicz and the Polish government-in-exile.?
Like Michalowsk i , Winiewicz accompanied the Polish delegation to
London as a counsellor to Modzelewski during the first meetings of the
United Nations Security Counci l in London .

7Ibid . ,

PP• 23-24.

He later came to New York

·
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as a counsellor to the Polish delegation to the United Nations.a

In

1947 Winiewicz was named Polish Ambassador to the United States, replacing
Oscar Lange who had been appointed permanent Polish representative to the
United Nations.
Rudzinski describes Winiewicz in this not so complimentary manner:
Winiewicz as Ambassador of a Communist Poland is a fantastic joke to
everyone who knowa his background.

Of an intelligence not much surpassing

the average leve l , very sel f-controlled and rather phl@�matic, of easy
manners, he is the kind of man trying very hard and with some . success
to persuade himself that what is going on in Poland is +ight after a l l
and consistent with basic Polish interests.

The German danger i s the

main psychological motive enabling Winiewicz to

try

to justify before

his own conscience the necessity of supporting the present Warsaw government." 9
SECTION S�Hilary Mine

Hilary Mine, a professional economist, came from a Polish family of
Jewish origin.

'Refore World War II he was an insignificant employee of

the Central Statistical Office in Warsaw.

He joined the Polish Communist

Party before the war and rec�tved special Party training in Moscow as the
war ravaged.

Mine participated in the Lublin Committee during the war

. as; Minister of° Industry and in the postwar Polish Provisional Government

Stearbook 2£. the United Nations, �-47 ,
of Public Information , 1947 ) , p . 952.

9.
Rudzinski ,

.21? • .£!! . , PP• 24-25.

(Lake Success:

Department
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of National Unity. 10 During the Second Part of the First Session of the
United Nations he was a Polish delegate to the United Nations General
A5sembly, while continuing as the Polish Minister of Industry.
In 1947, Mine returned to Poland to become Prime Minister and
Rakowski says of Mine :

virtual r economic dictator.

"He merely carries

out obediently the Soviet directives i� regard to economic life.
Extremely proud arid conceited, Mine is difficult to get along with, and
is

generally disliked even in Communist circles . 11 11

SECTION 6--Jozef O lszewski
Jozef Olszewski was a Communist Party member before World War I I .
He had served several terms in Polish prisons prior to the war as a
political criminal .

As the hostilities erupted in Poland, Olsz.ewski

escaped to the Soviet Union.

In 1944, he was appointed secretary of the

Polish embassy in Moscow, during Modzelewski ' s ambassadorship.

In 1946

Olszewski was selected to become the head of the Political Department
of the Polish Ministry of Fo.reign Affairs. 12 While serving in this capacity
he was chosen to be one of the Polish delegates to the United Nations
General Assembly during the Second Part of the First Session.

In February,

1948, Olszewski, having become unacceptable to the Communist leadership,
was removed from the Polish Foreign Ministry and was sent to Poznan as

10

.

" Rakowski , .22 • cit . , p 99.
llRakowski,
ll?• ci..t. ' p. 100.
1
2xbid. ' pp. 115-116.
•
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Commun ist Party district secretary, a position of little real significance. 13
SECTION 7� Igpacy Zlotowski
Little is known of Ignacy Zlotowsk i ' s activities prior to the estal>lishment of the Polish Provisional Government of Nation&l Unity in 1945 .
His first offici�l position was in 1945 in New York Ci�y as a member of
of a relief and rehabilitation committee conducting research for some
Polish universities and scientific institutions.

In 1946 he became a

counsellor to the Polish embassy in Washington; this �ppointment occurred
shortly after Oscfir Lange had been reassigned from hi � post as Polish
..

Ambassador to the United States to permanent Polish d� legate to the United
Nations.

Zlotows�i was soon transferred to the Uniteq Nations as Lange' s

deputy in the At�ic Energy Commission.

However, Zlotowski was returned

to Poland in 1948 after critical newspaper reports were released implicating
him in espionage activities concerning American scientists' advances and
experimentation with atomic energy. 14
SECTION 8--Juliusz Katz-Suchy
Another important figure in the Polish delegation to the United Nations
during the first few years was Juliusz Katz-Suchy.

Even though Katz�Suchy' s

appointment to replace Oscar Lange as Permanent Polish Delegate to the
United Nations on January 1, 1948, had a definite influence

on

subsequent

Polish voting in the United Nations, Katz-Suchy was not completely unknown

14Rudzinski , .21!• cit. , pp. 86-87.
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in international politics.

He had been a member of the Polish delegation

to the General Assembly during every session since 1946, as adviser,
alternate delegate , and temporary Security Council delega te.
Katz-Suchy was born to a family of small merchants in Sanok , Poland,
in the Carpathian Mountains of Galacia, on January 28, 1912.

He joined

the Communist Party at about fifteen years of age while still a student
in the Gymnasium.

He was later removed from the University of Lwow Law

School for organizing strikes and circulating Communist propaganda,

15

nit ·

fina lly attended the University of Cracow and the University of Warsaw,
earning his Ph. D . in 1932.

In 1933 he began a career in journalism by

contributing to several reviews on economics, foreign affairs, and social
problems.

By 1938 Katz-Suchy' s writings had become unforgivably hostile

to the prewar Polish regime , resulting in his imprisonment as a political
criminal.

After nine months in prison, hqwever, he was released and

forced into exile in Prague , Czechoslovakia.

16

When Hitler invaded

C!.Zechoslovakia in 1939, Katz-Suchy managed to escape to England with
the aid of the British consulate.

During the early part of World War

II he worked as a laborer in a British textile factory , later becoming

foreman in a tool factory.

During these years he published a left wing

magazine meant for Polish refugees in England, outlining his plans to

15
Ruth Karpf , "The Big Brain From Poland ," United Nations World, III
(May, 1949) , P• 60-62.
16
current Biography, �' Anna Rothe , ed. (New York:
Company, 195 1 ) , P• 322.

H. w. Wilson

organize forces to instigate a Communist take-over of several Eng lish
factories.

17

In July, 1944, when the Soviet-organized Polish Committee of National
Liberation moved from Moscow to Lublin, Katz-Suchy was named dupty chief
of the London bureau of Polpres s , the official news agency of the Lublin
Committee.

In July, 1945, after the Big Three had withdrawn diplomatic

recognition from the Polish government-in-exile in London and recognized
the newly-organized Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in
Warsaw , Katz-Suchy was appointed press attache of the Polish embassy in
London. 18

In 1946 Katz-Suchy became counsellor of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and adviser to the Polish delegation to the United Nations.

From

this time his life was so thoroughly interwined in Polish foreign relations
in the United Nations that the story has been incorporated into the body
of the preceding paper.

SECTION 9�0scar Lange

Oscar Lange , being the key personality within the United Nations
delegation during 1946 and 1947, has been discussed recurrently in this
paper; the following information concerns Lange ' s life before World War
II and after his service in the United Nations.

Lange was born on July

27 , 1904 , in Tomaszow, Poland, the only son of a textile manufacturer.
He attended the University of Posen in 1922-1923, then spent the next
ten years working and studying at the University of Cracow , where he

17
18

Rudzinski , 22• £.it. , pp. 10-11.

Current Biography, �' 22• .£!!. , p. 323.
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earned an LL.M. in 1926,

an

LL.D. in 1928 and in 1931 became an instructor

of economics and statistics.

As a student he had joined the Socialist

Students Organization and later became an active member of the educational
committee of the Polish Socialist Party.

Always active in the labor move-

ment, Lange had been a member of the Ministry of Labor .in the prewar Polish
government. 19
In 1932 Lange came to the United States on a Rockefeller Fellowship
and studied at Hqrvard , the University of Minnesota, and in 1936, lectured
on economics at the University of Michigan.

In 1937 he returned to Poland,

only to come back to the United States the fall of that same year, with
intentions of becoming an American citizen.

The University of California

and Stanford University were his first lecturing assignments upon his
return to the Un�ted States.

In 1938 Lange received a permanent appoint-

ment as assistan� professor at the University of Chicago where he became
a full professor· in 1943.
American citizen.

In the same yeur he became a naturalized

Lange' s activities from 1943 to 1948 are well known

and quite controversial, and need not be discussed here.

Frank Gibney says

that "by 1948 he (Lange) had discovered that it was far easier to be a
sophisticated Marxist' at the University of Chicago than it was in Warsaw. 0 20

19

Current Biograp�, �' Anna Rothe , ed. (New York: H . w. Wilson
Company, 1947) , P• 322.

20
Frank Gibney , The Frozen Revolution--Poland: � Study in Communist
Decay (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy , 1959) , p. 237.

In January , 1948, upon his replacement in the United Nations by
Juliusz Katz-Suchy , Lange returned to Warsaw.

Rudzinski says that Katz-

Suchy had misled Lange by suggesting that he might become· Prime Minister
of Poland upon nis return.

'

Lange also had plans to org�ize the Socialist

Parties of Europ� into an international force to fight
Polish independe�ce�

�ne

Soviets for

However, Lange was not allowed to leave Poland after
!-

his attendance at the General Assembly in Paris in ea�lY 1948, until he
was readmitted info the Polish government by Wladyslaw Gomulka in 1956. 21
Lange incredibly .managed to survive the 1948 to 1956 strict Stalinist
period in Poland, and in 1956 "when the winds had noticeably shifted he
'again revealed h�mself as an active libera1 . 1122
When Gomul�a came to power . in Poland in 1956, Lange who had not
been active in Polish politics since 1948, was called back into the
government service.

Lange later became Gomulka' s Deputy Premier and

chief econ�mic planner, as chairman of the economic council of the
Polish cabinet. 23

·

Lange was again allowed to suggest some degree of

Polish autonomy in such statements as this:

"Although the Soviet Union

used central planning as its basic method of economic coordination, other
socialist countries might differ from one another as to the character of
the produc �n� units, the degree of their centralization, and the relative

21
Rudzinski,

£1?.•

cit . , pp. 40-41.

22
Gibney, £1?.• � . , p. 238.
23
The New � Times, 4 October 1965 , p. 4 .
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importanc� of planning and of the market.11 24

Lange, "a 1930 vintage

parlor pink who dislikes Communist excesses ( especially when he had to
participate) �t who managed to survive , " 25 died on October 4 , 1965, in
London still a powerful and respected leader of Commun ist Poland .
Having a special interest in socialist economic theory and economic
fluctuation ,

Lange

published numerous works

in

this academic field:

On

the Economic Theory � Socialism, 1938; The Rate of Interest and �
Optimum Propensity to Consume, 1938; Economic Mobilization, 1940; The
Foundations .2f Welfare Economics , 1942; � Theory .2f the Multiplier,
1944; The Working Principles of the Soviet Economy, 1944; and Price
Flexibility � Employment, 1944 . 26

24

Richard Hiscocks , Poland Bridqe for � Abyss7 � Interpretation
of Developments in �-War Poland (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) ,
PP• 123-124.
25
Gibney, .2E• cit . , p. 77.
26
Current Biography, 1946, 2E· cit . , p. 323.

ANNEX II
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
DOCUMENT NO.

1 , �GREEMENT BETWEEN THE U . S . S . R . AND TH� POLISH

GOVERNMENT, JULY 30,

f

1.

The Goverrunen

1941•

of the u. s . s. R. recognizes the Soviet-German
,,

treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes i n Poland as having lost their
validity.

The Polish Goverrunent declares Poland is not �nd by any

agreement with any third
2.
upon

power

which is directed against tne u . s . s . R .

Diplomatic relations will be restored between the t�o goverrunents
of

the signing

·�

this agreement, and an immediate exch�ge of Ambassadors

will be arranged.
3. & 4.

The Govepllt\ent of the u . s . s . R. expresses its consent to
:

the formation on ter�itory of the u. s . s . R . of a Polish Army under a
commander appointed
Government.

s•

•

•

•

•

•

py

the Polish Goverrunent in agreement with the Soviet

•

The Soviet Government grants amnesty to all Polish citizens

now detained on Soviet territory either as prisoners of war or on other
sufficient ground s , as from the resumption of diplomatic relations.

•International Conciliation, Document No. 39, No. 386 ( January,

77-78.
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1943 ) ,

DOCUMENT NO. 2 , POLISH-RUSSIAN DECLARATION OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL
•
AID, DECEMBER S , 1941
.

1.

German Hitlerite imperialism is the worst enemy of mankind and

no compromise is possible with it.

Both governments, together with

Great Britain and other States and with the support of the United State s ,
will conduct the war until complete victory and the final defeat o f the
German bandits.
'

2.

In accordance with the agreement signed on July 309 1941, both

governments, as long as the war lasts, will give each other full military
assistance.

Also the forces of the Polish Republic statiqned in territory

of the Soviet Union will conduct war against the German robbers hand-in-

hand with the Soviet forces.

In peace-time their mutual relations will

be based on friendship, cooperation and the carrying out of obligations

undertaken.
3.

Once the war has been brought to a victorious conclusion and the

Hitler criminals duly punished, the task of the Allied Governments will
be to establish a just peace.

This can only be achieved by new organiza

tion of international relations based on the association of democratic
States in union .

•

78.

Such an organization to be a decisive factor must have

International Cocciliation, Document No. 40, No. 386 (January , 1943 ) ,
130
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respect for international law and
the Allied Governments .

be

supported by the armed forces of all

Only under such conditions can Europe be re

established and the defeat of the German barbarians achieved ; only thus
can it

be guaranteed that the catastrophe caused by Hitlerites shall never

repeat itself.

OOCUMENT NO. 3 ,

N<Jl'E HANDED TO EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, SEcRETARY OP'

STATE, BY THE POLISH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STA'J;ES , JAN

CIECHANOWSKI, ON BEHALF OF THE POLISH
ON THE SAN FRANCISCO

CONFERENCE,

GOVERNMENt

IN LONDON ,

MARCH 1 2 , 1945

The Honorable

Edward R . Stettinius, Jr.
Secretary of State.

Acting on instructions of my Government, I have the honor to bring

the following to your attention:
l.

The Polish Government learned through the press and radio on

March 5th, 1945, that the United States Govenunent, acting on its own
behalf and on behalf of Great Britain, China and the u.

s. s. R . ,

sent ou t invitations to thirty-nine States to take part i n a Conference
of the United Nations , convened on April 25th, 1945 , at San Francisco ,
for the purpose of preparing a general international organization for
the maintenance of international peace and security.
The Polish Government notes that i t has not received an invitation
to take part in this Conference, despite

the

fact that i t is one of

the original signatories of the United Nations Declaration of January
1st, 1942.
2.

Considering that the Polish nation was first to take u p arms

against Gennan aggression on September 1st, 1939, and that from that

•

United Nations Review, V ( March 15, 1945 ) , 99-100.
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day up to the present moment it incessantly continues to fight in Poland
and abroad on lan d , on sea and in the air;

considering also that,

thus carrying on the fight in defense of ideals,

in

the Polish nation

having fought longest has sustained in proportion to its possibilities
greater sacrifices in human lives and property than any other nation;
considering further that the war which started for Poland has created
among the free nations of the world that feeling of solidarity which
gradually led to the concept and the creation of the United Nations;
and,

finally, considering that at San Francisco the United Nations are

to work out a permanent world organization of peace for the purpose of
making aggression impossible in the future, and ,

that such an organiza

tion should be based on the respect of laws and of the sovereign equality
of peace-loving nations--the Polish Government, as the only legal and
independent representative of the Polish state, most emphatically and
insistently asserts its inalienable right to take part in the world
conference on security and most categorically protests against being
omitted in the invitations to the said conference.

3.

The Polish Government begs t o state that the fact that Poland ,

whose constitutional President and Government are recognized by all
United Nations as well as by all n e utral nations with the exception
of one power only, is not invited to the Conference at San Francisco-
is the first disturbing example of the application of the right of
veto on the part of the Big Powers exercised

United Nations have agreed

.t

by

them even before the

o and carried out the suggestions to be

submitted to them relating to the future establishment of a world
security organization.

�34
4.

The Polish Government has already presented some preliminary

amendments to the proposals prepared at Dumbarton Oaks and intends fully
to participate in the working out of an international security organization.
Under the circumstance , the Polish Government is deprived of the possibility
of presenting at the Confernece its final views both in relation to the

Dumbarton Oaks proposals and to the proposal respecting the voting procedure
in the Security Council formulated at the Crimea Conference.
Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
� . Ciechanowski

DOCUMENT NO. 4 , APPEAL OF THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL UNITY TO THE SAN
FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, JUNE 7 , 1945 •
At present it can be revealed that on April 25, 1945, the Council
of National Unity ( Poland ' s Underground Parliament) sent to the members
of the San Francisco Conference a note, addressed to Secretary of
State Edward R. Stettinius J r . , in which i t represented concisely the
wishes and desires of the Polish nation.
Assuming that its blood shed in this war and its steadfast loyalty
to the noblest ideals of humanity established Poland ' s rights to independence and sovereignty, the Council of National Unity expressed the
belief that the United Nations , negotiating in San Francisco would not
pass over in silence the tragedy of Poland , which for six long years
has been fighting for the ideals of humanity, of freedom and of real
democracy .
The Council of National Unity stressed that being in the Polish
Underground Parliament, consisting of repres .ntatives of exclusively
democratic parties,

speaks

in its general attitude.

on

behalf of the whole Polish nation united

A t this occasion, it is necessary to remind

history of the creation and the

�evelopment

of democratic political

representation of Poland, during the six years of criminal occupation •

•

� Poli·sh Review (PIA) , V (June, 21, 1945 ) , 2.
13.5
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At the beginning of the German occupation three great Polish
political parties:

the Polish Socialist Party,

the National Party created ,

the Peasant Party and

together with the Labor Party, a political

intermediary committee which later called itself the Home Country
Political Representation of the Polish Nation.

The above-mentioned

four parties committed themselves to close collaborati9n, and resolved
I

upon a common program in the basic structural and social problem s ,
an expression which was given i n the declaration o f A�gust 15,

1943.

In January, 1944, in the place of the political representation
of the home country, the Council of National Unity was appointed;
three other democratic groups, headed by the Democratic Party,

joined

this recently created Council of National Unity.
The Council of National Unity was the genuine und�rground parliament
of Poland, fighting against the Germans.
After the expulsion of the Germans, conditions which existed in
the home country did not permit the parties of the Council of National
Unity to reveal their activities.

Among the fifteen Polish democratic

leaders arrested March 28th are many members of the Council of National
Unity, together with its Socialist leader Kazimierz Puzak .

In the place

of the arrested, the parties have delegated new representatives .

The

Counci l of National Unity still exists.

�ziennik Polski, official organ of Polish Government, London.

'

DOCUMENT NO. 5 , AMERICAN CHARGt D AFFAIRES, GERALD KEITH ' S , NOTE
TO THE POLISH FOREIGN OFFICE, NOVEMBER 22, 1946 , - CONCERNING
AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE COMING POLISH ELECTIONS•
'

Excellency:
I have been instructed to inform you that my Government has taken
note of the announcement that the Polish Government of National Unity
has fixed January 19, 1947, as the date on which genera� elections will
be held in Poland.

In this connection, my Government recalls that

Ambassador Lane ' s note of April 24, 1946, stated that in accordance
with the Potsdam Agreement of August 2 , 1945, which provided that elections
would be held as soon as possible, elections would take place this year.
Although my Government is surprised that the Polish Government would
fail , without explanation, to fulfill this formal assurartce, its chief
concern is not with any particular date but with the discharge of its
responsibility under the decisions taken at the Crimea and Potsdam
conferences with respect to the holding of free elections in Poland.

The importance which the United States Government attaches to the
carrying out of these decisions has repeatedly been brought to the
attention of the Polish Government.

In his note of August 19, 1946,

to which no reply has been received, Ambassador Lane outlined certain

•Journal .2!. Central European Affairs, VI (January , 1971) , 404.
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f>:Oints w11lch the United States Government considers essential for the
carrying out of free elections.

In view of the disturbing reports

which it has received concerning the preparations for the elections,
my Government has instructed me again to inform Your Excellency that
the Government of the United States expects that equal rights and
facilities in the forthcoming election campaigns and in the elections
themselves will be accorded to a l l democratic and anti-Nazi parties
in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement.

My Government could not

<,lherwlse regard the terms of the Yalta and Potsdam decisions as
having been fulfilled.

Gerald Keith, American Charg'e d' Affaires

DOCUMENT NO. 6 ,

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT APPEAL TO THE ijRITISH

AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON AND TO THE . SOVIET FOREIGN QFFICE
IN MOSCOW , JANUARY S ,

.

1947•

Excellency:
The Government of the United States as a signatory of the Yalta
and Potsdam agreements, with particu lar regard to those sections of
the two agreements which deal with the establishment of a representative

Goverrunent in Poland through the instrumentality o� free and unfettered
elections, wishes me to inform you of the concern with which i t views
the pre-election activities of the Polish Provisional Government of
National Unity.

My Government is especially perturbed by the increasingly

frequent reports of repressive measures which the Polish Provisional
Government has seen fit to employ against those democratic elements in
Poland which have not aligned themselves with the "bloc" parties.
According to information reaching my Government from various
authoritative sources , these repressive activities on the part of the
Provisional Government have now increased in intensity to the point
where, if they do not cease immediately, there is little likelihood
that elections can be held in accordance with the terms of the ·

•

Journal

£f

Central European Affairs, VI (January
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1947) , 405.
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Potsdam agreement which call for free and unfettered elections
"on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all
democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part
and put forward candidates .

"

DOCUMENT NO.

7,
NarE TO THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTRY FROM UNITED
STATES AMBASSADOR ARTHUR BLISS LANE•

Excellency:
I have the honor to refer to the Embassy ' s notes of August 19
and November 2 2 ,

1946, regarding the .Polish national elections, to

which no reply has yet been received, and pursuant to instructions
from my Goverrunent to inform Your Excellency, as a signatory of the
Yalta and Potsdam agreements, with particular regard to those sections ·
of the two agreements which deal with the establishment of a government in Poland, through the instrumentality of free and unfettered
elections, of my Governmen t ' s continued concern over the

pre-election

activities of the Polish Government of National Unity.
My Government is especially perturbed

by

the increasingly

frequent reports of repressive measures which the Polish Provisional
Goverrunent has seen fit to employ against those democratic elements
in Poland which have not aligned themselves with the "bloc" parties.
It is a source of regret to my Government that its previous efforts
to call the attention of the Polish Provisional Government to its
failure to perform its obligations under the agreements cited have
not resulted in any change in the course which that Government has

•Journal of Central European Affairs, VI (January,

�4 l.

1947) , 407-408.
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pursued in connection with pre-election political activities .
According to information reaching my Government from various
authoritative sources , these repressive activities on the part of the
Provisional Government have now increased in intensity to the point
where , if they do not cease immediately, there is little likelihood
that elections can be held in accordance with the terms of the
Potsdam Agreement which call for free and unfettered elections "on
the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all
democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part
.

and put forward candidates."
It is the view of my Government that this matter involves the
sanctity of international agreements, a principle upon which depends
the establishment and maintenance of peace and the reign of justice
under law.
The obligations with respect to the Polish elections which my
Government assumed at Yalta and reiterated at Potsdam, together with
the Soviet and British Governments, and the obligations subsequently
assumed by the Polish Government and frequently reiterated, provide
for the cond�ct of free and unfettered elections of the type and in
the manner described above .
The fact that the subject matter of these agreements related to
elections in Poland i s incidental.

The essential fact is that they

constitute an international agreement under which all four nations
concerned have assumed obligations.

) .43

I need hardly say that my Government is interested only in seeing
that the Polish people have the opportunity to participate in a free
and unfettered election and that my Government does not regard the
resu lts of such an election as being a proper concern of anyone other
than the Polish people themselves.
My Government would be failing in its duty if it did not again
point out that the continuation of the present policy of suppression,
coercion and intimidation as applied to political opposition in
.

'

Poland constitutes a violation of the letter as well as the spirit of
the Yalta and Potsdam agreements.

IXX:UMENT NO. 8 ,

STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONCERNING

THE POLISH ELECTIONS, JANUARY

On January

28 , 1947•

19 a general election was held in Poland, the results of

which are to be announced shortly.
The United States Government has followed the developments leading
up to this event in accordance with the commitments it accepted at
the Yalta and Potsdam conferences .

O n numerous occasions i t has expressed

its concern over the course of events in Poland which increasingly
indicated that the election would not be conducted in such manner as
to allow a free expression of the will of the Polish people.
On August 19 and November

22, 1946, formal notes were addressed

to the Polish Government on this subject.

On January 5 this Government brought the situation in Poland to
the attention of the British and Soviet Governments and expressed the
hope that those Governments would associate themselves with the Government of the United States in an approach to the Polish Provisional
Government of National Unity.

This proposal was rejected by the

Soviet Government.
On January

9 this Goverrunent delivered a further note to the

Polish Provisional Government which stated among other things that
if the repressive activities on the part of the Provisional Government

• Journal of Central European Affairs, VI (Januray

1947) , 409-410.
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did not cease invnediately, there was little likelihood that elections
could be held in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam agreement.
The British Government has also protested to the Polish Provisional
Government the violation of its election pledges.
The reports received from the United States Embassy in Poland in
the period immediately prior to the elections as well as its subsequent
reports based upon the observations of Ame�ican officials who visited
a number of Polish voting centers confirmed the fears which this
Government had expressed that the election would not be free.
These reports were corroborated by the general tenor of the dis
patches from foreign correspondents in Poland.

It is

clear

that the Provisional Government did not confine itself

to the suppression of the so-called "underground" but employed wide
spread measures of coercion and intimidation against democratic elements
which were loyal to Poland although not partisans of the Government
"bloc ."
I n these circumstances the United States Government cannot consider
that the provisions of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements have been
fulfilled.

The United States Government has made it clear that it
desire to intervene in the internal affairs of Poland.

has no

By virture

of the responsibility which devolved upon i t as one of the principal
powers engaged in liberating the countries of Europe from Nazi occupation,
it undertook , together with the British and Soviet Governments, to
secure for the long-suffering Polish people the opportunity to select
a Government of their own choosing.

It was in connection with this
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undertaking that this Government agreed to the decisions respecting
Poland that were taken at the Yalta conference, including the decis ion
to recognize the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
These decisions with respect to Poland, which were accepted by
the Polish Provisional Government in their entirety, formed part of a
series of agreements between the United States, British and Soviet
Governments.

The United States Government considers that the Polish

Provisional Government has failed to carry out its solemn pledges.
The United States Government firmly intends to maintain its
interest in the welfare of the Polish people.

While retaining full

liberty of action to determine its future attitude toward the Government
of Poland , this Government will continue to keep itself informed of
developments in Poland through its diplomatic mission in Warsaw .

DOCUMENT NO. 9 ,
JANUARY 16,

SPEECH BY WINCENTY RZ'lMOWSKI IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
•
1946

Before defining Poland ' s attitude towards the historic tasks of
the United Nations.

I wou ld like to ask permission to perform the

duty entrusted to me

by our provisional Parliament at its last

meeting in Warsaw.
"The Polish nation, represented by its National Counci l , greets
the delegates of all the peace-loving nations.
"At this crucial . moment in the history of mankind , we greet you ,.
Gentlemen , as brothers, on behalf of twenty-three million living Poles
and also on behalf of six million Polish citizens murdered or slain
in battle.
"We who were the first to stand against the Hitlerite invasion,
who made countless sacrifices, who know the essence of Fascism thcoug�
and through , we have paid dearly for this knowledge , but thereby we

have earned the right �o speak with authority on the problems of war
and Facism and on the danger these problems represent for the whole
world.

•official Records .2f. �First � of the First Session of General

Assembly, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly-Verbatim Record
Januray 10, February 14, 1946, Tenth Plenary Meeting, January 16, 1946,
(Central Hall, Westminster , London: United Nations Publications ,

152-158.
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"To you, the representatives of the United Nations, we address
this appeal:
''Henceforward, let there be no more war, no more sufferance for
the seeds of Fascism, no more irresponsible playing with the ·fire
which, but for the joint victory of the Allies, would have destroyed
human civilization.

Never

again

must

we

repeat the mistakes

of the

past.
"The Polish nation firmly believes that the United Nations can and
will become the factor which will guarantee the peaceful progress and
prosperity of mankind.

It will do so on condition that all peace

loving nations remain united in their action and base themselves on
the harmonious collaboration of the three great Powers, and provided
they concentrate their efforts on the prevention of aggression and on
securing the prompt reconstruction of the war-ravaged countries.
"The Polish p.ation assures the representatives of the United
Nations that Poland will take her place in the forefront of the builders
of peace and prosperity.
"Within her new frontiers, Poland, independent and democratic,
is an indispensable factor of European and world peace.

Harmonious

international collaboration and understanding are necessary conditions

for the security and well-being of our martyred country.
"In addressing to-day its best wishes to this great Assembly which
has become the world ' s focal point, the Polish nation believes that,
by our combined efforts, we shall banish the terror of war and Fascism,
and that friendship and brotherly collaboration among the nations will
become a lasting reality."

That is how our provisional Parliament concludes its appeal to
the United Nations.
I should now like to state the Polish delegations position with
regard to the problems of an enduring peace.
Never before have the intentions and decisions of Governments
been of such importance; never have the nations bound up

their destinies

to such an extent �ith that of a single institution.
We are faced with this alternative: either to destroy the plans for
a better world and allow the forces of destruction to be unleashe� , ; ·thus
hurling mankind into chaos ; or else, notwithstanding the difficulties,
to prepare in common for a better future.
Already the nations have spontaneously found a way out of this
dilemma: they wish to live in peace , to work , to recover.

Entrusted

with a great mission�to give effect to the goodwil l of the nations--we
are advancing along the difficult path that leads to its achievement.
We shall accomplish our task�we who voice the sentiments of the peoples,
who think as they do, who speak their language .
Many questions divide us, but others, still more numerous, unite
us.

What are racial or national differences, contrasting levels of

civilization or culture , different ways of life, cqntrary interests,
past ills, lack of confidence , or even dissimilar systems of government, compared with the community of man and the unity of effort to
attain our distant goals, with ever increasing international cooperation and interdependence?
i

How trivial are these differences compared with all that would
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await us in the event of another wart

How unimportant these divergencies

and difficulties at a period when man is becoming the dominant factor
in shaping history, when social, economic and international relations are
more and more the product of the constant will of the masses and of their
leadersl
We are passing from the age of chaotic events in history to that
of its conscious moulding.

The essential bases and conditions of this

new era already exist; they have been created by economic and social
progress.

To-day we are capable of rationalizing the life of man and

even the turning-points of history, just as we rationalize economic
processes.

We have the power to lower the cost price of progress in

the history of future times , just as we are already lowering the cost
of production of material goods .
We are able to form a picture of the future we want, and provided
it is based on the laws of progress, we can make it a reality.

We can

achieve this, as experience has shown, by building up a social and
economic system on a planned basis, and by organizing international
relations--the purpose for which the United Nations exists.

It must

be said that, at the present stage of historical development, systems
of government tend more and more to become a means of attaining a
definite aim: the welfare of the community.

We can try to achieve

this , not through revolution and bloodshed, but through deliberate
and planned reconstruction; not by force of arms , but by ideological
and political efforts.

Are not the latest transformations of the

European countries sufficient proof of this1
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Social conditions have undergone fundamental changes in many
parts of the world.

The sources of imperialistic wars, I venture to

say it openly, have gone.

War is no longer a necessity; it is no

longer a manifestation of life; on the contrary , i t now spells
destruction.

What

is

more , international collaboration , the bui lding

of the worlds future by joint and consclous effort, has become a

vital necessity.
This is the result of historical advancement , as well as the
raison d ' �tre of our Organization and the real basis of its future
success.

That is why it seems to us that the call of our nations is

not a voice crying in the wilderness.

We must answer this call.

It

would be a crime against humanity to al low the nations to endanger their
own

existence �ither through lack of understanding or through the fault

of their leaders .
We maintain that peace--lasting peace�is possible in the world
of to-day .

Will this possibi lity materialize?

We are convinced it

will, provided certain conditions are fulfilled.
Here are a few of the main stipulations:
1.
The complete extermination of Fascism
true democracy.
2.
Intensified collaboration between the
democratization of international relations and
of peace.
3 . Prompt international action to adjust
all countries and speed up the rate of social,
lectual advancement throughout the world.

What Fascism · is , would be superfluous to

and the triumph of
great Powers , the
the indivisibility
cultural levels in
economic, and intel• ".

say

here.

We wish to

stress just one of its characteristics which must awaken a deep
.

loathing in every human being.

'

The essence of Fascism is

its; ibestialt�y
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in the relationship between man and man: out-and-out barbarism.

You

have been made familiar with the manifestations of Fascism by news
paper stories, films, photographs of Oswiecim, Belsen and Majdanek ,
the Nuremberg trials, and Dachau .

But, fortunately, the majority

of you the United Nations, have escaped direct contact with Hitlerism.
We the peoples of continental Europe , know what it is from personal
experience, from the ordeal of five years of occupation .

You have

heard about the gas chambers and the crematorium ovens; our kith and
kin were burnt in them .

As

we

walk through the ruins of Warsaw, we

trample the sacred remains of our brothers and si�ters, whereas your
dead have found decent burial in places of . public worship.
perished as soldiers in glorious battle.

Your sons

Many of ours perished under

torture, stripped of that which is most sublime in man: human dignity.
Believe me, it is not death that is horrible, but the torture
that goes before , inflicted by Nazi butchers; the fact that man is
stripped of his humanity, that he must die like a brute beast simply
because he lived and fought like a hero.
The great Allied leader, General Eisenhower, said, when he visited
the ruins of Warsaw, that he would like to show this monument of German
barbarity to every American soldier, because then they would realize
the purpose of their efforts, the purpose of the sacrifices made by
the American people.
How we wish that each member of this great Assembly could visit
our martyred landl

Then they would witness the degree of suffering

and misfortune wrought by Fascism, and would understand our attitude
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towards it.

They would support our demands that the work of justice

be completed, the seeds of Fascism destroyed.
Although its military might has been smashed , Fascism i s not
extinct.

It st!ll lives.

It lives on in the form of latent seeds

among a reaction�ry minority;

in social classes opposed to progress.

It lives on in conceptions of racial ascendancy fosterep by Hitlerism;
in post-war demoralization and decadence; in the machinations of great
trusts and cartels,

It has spread throughout the world, lurking in

nooks and crannies, lying in ambush and biding its time ; waiting for the
war to be forgotten ; waiting for increased antagonism and a revival of
the influence of private interests and group egoism over the policy of .
the various Governments.
�·

We experienced a similar state of affairs after the first world
war .

It led to the . industrial rebui lding of Germany, rashly financed

by foreign capital, because Hitlerism was backed by the moneyed German
capi talist classes, and because other countries tolerated Germany ' s
aggressive policy and allowed her to re-arm.

And so we had a second

world war.
That is why

we

voice our determination never again to fall into

the errors of the past.

Let us put

forth our

best

efforts

to destroy

the conscious and unconscious seeds of Fascism, even if they be well
disguised.
countries;
cartels.

Let us deprive them of the right of santuary in certain
let us control the activities of the German trusts and
Let us do all in our power to instill,in our peoples faith

in a better future towards which , with their help, the world will
go forward along a smoother path.
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This path is that of true democracy of a political, social,
economic and intellectual democracy.
has just been born.

The idea of such a democracy

Its essence is beginning to take shape.

It is

not surprising that there should be so many differences , and even ·
discrepancies, between our conceptions in this respect, but this will
not be allowed to hamper our common efforts.

We all have some far'

off vision of universal happiness towards which we are striving.
.

.
·

Such happi�ess lies not in material prosperity alone.

Freedom

for the nation and for the individual, an untrammelled spiritual life,
opportunities for the development of creative powers, respect for human
dignity of peoples in international relations, the impregnation of
daily life with great and high ideals all these are almost as important
as the material factors.
Some of us go boldly forward towards this future , with definite
aims in mind, realizing the path we must follow and the methods by
which these aims can be achieved, mobilizing all our strength, making
an almost superhuman effort.

Others allow themselves to be carried

forward by technical, economic and scientific progress, by the spontaneous evolution of history, husbanding their muscles and nerves,
sacrificing less generously the effort of this present generation for
the happiness . of generations to come •

.

Through these two channels, controlled by the great nations,
modern life flows on.

To-day, the two currents are strange to one

another, aloof and sometimes hostile.
or dismayed .

Let us not be discouraged

Life obliges us to harness and control the blind forces,

to keep them in check .

The activities of the United Nations will
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hasten this process.

The goodwill of the great nations and their

leaders will place it on a sound and lasting basis.
That is whf we remain convinced that collaboration between the
great powers--no�withstanding certain appearances--will be intensified and that its blessings will spread to every sphere of life
throughout the globe .

We realize the importance of such collaboration.

To it the nation of Europe owe their liberation from the yoke of
Hitlerism.

Thanks to it, the peoples will be delivered from the
. .....

dread of war and, it may well be from fear of want.

Even to-day-

notwithstanding great and understandable difficulties the fruits of
this life-giving collaboration are already manifest.
The threat of civil war in Euro� has been eliminated.

National

coalition governments are being formed practically all over the continent;
our countries are beginning to raise themselves from their ruins; an
atmosphere of peaceful toil and confidence prevails.

These are the

first-fruits of your collaboration , great nations of the worldl

You

have won the war, and you will win the peace.
Ravaged and decimated as we are, we shall help you with all the
strength of our hands, hearts and brains, just as we helped you by
our sacrifices in the war against Hitler.

The greater our responsi-

bility, the more we shall help you .
This depends primarily on our

own

depends on your attitude towards us.

creative powers, but it also

It would not be to our benefit

or yours nor would it help world progres s , if your strength were to
diminish our responsibility.

To achieve its destiny, the human race

must mobilize all its forces and reject all impediments .
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We must concentrate on one thing only:

to create a collective

psychology, so that we may look to a conunon future and not brood over
the differences�sometimes even the hostility�of the past,

so that

we may follow our guiding star.
To-day�as has been stressed by the British Prime Minister, Hr.
Attlee�each nation ' s destiny is bound up with the destiny of the family
of nations,

just as the destiny of each individual is bound up with

that of the community.
It will be the task of the coming era to bridge the gap between
the individual and the community to form a synthesis and ensure that
the highest values for the individual are social values.

Just as the

principle of indivisible peace has already taken root in our minds,
so the principle of indivisible world happiness is establishing it
self in the consciousness of the nations and their leaders.
To-day these are no longer mere ethical maxims.

They are realities.

If we desire consciously to shape the course of history,

we must know

the laws by which it is governed and help to fulfil them by our j oint
efforts.
Such,

in our view,

are the guiding principles which must preside

over the work of the Economic and Social Council.

Its task is to

establish the most suitable concrete forms of international collaboration
with a view to economic,

social and intellectual reconstruction and progress

in the devastated countries.
Collaboration, we maintain, is not charity.

Considered thus,

the

tremendous sacrifices which the great nations are making to help the
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impoverished and ravaged countries are not only a noble demonstration
of human solidarity, but a w�se and far-sighted contribution to future
world peace and prosperity .

We welcome these sacrifices not only with

our hearts but with our minds.
In making this statement on behalf of martyred Poland, now risen
again , we would stress that the United Nations, in its �ork for the
stabi lization of peace and international collaboration,
lasting and energetic support of the Polish people.

will

have the

DOCUMENT NO.

10,

POLAND' S FOREIGN POLICY, OR. OSCAR LANGE , POLISH

AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES •

The foreign policy of the Republic of Poland is inspired
objectives.

by two

One is the preservation of peace, the other is the

preservation of Poland ' s national independence.
closely interre lated.

Both objectives are

A people in Poland ' s geographical position can

survive as a free and truly independent nation only in a world at
peace .

On the other hand,

the peace of the world cannot be maintained

without a free and independent Poland.

Under no circumstances will

the Polish people give up their national independence, a fact amply
demonstrated by the whole course of Polish history.

Whoever has seen

the ruins of Warsaw, whoever visualizes the fact that six million
people in Poland have given their lives during this war must know
about the Polish people ' s· readiness and ability to resist, 1"t he will
also understand why the preservation of peace is the cornerstone of
Poland ' s foreign policy.
The Polish Provisional Government of National Unity believes
that the preservation of peace depends upon good and friendly cooperation
between the great powers, between the United States and the Soviet
Union, as - well as between each of these and Great Britain and France.

• Poland .2f Today, I (March,

1946) ,

4-5.

159

It desires,

therefore ,

to f�ci litate such cooperation by removing

Poland from any situation which may make her a center of international
trouble.

This policy is the exact opposite of the policy pursued

the former government-in-exile.

by

The government-in-exile sought to

·

create conflict between the Western powers and the Soviet Union and
speculated upon a new world war.

The present Polish Government
'

believes that any major international conflict can only be harmful to
the Polish people and may endanger the very existence of the Polish
nation.
In order to promote the cause of international peace and cooperation Poland allies herself with the democratic and progressive forces
throughout the world.

She demands the isolation and removal of a l l

Fascist centers which have survived the military defeat o f the Axis
and she participates and plays an active role in the international
bodies which have been created by the United Nations.

Poland has

signed the Bretton Woods agreements and will participate in the
International Morletary. Fund and in ·the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Poland has joined the United Nations

Organization and has been elected to serve for two years in the

Security Counci l .

This election constitutes internationa l

recognition of the important place , both economic and politica l , which
Poland occupies in Europe.

At the meetings of the Security Counc i l ,

the Polish delegate pursued a consistent policy of promoting understanding
and adjustment between conflicting interests.
The preservation of Poland ' s national independence requires a
prevention 'of any possible resurgence of German imperialism.
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The problem of Germany must be solved in such a way that Germany can
never become a menace to her neighbors , whatever the relation between
the great powers.

This necessitates complete destruction of Germany ' s

war making capacity and eradication of the social roots of German
imperialism.

In both directions Poland has made a notable contribution.

The acquisition by Poland of the whole of Silesia deprives Germany of a
major part of her war potential.

The expropriation by the Polish Govern

ment of the German industrial barons of Silesia strikes at one of the
foundations of German inperialism.

The acquisition by Poland of East

Prussia and of Pomerania, the expropriation of the Junker estates and the
division of these estates among Polish peasants, destroys the social
breeding-ground of Prussian militarism.

This effect is reinforced by

the agrarian reforms carried out by the Soviet authorities in the part
of Germany occupied by the Red Army .

German feudal barons will no

longer be able to subjugate Slav peasants and to turn them into serfs.
In order to prevent a new resurgence of German imperialism Poland
has also entered into a military alliance with the Soviet Union.

Further

.
more , she pursues a policy of friendly cooperation with Czechoslovakia
and with other Slav nations .

The alliance with the Soviet Union is a

direct consequence of the f ac t

that the absence of such

an

alliance in

1939 made impossible any effective defense of Poland by her Western
Allies and that Poland owes her liberation in 1945 to the Red Army.
Poland and the Soviet Union both distinguish clearly between the role
of an ally and that of a satellite.

Poland is not, and will never

consent to be, a satellite of any power, near or distant.

The Polish

Soviet alliance is based on cooperation between free and equal partners.

161

The policy of preventing a new resurgence of German imperialism does
not rely upon al liance with the Soviet Union alone.

Poland wants to

maintain her alliance with Great Britain and desires to enter into an
alliance with France .

The necessity of supplementing the Polish-Soviet

al liance with the Polish-British and a Polish-French alliance is clearly
recognized by the government of the Soviet Union.

Views to that effect

have been expressed on several occasions by Generalissimo Stalin.
In order to play her role of a truly independent nation, an ally
of her neighbors and of more distant countries, Poland needs a proper
geographical and economic . basis .

Such a basis is provided by the land

transferred to the Polish administration under the Potsdam agreement.
The final international recognition of this territory as an integral
part of the Polish Republic is regarded by the Polish people as a
vital neces�ity for their national independence.

On this question a l l

Poles are perfectly unanimous, whatever other differences there

may be

among them on questions of internal or foreign policy.
The policy of a network of al liances between Poland and the Soviet
Union and between Poland and the countries of Western Europe makes the
Polish Government and people strongly opposed to any idea of a Western
Block in Europe.

Such a Western Block as preached by some people in

France and in Great Britain , is but another form of a cordon sanitaire
directed against the Soviet Union .
such a block must result

Furthermore , in order to be effective,

in re-establishing Germany as a political and

military power to serve as the outpost of anti-Soviet policy.
endangers the peace of Europe.

Thus it

Another consequence would be the emergence

of an Eastern Block under the guidance of the Societ Union.

Frequent
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misunderstandings to the contrary, such an Eastern Block does not exist.
Neither Poland, nor Czecholsovakia, nor the Soviet Union desire i t .

Polish

policy stands for economic and political cooperation of a l l European
countries.

It rejects, however, all plans of unification of Europe in

which the Soviet Union does not participate.
restoration of German hegemony over Europe .

Such plans imply the
The only sound unification

of Europe is one in close cooperation with the Soviet Union as well as
with Great Britain and the United States.
Relations between Poland and the United States are based on a
conunon interest in peace and " in · economic . and social, progress.

'The Polish

people are fully aware of the great role the American armed forces have
played in the defeat of the Axis and they are desirous to maintain the
most freindly relations with the United State s .

In addition t o being

based on a community of democratic ideal s , these relations should be
cemented by close economic relations.

The acquisition by Poland of

.

new industrial regions as well as of a large Baltic coast, will make
her a major maritime nation.
American trade .

This opens new possibi lities for Polish

Poland realizes that American participation in interna

tional security is essential for the effective preservation of peace .
Poland , therefore , greets with great satisfaction the participation of
the United States in the United Nations Organization.

In expression of

the great importance it attaches to this participation , the Polish
delegation at the UNO Preparatory Conference has voted that the United
Nations Organization have its seat in the United States of America.

(Signed)

Oscar Lange

DOCUMENT NO
1 1 , LETTER DATED APRIL 8 , 1946, FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF POLAND ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GEN�RAL•
• .

(

I should like to inform you that I have received �q�tructions
from my Government to draw the attention of the Securit¥ Council to a
·.-

situation of the nature referred to in Article

34 of the Charter.

This situation is due to international frictions resulting �rorn the
existence and activities of the Franco regime in Spain .

In view of .the fact that information about it has already appeared
in press dispatches from Warsaw, I want to inform you that in the
very next day I shall present you with a request to put this matter
on the agenda of the Security Council .

(Signed) Oscar �ange
Ambassador of Ptjland

•security Council-Official Records, First 1ear: First Series, 1946,
Supplements, No. 2 , Annex Ja, (Church House, Westm.inster, London : United
Nations Publications , 1946) 1 54.
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DCX:UMENT

NO. 12, LETTER DATED APRIL 9, 1946, FROM
OF POLAND ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL•

THE

REPRESENTATIVE

On February 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations without
a dissenting vote condemned the fascist regime in Spain as having been
founded "with the support of the Axis Powers" and banned it from membership in the United Nations · on the grounds that "it does not possess by
reason of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association
with aggressor States the qualifications necessary to justify admission."
The Assembly also recommended that the United Nations take this resolution
into account "in conducting their future relations with Spain."'
Since then a series of developments has made it clear that the
activities of the Franco Government have already caused international
friction and endangered international peace and security.

As a consequence

the French Government was compelled on February 2691946, to close the
frontiers between France and Spain.

These frontiers continue to be closed.

One day later the Franco Government ordered the concentration of troops
at the border of France.
Moreover, the Franco regime has given haven to the largest aggregation
of Nazi assets and personnel, it has given refuge

•

to

a large number of war

Security Council-Official Records, First Year: First Series, 1946,
Supplements, No. 2 , Annex 3b, (ahurch House, Westminster, London: United
Nations Publications, 1946) , s .
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criminals and Nazi leaders who continue their activities from Spanish
territory , it al lows and promotes scientific research by German scientist
engaged in devising new means of warfare .
In view of the foregoing, the situation in Spain must be considered
not as an internal affair of that country but as a concern of all the
United Nations.

'
Article 2 of the Charter in paragraph 6 provides that

the United Nations Organization shall ensure that States not Members
of the United Nations act in accordance with · principles of the Organization so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international
peace and security.

The situation in Spain makes the application of

this provision imperative .
The Polish delegation, therefore , under Articles

34

and

35

of the

Charter, requests the Security Counci l to place on its agenda the
situation arising from the existence and activities of the Franco
regime in Spain for consideration and for adoption of such measures as
are provided for in the Cl)arter.
(Signed)
Oscar Lange
Representative of Poland

DOCUMENT NO. 13, ADDITIONAL REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
POLAND TO THE REPORT OF THE SU&"COMMITTEE ON INCIDENTS IN THE
CORFU CHANNEL•

I.

Considering that the main aim of the Sub-Committee of the

Security Council on the Incidents in the Corfu Channel was to "examine
all the available evidence concerning the above mentioned incidents,
and to make a report to the Security Council •
case as disclosed by such evidence", the

•

•

on the facts of the

Polish representative

asked

at various meetings of the Sub-Committee that certain facts established
during the proceedings of the Sub-Committee which are relevant to the
question under consideration should form the main part of the report,
and thus enable all the members of the Security Council to draw certain
conclusions and to form an opinion on the basic questions.
II.

It was agreed by the Sub-Committee that the problem under

consideration could not be solved before the three following questions
were answered:
Ca) Whether explosions on October 22, 1946, caused lose of life
and damage to ships of the Royal Navy when sailing in the Corfu Channel ;
(b) Whethe� a minefield existed i n the Channel on October 2 2 , 1946,
and whether this minefield was unnotified; and

•security Council-Official Records, Second Year, Supplement No. 10,
Appendix I , ( Lake Success, New York: United Nations Publications, 1947) ,
83-87.
·il.66
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(c) Whether this minefield was laid by Albania or with the
connivance of the Albanian Government.
In the opinion of the Polish representative, the proceedings before
the Security Council and the Sub-Committee confirmed only the first
question, while no evidence exists on the remaining two questions.
III.

During the proceedings of the Sub-Corrunittee

.a

certain

number of �acts directly relating to the problem have been established.
I

;

Both in the draft report prepared by the Secretariat and in that prepared
by the chairman of the Sub-Committee, a list of the above-mentioned facts
has been included.

In both cases, the Polish representative was prepared

to accept the reports as a basis for the report of the Sub-Conunittee,
subject to certain minor changes he would propose.

The Polish representative

was prepar:ed to dispense with any conclusions ·if such were imp.lied in the
proposed list of facts, and agreed to include in the report any facts any
other representative might ·consider relevant to the basic problem.
IV.

In the opinion of the Polish representative, the report as

accepted at the meeting of the Sub-Committee on March 1 2 , 1947t · .does· ·not
represent a report "on the facts of the case" , and therefore does not
fulfil the task set forth by the Security ·Councif for the Sub-Committee.
The Polish representative had no objections to the main parts of the
report; however, he could not accept it as such and reserved for himself
the right to submit an additional report on the facts established during
the proceedings of the Sub-Committee.
V.

In the opinion of the Polish representative , the following

facts · established

on

the basis of evidence should be taken into con-

sideration by the Security Council , when pronouncing itself
qUestions:

on

the two
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(a)
1946, and
(b)

Whether a minefield existed in the Corfu Channel on October 2 2 ,
Whether this minefield was laid by Albania or with the connivance

of the Albanian Government.
A.

·

Facts relating to the situation prior t o the explosion
1.

The existence of a German minefield CPS directly in the vicinity

of the explosion and the question whether the incident could have been
caused by floating mined or mines remaining from a previously swept field.
2.

General Hodgson , chief of the British Military Mission in Albania,

in a note addressed to the General Staff of the Albani an National Army
on January 2 5 ,

1945,

said that even the channels of navigation declared

open were not safe and ships navigating in them did so at their own risk.
3.
On May 29, 1946, the Government of the United Kingdom received the
.
text of a note which the United States representative had received from

the Albanian Chief of Staff warning the authorities concerned that vessels
must not sail in Albanian territorial waters without notification.
B.

Facts relating to the situation in the channe l during explosions
4.

The heavy Bri tish cruisers passed through the alleged rather dense

minefield without being damaged,
5.

whi le lighter ships struck the mines.

A west wind of 15 to 20 miles per hour was blowing the ships

toward the Albanian shore .6.

The first explosion occurred at 1 4 . 5 3 , while the second explosion

occurred at 1 6 . 1 6 .

The difference is nearly one hour and a quarter ,

during which time the vessels had been maneuvering in the alleged mine
field without being struck by mines.

c.

Facts relating to the situation i n the channel after the explosion

7.

On October 2 9 ,

1946,

three UNRRA barges passed through the alleged

minefield undamaged.

8.

No explosion occurred during the operations of the British Navy

in the Channel on November 1 2 ,
o.

prior to the minesweeping .

Facts relating to the minesweeping on November 13
9.

The Mediterranean Zone Board agreed to ask the Central Board to

request the concurrence of the Albanian Government for a check sweep of
those parts of the Medri routes which passed- through Albanian territorial
waters .
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10.

The Central Mine Clearance Board had decided that the clearance

of mines from the Corfu Channel shou ld be carried out only after the
approval of the Albanian Government had been obtained.

The British and Greek representatives rejected the Yugoslav and
Soviet proposal that Albania should be invited to participate in mine

11.

clearance of her coastal waters.

12.

The responsibility for the minesweeping of the Corfu Channel was

laid by the Mediterranean Zone Board upon Greece but the Commander of the
British Naval Forces unilaterally ordered Greek forces to undertake other
tasks than those assigned by the Board .

13.

The French naval officer, Commander Mestre, who was present as an

observer during the minesweeping on November

14, was invited by the British

Command without the knowledge of the Mediterranean Mine Clearance Board,
and without its authorization.

14.

The statement of the Albanian representative allowed a possibility

that mines could have been laid under cover of darkness without the know
ledge of the Albanian coastal authorities.

15.

No evidence exists that the fragments of the mines which caused

the explosions on October

2 2 , 1946, are identical with the mines found
1 3 , 1946.

during operations of November

16.

All the mines found on November

17.

Exhibit VIII presented by the representative of the United

been in the water less than two months .

13, .were brand-new and could have

Kingdom shows that the mine' nearest to the Albanian shore , allegedly
found on November 13, was 525 yards from the shore, while the British
statement places the mine only

18.

300 yeards from the shore .

Actual laying of mines requires about fifteen minutes for eight

mines from one mine-laying vessel.

19.

On February

20, 1947, Lloyd ' s listed that forty-five ships were

sunk by mine s and sixty-four had been damaged since the end of hostilities.
In addition, eight-six smal l vessels under 500 gross tons were sunk and
thirty-one were damaged.

VI.

The Polish representative stated at various meetings of the

Sub-Committee that no evidence is available as to the existence of the
minefield on November

13 , 1946.

There is only a British statement in

this respect, and as the United Kingdom is a party to the dispute this
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statement cannot be accepted as evidence .
VII.

The Polish representative held the opinion that the statement

of Convnander Mestre cannot be taken into consideration as evidence as
it contains several contradictions.

Commander Mestre states that the

resu lt of the sweeping on November 1 3 , 1946, was twenty-two mines, but
he indicates that he only saw eight mines during the first and second
lap.

In his statement of November 16, he says

�hat

two mines were

brought ashore , one of which he examined, while the other could not
be examined because of the darkness.

On November 2 3 , he states that

"owing to the difficulty of getting ashore before nightfall I was not
able to examine them personally on shore . "

On November 16, Commander

Mestre described the mines as German mines of the type GR, while on
November 23, the mine shown to him in Malta he described as a German
mine type GY which is much larger in diameter and differs so much in
shape from the GR type that the fact that the mines were submerged in
water does no

�

justify the error , especially as on November 16, Commander

Mestre stated that he examined one mine on the shores of Corfu .

Commander

Mestre ' s report does not give any location of the mines or of the mine
sweeping operation except for the description of a general character
that the operation took place in the Corfu Channe l .
VIII.

At various meetings of the Sub-Committee the Polish

representative pointed out that, although many of the British al legations
and Albanian counter-allegations have no direct bearing on the answer to
the basic questions, they should be taken into consideration for the
purpose of understanding the whole atmosphere of the mutual relations ·
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between the United Kingdom and Albania, which in his opinion was responsible

�

for allowing this question to develop into a dispu e before the Security
Council.

DOCUMENT NO. 14, JULIUSZ KATZ-SUCHY ' S LAST SPEECH IN THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL, DECEMBER 30, 1947•

The end of the year is the traditional time for looking back over
the record of accomplished work .

For the Polish delegation, this date

also marks the end of its term as a non-permanent member of the Security
Council and I should therefore like to review briefly its position during
the two years of its membership in this principal o�gan of the United
Nations.
It was a great privilege indeed, and at the same time

a

great

responsibility, to be elected by the United Nations during its first
General Assembly as a member of the Security Council.

No doubt those

who wanted to see Poland represented on the Security Council took into
consideration the role Poland played during the war, its sufferings
during the period of German occupation and the great contribution of the
Polish nation which fought in accordance with our best historic traditions on all the fronts�in the air, on the seas, on land and in the
underground.
The Polish delegation has always considered that it represented on
the Security Council not only itself, or even the regional group from

•

security Council-Official Records, Second Year, No. 108, 225th
Meeting , December 30, 1947, (Lake Success, New York: United Nations
Publications, 194 7 ) , 5-11.
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which i t has been chosen , but all the United Nations.
Its attitude in all problems which were brought before the Council
was dictated,

therefore , not only by its own national interests.

Its

primary consideration was given to the interests of peace and security.
It has always acted in accordance with the letter and spirit of the
Charter .

It has always considered as its paramount duty to serve the

fundamental interests of the United Nations . and not the interests of
one country or of a group of countries.

This principle has guided it

during its two years of work in the Security Counc i l , as well as in
every other organ of the United Nations on which it was represented .
The war against fascism has taught us that peace is indivisible
and collective;

and that wherever it is threatened, the security,

peace and the freedom of our people are equally endangered .
Pole,

therefore ,

the

To every

the United Nations, representing the universal interest

in the maintenance of peace and security, represents at the same time
the primary and principal interest of the Polish nation.
taught us that only by a common effort of all nations,

The war has

small and large,

can we maintain and guarantee the peace.
At the same time, we have learned that the role in maintaining
the peace varies, and that much more responsibility in this matter is
to be assumed by the big Powers .

This is a lesson of life which we

learned at the gravest hour of our nation, much stronger than any theory
invented in a school or in a laboratory .

It was our desire,

therefore ,

to continue this new form of international collaboration, born in our
conunom fight against the enemy of humanity and embodied in the structure

174

of the United Nations,

in the special position of the Security Council

and of the permanent members of the Council.
We accepted the fact that at the very basis of the Organization of
the United Nations lies the principle of understanding and compromise.
This is the only way the United Nations can work and achieve its purposes.
Whenever possible,

therefore,

my

delegation has attempted

to bring

about

such compromise and understanding and it was one of those which always�
although often in vain�called for understanding .

I

must confess that the realization of the existing disagreements

is by no means gratifying .

We understand , however, that this cannot

be ascribed to the special position the five permanent members enjoy.
We have opposed the clamour and propaganda of those who th�ght that
by abolishing these special rights they can improve the entire Organization.
We fully understand that we are living in a transitional period when the
effects of the war are still in process of liquidation and when the
differences and disputes between the major Allies are much greater than
at the time when we were faced with one great problem--victory over the
I
/

enemy.

My Government believes, however, that agreement on all the controversial
issues is not only possible but most essential.

The preliminary require-

ment for such an agreement, which might become the foundation of harmonious
co-operation,

is -a proper understanding of the differences in approach to

various international problems .

Every effort must be made to lessen these

differences in the approach to various problems

by

having mutual respect

and by constantly bearing in mind the final goal of all of us�peace.
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Only by working together can we win the peace as we have won the war.
The Polish delegation spoRe in the Security Council for those
countries which wished to see this collaboration maintained , strengthened
and extended.

We based our conception of international collaboration

on the principles of law, justice and national sovereigrty, rejecting
violence, force <Pld any form of pressure.

We rejected: also the alleged

solidarity which resembles the solidarity between the : porse and the rider.
Our will for peac� is dictated not by weakness, but by pur moral strength.
We wanted the united Nations ., and the Security Council in particular, to
be organs of harmonious co-operation for the maintenance of peace and
general prosperity.

It is not the fault of the Polish delegation that

many of these ai�s have not been achieved and many a problem has remained
unsettled.
Considering that fascist centres, if al lowed to continue, may become
a source of political complications and endanger the peace, the Polish dele
gation submitted to the Security Council and later to the General Assembly
a proposal to extinguish the centres of fascist unrest and aggression in
Spain and thus to bring to an end the regime brought about by the war
which Germany and Italy waged against the Spanish people.

We found,

however, with regret , that a bloc of nations, contrary to their

own

interests and acting against the will of the majority, has made impossible even the simple re-affirmation of the resolution of the General
Assembly of December 12, 1946.
It was not Poland which supported the monarcho-fascist regime of
terror and civil war in Greece .

We have consistently tried, along with
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all the nations which defend the cause of peace and security, to
liquidate that centre of civil war which constitutes a great danger
to south-eastern Europe .

We opposed those who, in spite of the unanimous

resolution that no foreign aid should be used for political purposes ,
went on pouring cµins, ammunition and money to keep the fires of civil
war burning, notwithstanding the fact that at the same time most war
stricken nations of Europe were being refused economic aid for re
construction, aid which is due to them , and that the refusal was
motivated by purely political reasons.
We strongly advocated the withdrawal of foreign troops from the
territory of war-torn Greece and demanded that the Greek nation, which

has a glorious tradition of fighting for freedom, should be al lowed
the right of self-government according to its own will, without foreign
intervention.
Bearing in mind the General Assembly ' s resolution of December 1 4 t
1946, we demanded , i n conformity with the principles o f sovereign
equality of nations, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Greece,
from Indonesia, from Egypt and from Palestine.
Poland demanded an effective disarmament and an effective control

of weapons of mass destruction.

Having started disarmament in

ou

r

own

country , we submitted plans both for disarmament of conventional
weapons and for control of atomic energy .
progress has been made ,

Instead, we find that no

that atomic bombs are being manufactured and

stockpiled, that experiments with new weapons are being continued and
that a threat of bacteriological war is becoming real.

We wanted to
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end the war of nerves which was started on August s , 1945, by the blast
in Hiroshima and which since has been fought in the hearts and minds
of the conunon people of the world.

We wanted to see the warmongers

branded and outlawed and mutual confidence installed in their place,
because what is lacking most in our work is mutual confidence .
All these set-backs, however, have not undermined the confidence
of our people in the United Nations.

We continue to stand firmly on

the principles of the Charter which we have signed and we fight for
the sanctity of all treaties and agreements which have been concluded •.
In the framework of our foreign policy we shall continue to
participate actively in the solution of all international problems
and shall not confine ourselves to the role of spectators.

We shall

vigorously attempt to influence the course of events and, acting in
conformity with our right to national existe�ce, we shall fight to re
strain aggression and to bring about a consolidation of all constructive
forces for peace.

We shall try to steer the course of national feelings

and world economy on the road to peace and to strengthen the dearly
bought independence and sovereignty of the nations of &urope.

We shall

try to consolidate the efforts of all Member States in order to assure
the economic reconstruction of the world and to bring a.bout a gene�al
prosperity based on new economic foundations.

It is another lesson of

this past war that not only peace and war are indivisible--prosperity
is indivisible as well.
There is no return to a Europe of the past.

The economic and

political structure of that Europe was the cause of the war.

We note
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with regret the attempt to eliminate dictinctions between aggressors
and victims, between those who supported the aggressor under the cover
of neutrality and those who carried the heavy burden of the war to the
very end.
New criteria are being put forward and from them derive the claims
for help and reconstruction of Germany at a time when her victims are
being barred from most needed commodities.

History teaches that the

economic hegemony of Germany has always resulted in political hegemony
and that both have then created the war machinery which in time was
let loose.
If it is possible today , on this side of the Atlanti.ci:·,. � to· Jthinlc' :
of war, I say that to my people, who twice in one generation have seen
world war and occ:Upation , 1 to the men and women · of Warsaw who are being
denied mechanical tools and with their bare hands are removing the
rubble from the streets of Warsaw , the very thought of war is beyond
the realm of possiblity.

That is why we say that there is no return

to a Germany which may become a centre for future aggression .
In the coming year the Security Council will be faced with many
difficu lt problems which will require speedy solution.

The war in

Indonesia is still being fought, Franco is still oppressing the people
of Spain, foreign troops are maintained in many countries and the
majority of the people of Greece are still forced to tolerate a Govern
ment imposed upon them.
The peoples of the world ex{>ect from the Security Council that
in the next year it should bring about real disarmanent and solve all

the problems of int�rnational collaboration and the problem of placing .
an international police force at the disposal of the Security Council.
My Government is watching with great anxiety the developments in
Palestine which may require the intervention of the Security Counci l .
I may assure members that even from outside the Security Council
we shall continue to watch

their efforts with the greatest of interest,

and we pledge here again our full support of all new decisions which
may lead to the realization of the aims of the Charter,

because peace

in our time and for future generations depends upon it.
On his way to the Congress of the Socialist Party,

the chief

repre ·sentative of Poland, Mr . Oscar Lange, whose name will always be
associated with Poland ' s work in the United Nations during its first
two years of existence ,

sent to us the following letter addressed to

the members of the Security Council, which , with the permission of
the President, I shall now read:
'Ir

regret very much that urgent political business at home

prevents me from participating personally in this meeting of the
Security Counci l ,
Poland.

which is the last attended by the representative of

I should like, however,

to take this occasion to express my

words of appreciation for the freindly co-operation shown to me by
all my colleagues · and by those with whom I have been associated during
the two years of Poland ' s term - in the Security Council.

It was a great

honour for my country to have been entrusted with the high office of
membership in the Security Council.

To me, personally,

it has been a

great privilege to be associated with and to be a colleague of all of you.
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ttAs the representative of a non-permanent member of the ·security
Council, elected by the General Assembly ,

the representative of Poland

has always considered himself as a mandatary of all the United Nations,
a mandatary entrusted with the responsibility for international peace
and security.

It is this responsibility which shou ld take precedence

over any narrow nationalist or special interest.

I have tried to live

up ot it according to the best of my conscience and wisdom.

It is not

for me to judge to what extent I have been successfu l .
"As the representative of a non-permanent member of the Security
Counc i l ,

the representative of Poland has always been conscious of the

special role entrusted by the Charter to the permanent members.

This

role, which resu lts from fundamental facts of history which none of us
can change , imposes on the permanent members a special duty ,
of seeking agreement and conciliation,

the duty

the duty of refraining from

using this Council or any other organ of the United Nations as a means
for organizing groups of countries or world opinion against any of the
Powers.
ttThe representative of Poland has made every effort to promote
agreement among the members of the Security Council,
among the

permanent members.

Such efforts

particularly · ·

were made by Mr. Modzelewski

in connexion with the Greek question during the sessions in London .
Such efforts were made by myself, or by my colleague ,

Mr. Katz-Suchy ,

in connexion with the questions of Iran, Spain and Greece ,

in connexion

With the problems of admissions to membership of disarmament and atomic
energy , of the armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security
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Council and many others.

Some of the efforts were successfu l , others

were not, but we are not di scouraged because we firmly believe in the
future of the United Nations and in the special role entrusted to the
Security Council within the framework of our Organization.

As firm

supporters of the United Nations, we have done everything in our power
to maintain the authority of the Security Council, for example, in the
cases of Indonesia and Egypt.

For the same reason we advocated rapid

and radical disarmament, a position which my Government continues to
uphold.
. "I should like to convey my greetings· to the new members of the
Security Council.

I wish thE?¥ will stay in my memory.

The personal

assibilities which, by the wish of the General Assembly, have been
assigned to them.
"For me personally, the time spent as a member of the Security
Council will always remain one of the most valuable periods of my
life.

The debates we have had and all those who participated in them

will stay in my memory.
continue.

For this reason

assembled at this table.
a

The personal associations formed will,

I hope ,

I refrain from taking leave of my friends

Instead, I wish them all a happy New Year;

year of successful work for the benefit of the United Nations."

(Signed)

Oscar Lange
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I

have been acting with the Polish delegation in various capacities

during the past year and a half.

The time I have been associated with

the Security Council I shall always consider as the most important
period of my . life.

It was a great honour and privilege to be allowed

to be associated with its members, to learn statesmanship from all of
them and to represent Poland in the Security Council.
With the end of the year, let me wish all the members of the
Security Council personally, to their Governments and to the people
they represent, every happiness and success in their work .
I should like to convey my greetings to the new members of the
Security Council.

My special greetings go to the Ukrainian Soviet

Socialist Republic which , in accordance with the principle of equitable
geographical distribution , and in spite of the ill effects of those
who wanted to see it barred, is taking Poland' s place on the Security
Counci l .
Le t me once more express my thanks for the help I have been given
here by all the members of the Secutity Council and their delegations,
by the Secretary-General, Mr. Trygve Lie, by the Assistant Secretary
General, Mr . Sobolev, and by all the members of the Secretariat and
the Press who, in their

various capacities,

have made

our work possible.

To all of you then go rrry best wishes at this solemn moment.
(Signed) Juliusz Katz-Suchy
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